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INTROOOCTION 
Polish foreign aff aira have been a failure throughout n..ach of modern 
and contemporary history because Poland has not been in a position to con­
duct an independent foreign policy. As a result of the high degree of 
dominance in all facets of Eastern European affairs by the u. s. s. R. 
after World War II, Poles again have been lcept from attaining complete 
independence. Thia has led sane observers to conclude that Poland has 
become completely insignificant within international diplomacy since 
1945. 
The failure of Polish diplomacy is aptly illustrated in the history 
of Poland's diplomatic activities in the United Nations, the main con­
cern of this paper. Chapter I reviews the situation in Poland during and 
immediately following World War II. The war had left Poland devastated 
and completely powerless-politically, socially, economically, and diplo­
matically. The Soviet Union clearly sought to establish a postwar Polish 
regime that was sympathetic to the Soviets. The complex situation which 
evolved in Poland from 1939 to 1945 must be carefully scrutinized to fully 
comprehend the conditions surrounding the eventual restructuring of the 
Polish nation. The new Polish �rovisional Government of National Unity 
was established in mid 1945 as a result of the recorcsnendations of the 
Big Three (U. s. A., u. s. s. R., and Great Britain) at the Yalta Con­
ference. The Weatem Powers were unable to control the complicated chain 
iii 
iv 
of political events in Poland after the Yalta decisions. Provisions of the 
Yalta agreements stated that "free and unfettered elections" would be held 
as soon as possible. Amid denunci:ations and accusations from the West, 
the Polish elections took place in 1947 and resulted in cOl'llplete victo� 
for the pro-Soviet parties. 
As the new pro-S:bviet Polish government tried to establish itself o� 
the international scene after the var, numerous proble11s developed as 
efforts were made to select capable, loyal diplomats to fill her embassies 
abroad. Usually the person selected to represent Poland abroad as chief 
delegate or ambassador vas a little-trusted, but well-known individual. 
This delegate was then assigned deputies who were of ten incompetent in 
foreign affairs, but highly respected in the Communist Party. The deputies 
reported the activities of the embassy back to the Warsaw regime. Develop­
ments as the first Polish delegation to the United Nations came to New York 
in 1946 support this diplomatic appointment procedure. Oscar Lange, a well• 
known former American citizen and University of Chicago economics professor, 
was named chief Polish delegate. Lange was undeniably pro-Soviet, as 
many of his state�nts distinctly illustrate. However, he did hold clearly 
defined ideas of a Polish state functioning independently of both the 
United States and the u. s. s. R. The record in Chapter II presents the 
course of Lange's activities in the United Nations during 1946 and 1947. 
Early in 1946 Poland's delegation, under Lange's leadership, made a careful 
attempt to maintain an independent foreign policy as a non-permanent mem­
ber of the United Nation's Security Council. These efforts, however, ended 
with Lange's removal from the United Nations in the fall of 1947. 
Juliuaz Katz-Suchy, and avid pro-Soviet �nist, vas naiaed to succeed 
v 
Lange. The replacement of Lange as chief Polish delegate to the United 
Nations ended any evidence of Polish independence in the Security Council. 
In certain periods Poland has been able to acquire more independence 
from the u. s. s. R. in domestic affairs than any of the other Eastern 
European nations. Polish foreign relations , however, have remained large-
ly dominated by the Soviet Union, except for brief periods of time around 
l 
Stalin's death in the early 1950's and the Polish revolution in 1956. With 
the increase of Polish domestic.independence muc� speculation has been 
made concerning the possibilities of alterations in Polish foreign affairs. 
In its concluding chapter this paper discusses some of the speculation. 
In this speculation one finds Poland's hope for achieving a chance to trans-
form her diplomatic failure into a new opportunity for some achievement. 
The major P<>rUon of the research for this paper was conducted at the 
University of Illinois. Since World War II there has been an abundance of 
material on Poland published, much of it highly sentimental toward the 
non-Cbmmunists. Numerous books, monographs, and articles can be found, but 
these must be handled with the utmost apprehension. For this study the 
records of the United Nations (Official Records .2f � General Assembly, 
1946-; Security Council-Official Records, 1946--; and Yearbook .2!!!:!! 
United Nations, 12!2--> were the major sources of evidence. 
Chapters I and III are not meant to be all-inclusive accounts of pre-
war Poland and affairs after 1948, .prepared to answer every question which 
might arise. These chapters are merely accumulations of necessary information, 
from numerous sources , that help provide a smooth entry into and exit from 
the time period 1946-1947 in Polish foreign affairs. The material in 
Chapter IV, stressing the current fluidity in Polish internal and exter-
nal affairs, uses conclusions from many articles, aside from my own opinions. 
CHAPTER'! 
POLAND IN WORLD WAR II 
AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE POLISH QUESTION, 1939-1948 
Poland emerged from World War II devastated. Her population had 
been fragmented, most of her industry destroyed, her agricultural fields 
ravaged, and many of her cities, including her capital, Warsaw, almost 
I 
entirely destroyed. The Polish populace was split intb numerous 
political factions either supporting or opposing Soviet influence in 
varying degrees. 
Long before the hostilities had ceased in Europe, it became evident 
that the peace settlement was not going to find an easy solution to 
Poland's numerous problems. General principles to be followed in the 
re-establishment of a Polish government were tentatively agreed upon and 
laid down by Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, United States President 
Franklin o. Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at 
the Yalta Conference in February, 1945. In the first meetings it became 
clear that the u. s. s. R. planned to establish a Communist regime 
in Poland, disregarding any promises made at Yalta in February, 1945. 
The Soviets intended to reconstruct all of Eastern Europe to accom-
modate their own security system. "Allied cooperation became at 
most a formality, with Soviet armed forces, Soviet diplomats, and 
local Communists cooperating closely to ensure the establishment of 
1 Communist controlled regimes." 
1 Leland M. Good.rich and Anne P. Simmons, The United Nations and the 
Maintenance£! International Peace � Security (Washington, D. c7 Th; 
Brooklings Institution, 1955), P• 36. 
1 
The dismal conditions in Poland were the result of many complex 
and long range developments. The political situation in the country 
from 1939 to 1945 had been extremely chaotic and tragic. Without a 
declaration of war German troops had advanced into Poland from the 
.west, south, and north on September 1, 1939. France and Great Britain 
declared war on Germany two days later� The Polish forces resisted 
but were easily overpowered by the technically and numerically superior 
German army. Within two weeks the Germans had occupied Brest and 
Bialystok; they had surrounded Warsaw and were marching toward Lwow. 
The Red Army attacked Poland from the east on September-17,1939, in 
accord with the Nazi-Soviet agreement$ of August 23 and 28. The Soviet 
troops met little resistance as they·sought a portion of eastern Poland, 
populated by Ukrainians and Belorussians.2 
The Polish government of President Ignacy Moscicki and the commander 
of the army, Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly, had left Warsaw on September 
6 and 7 and a few days later entered Rumania. On September 27 the 
Polish capital, under siege from ground and air attacks, capitulated 
after a valiant resistance effort. Most of the open Polish resistance 
was terminated when the troops of General Franciszek Kleeberg surrended 
near Kock, southeast of Warsaw on October 5, 1939.3 
2For more information on Polish-Soviet and Polish-German relations 
before the war see: Bohdan Basil Budurowycz, Polish-Soviet Relations, 
1932-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Diplomat in 
Beri'in, 1933-1939, Papers and Memoirs of Jozef Lipski, Ambassador-to 
Poland, ed. wacTaw Jedrzejewlcz (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1968); and Russo-Polish Relations, ed. Serge Konovalov (London: The 
Cresset Press, 1945). 
3 
Feliks Gross, "The Fate of Poland," Journal of Central European 
Affairs, VIII (October, 1948), PP• 243-245. 
� 
2 
.) 
On September 28, 1939, the Germans and the Soviets established 
a new boundary defining the German and Soviet spheres of interest. 
The agreement, signed in Moscow by Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet Foreign 
Minister, and Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
fixed a Soviet-German border along the San and Bug rivers, then westward 
to Bialystok. Gdynia,  Bydgoszcz, Poznan, Katowice, Lodz and Plock became 
a part of the Ger11an Reich. The remainder of the German occupied territory 
was set up in four districts as a General-Government. The four districts 
were Warsaw, Lublin, Radom and Cracow, where the governor-general Hans 
4 Frank resided. 
Thousands of Jews were deported from Germany into the General-
Government and became forced laborers or prisoners along with many 
Poles from the newly-annexed regions. Thousands of Germans were settled 
by the Reich.in the former Polish western territory. The Poles who re-
mained in the annexed areas were subjected to a vigorous Germanization 
program. The General-Government was, of course, completely administered 
by Germans. All educational institutions were either taken over by the 
Germans or closed. Polish literature and history was prohibited. In-
human and savage treatment of the Poles began during the initial days 
of the German occupation with mass executions and ruthless persecution 
5 in the numerous concentration camps. 
4 Louis Gottschalk and Donald Lach , � Transformation � Modern 
Europe (New York: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1954), pp. 856-857. 
5 See: Tadeusz Cyprian, Nazi Rule in Poland, trans. Edward Rathert 
(Warsaw: Polonia Publishing 'iiOU'Se ,  196Tr; and William F. Gingerich, 
The German Administration of the General Government of Poland, 1939-1941 
(Washington, o. c., 1949) .- - -
-
Portions of the Polish territory occupied by the Soviets were 
integrated into the Soviet Ukraine and Belorussia. The remaining 
area, including Vilnius, was annexed to Lithuania which became a re-
public of the Union of Soviet-Socialist Republics on August 3, 1940. 
The Soviets deported many Poles to Siberia and Central Asia. Even 
though the procedure was largely a random matter, the deportations 
were carried out under the pretense that these persons were political 
activists or radical members of the former Polish administration. 
Later, in 1941 when the German troops began to inove into the u. s. s. R., 
Galicia was annexed to the General-Government. Other former Polish 
provinces became parts of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and 
Reichskommissariat Ost. The Poles in these areas now saw Soviet 
brutality replaced by Nazi barbarism.6 
President Moscicki had left Poland for Rumania and was interned 
there. Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz, as Moscicki's successor, established the 
Polish government-in-exile in Paris and, after the collapse of France, 
moved to LOndon. A Polish army of about 85,�00 men was organized out 
of Polish wartime refugees and other persons of Polish descent already 
abroad. General Wladyslaw Sikorski was designated commander-in-chief 
of the new Polish army. As part of the Allied forces, the Polish 
troops made an impressive record for themselves, in battles throughout 
World War II. Sikorski also became Prime Minister of the Polish govern-
ment-in-exile which was more representative of all the Polish political 
7 parties than the prewar Polish government. 
6 Gottchalk and Lach, .22• .£!!•• PP• 857-858. 
7 
James F. Morrison, � Polish People's Republic (Baltimore& The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1968) , pp. 3-28. 
4 
A Polish underground resistance movement began to crystallize 
within Poland promptly after the German invasion in 1939.8 The "Victory 
of Poland Service0 was initiated on September 27, 1939; this was later 
called the "Union for Armed Struggle" (January, 1940). The Polish 
government-in-exile designated a representative inside Poland in August, 
1940. Even though political parties were illegal in Poland under the 
German occupation, subversive activities and sabotage were led by the 
"Union for Armed Struggle." 
Nazi aggression against the Soviet Union abruptly ended Soviet-
German friendship established on August.23, 1939, by the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviets began to praise the Western Powers in 
order to obtain military assistance. A Polish-Soviet agreement of 
cooperation during the wa.r was reached on July 30, 1941, in London.9 
The agreement called for the creation of a Polish army in the Soviet 
Union to be recruited from Polish prisoners of war and from the Poles 
who had been deported to Russia during the preceding two years of 
Soviet occupation of Poland. The agreement also canceled all earlier 
8Polish activities during the war are discussed in: Wladyslaw 
Anders, An Army in Exile (New York: Macmillan, 1949); Ann Su Cardwell, 
Poland Here-rs-the Record-An American View (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The 
Michigan-committee of AmerTCans for PoTaiia', 1945); Jan Karski, Story 
of a Secret State (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1944); and Stefan 
'R'Oroonski, Fighting Warsaw; � Story .2f the Polish Underground State, 
1939-�, trans. F. B. Czarnomski (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968). 
9 
For further information on Polish-Soviet relations see: w. w. 
Kulski, "The Lost Opportunity for Russian-Polish Friendship, "Foreign 
Affairs,� (July, 1947), pp. 677-685; and Documents on Polish-Soviet 
Relations, 1939-1945, General Sikorski Historical Institute (LOndon: 
Heinemann, �>:--
5 
6 
agreements concerning Polish boundary changes between the Germans and· 
the Soviets.10 Poland concluded these agreements in spite of the atrocities 
which the Soviets had implemented against the Polish people during the pre-
vious two years. The Polish government-in-exile not only forgot earlier 
hardships rut also trusted that the agreements would lead to a new period 
11 of Soviet-Polish cooperation. 
A Polish army was organized with General Wladyslaw Anders as commander 
after a Polish-Soviet military agreement was signed on August 14, 1941, 
in Moscow. Prime Minister Sikorski and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin jointly 
signed a Polish-Soviet declara�on of friendship on December 5, 1941, 
. 
12 assigning the Polish military forces to the eastern front. 
"At this time Stalin believed that he could sway General Sikorski's 
government to follow a pro-Soviet policy. The very first parleys, however, 
showed the Polish government's unwillingness to be subservient to Soviet 
policy and, even more, to recognize the Soviet annexation of nearly half 
13 of Poland's territory in 1939." According to Rakowski, even as early 
as December, 1941, the Polish pro-Soviet leaders met at Saratov to discuss 
formation of the Union of Polish Patriots, a pro-Soviet Polish organization. 
This meeting was called to concur with Sikorski's negotiations in Moscow, 
10 See Annex II , Document No. 1, p. 129. 
11Manfred Kridl, "Poland and R\.issia in the Past and in the Future," 
Journal .2f Central European Affairs, V (July, 1945), pp. 148-149. 
12 See Annex I I ,  Document No. 2, p. 130-131. 
13 Tadeusz Rakowski, Foreign Policy 2!, � Communist Regime in Poland-
Techniques � Functions, .!2.12,-� (New York: Mid-Eu.t"opean Studies Center 
of the National Committee for a Free Europe, 1953), P• 26. 
showing Sikorski that the Russians really did not need his cooperation. 
If Sikorski refused to accept the Soviet suggestions, they would organize 
a Polish puppet government. In fact the Union of Polish Patriots was not 
made official until March 1 ,  1943.
14 
From the very outset the Polish and Soviet governments did not work 
in harmony. Early in 1942 it was obvious that relations were growing 
more strained. In March and April, 1942, some of the Polish military 
divisions were assigned to the Middle East. By August all of the Polish 
troops had left the Soviet Union. Relations between the Polish govern-
ment-in-exile and the Soviet authorities continued to erode during the 
remainder of 1942 and early 1943. The announcement in April, 1943, of 
the discovery of mass graves of over 14,000 Polish officers in the Katyn 
Forests near Smolensk caused further deterioration in Polish-Soviet 
relations. The Germans charged that the Soviets had conunitted the 
massacres in April, 1940, while the Soviets accused the Germans of the 
crime. The Polish government of General Sikorski requested that the 
International Red Cross make an investigation of the murders. Even 
though the Red Cross refused to examine the area, which was eventually 
investigated by Swiss officials, the Soviet government severed diplomatic 
relations with the Polish government in London on April 25, 1943, saying 
that the Polish government's attitude toward the Katyn massacres was 
hostile to the Soviet Union.15 
14Ibid., P• 27. 
15 For further details see: J. K. Zawodny, Death !!l .!h! Forest: 
�Story _2! �  Katyn Massacre (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1962). 
7 
The Union of Polish Patriots in the u. s. s. R. now increased their 
vigorous progaganda campaign against the Polish government-in-exile in 
London. The Union was preparing to accept the role of the Soviet­
recognized Polish government. The Union attempted to establish in­
fluence abroad by publishing a pro-Soviet periodical, Poland, in London. 
In the United States the Kosciuszko League was founded and strongly 
advocated Polish cooperation with the Soviets through the Union of 
Polish Patriots. One of the leaders of the Kosciuszko League was Oscar 
Lange , who was later selected as the postwar Polish ambassador to the 
United Nations. Prominent members of the Union of Polish Patriots were: 
Wanda Wasilewska., the daughter of a distinguished Polish Socialist and 
former Polish government official1 Andrzej Witos, a step-brother of the 
former Polish prime minister and Peasant Party leader Wincenty Witos; 
Boleslaw Drobner; Stanislaw Skzesjewski; Stanislaw Radkiewicz; Jakub 
Berman; Stefan Jedrychowski; Jozef Brubecki; J. Haneman; and E. 
Sommerstein. Rakowski states that the only ones of these even known 
to the Polish people were Andrzej Witos and Wanda Wasilewska. These 
two had been specifically included in the Union because of their con­
nection with formerly important Polish political families. The Soviets 
16 felt that these names would sufficiently deceive the Polish people. 
The spring and summer of 1943 brought about significant alterations 
in the plans for a postwar Polish state. General Sikorski was killed 
in an airplane crash near Gibraltar on July 4 ,  1943. This brought about 
16 Rakowski,  .22• ill•, P.• 27. 
8 
9 
a reorganization of the Polish government in London. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, 
the leader of the Peasant Party, became the new prime minister. The new 
commander of the Polish army, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, proceeded 
to reform the army which had recently been transferred to Iraq from the 
Soviet Union. 
The Soviets had organized from the Union of Polish Patriots, a new 
representative body for the Polish state, the Polish Liberation Committee, 
along with an additional Polish army more on the Soviet model. The split 
between the Soviets and the Polish government in London had made this 
necessary if the Soviets wished to have any influence in Poland after the 
17 war. 
The question of future Polish boundaries had been ignored by the West 
up until this time. However, the Polish-Soviet rupture brought the border 
issue officially to the surface at the Teheran Conference (November 28-
December 1, 1943). Franklin o. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph 
Stalin discus�ed postwar Polish borders, but no definite decision emerged 
from the conference. Nevertheless, Churchill suggested before the British 
House of Commons on February 2, 1944, that the so-called "Curzon Line" be 
the Polish-Soviet boundary and that Poland be compensated with German 
territories in the north and west.1
8 
17 Gross, 22• cit., pp. 249-250. 
18For further information on the Polish frontier see: w. M. 
Drzewieniecki, �German-Polish Frontier (Chicago: Polish Western 
Association of America, 1959); Norman J. G. Pounds, Poland B etween 
East and West (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1964};and The Genesis 
of the Oder Neisse � !!l � Diplomatic Negotiations Ourrng World 
� g, eds. Rhode, Gotthold, and Wolfgang Wagner (Stuttgart, Germany: 
Brentano-Verlag, 1957). 
· 
Jan s. Jankowski, the Polish government-in-exile's representative 
in Poland was chosen deputy premier of the Polish government in London 
on April 26, 1944. Jankowski along with three other London-appointed 
ministers constituted the Home Council Ministers. As an advisory body 
the Council of National Unity was formed consisting of representatives 
of all Polish parties, except those with leftist views. The Union for 
Armed Struggle and the armed forces of the Polish govepmlent-in-exile 
had been reorganized into a single force, the Home Army, under the 
conunand of General Stephan Rowecki, as early as February, 1942. 
During early 1943 the Soviet Conununists assigned Boleslaw Bierut to 
German occupied Poland to begin the reorganization of the Polish 
19 Communist Party, which had been dissolved for Trotzkyism in 1937. 
The Polish Communists formed the Polish Workers• Party (Polska 
Partia Robotnicza; PPR) in January, 1942. Marceli Nowotko held the post 
of secretary-general of the party until his death. He was then succeeded 
10 
by Pawel Finder until Noyember, 1943, when Finder was replaced by Wladyslaw 
' 
Gomulka. The PPR organized its military forces, the Peoples• Guard, in 
May, 1942, to rid the homeland of the German invaders. The Home Army 
of the Council of National Unity and the Peoples• Guard of the PPR carried 
out intensive guerrilla warfare against the Germans from mid 1942. The 
PPR agreed to the Soviet initiative to establish a new government for 
Poland. This effort was realized on January 1, 1944, with Boleslaw 
Bierut, a Soviet citizen as the chairman of the National Home Council. 
This body was composed of some left wing members of the Socialist Party, 
19 Rakowski, .2£• ill•t P• 28. 
and some democratic groups; but the new body was extensively dominated 
by the Communists.20 Rakowski states that the National Home Council 
(KRN) was "based on non-existent and imaginary groups such as the 
'Initiative Committee' and the 'Group of Leftist Syndicalists', neither 
known nor supported by the Polish people.n21 The Peoples' Guard was 
reorganized under the command of General Michal Zymierski and was renamed 
the Peoples' Army. 
On July 21, 1944, Soviet and the pro-Soviet Polish military forces 
in the u. s. s. R. entered into Polish territories upon the retreat of 
the Germans. By its decree on July 21, 1944, the National Home Council 
called into being the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN). 
When the Germans were forced to evacuate Lublin, this city in eastern 
Poland became the operating base for the PKWN. On July 22, 1944, the 
PKWN declared itself the sole governing body o� Poland and issued state-
ments declaring that the Polish constitution of 1922 was reinstated. 
Decrees called for complete Polish-Soviet cooperation in the struggle 
against Germany. The PKWN declared that border problems would be 
settled according to ethno-graphic principles. The new government 
announced government control of heavy industry, called for agricultural 
reform, and advocated the restoration of democratic rights. The Peoples' 
Army and the Polish army, which had been organized in the Soviet Union, 
were united into a single military force.22 
20Rakowski, 21?.• .£!!., pp. 27-29. 
21 �., P• 29. 
22 
Morrison, 21?.• �. , p. 42. 
11 
The PKWN was composed of: Wanda Wasilewska, Edward Osobka-Morawski, 
Andrzej Witos, General Michal Rola Zymierski, General Zygmunt Berling, 
Wincenty Rzymowski, Stanislaw Radiewicz, Dr. Boleslaw Drobner, Jozef 
Brubecki, Stefan Jedrychowski, Stanislaw Skrzeszewski, J .  Haneman, E. 
Sommerstein, s. Kptek-Agruszewski, and J. Czechowski. All of the 
members had arrived in Lublin from Moscow and at least ten of the 
: 23 
committee's members had also belonged to the Union Qf Polish Patriots • . 
Twice in 1944, (October and November)Prirne Minister Mikolajczyk 
of the Polish government-in-exile journeyed to Moscow to negotiate 
with Stalin concerning the problem of the two Polish governments. 
However,. agreement could not be reached concerning postwar Polish 
boundaries and the establishment of a coalition Polish government 
between the Soviets and the Poles from London. After these attempts 
Mikolajczyk resigned from his position as Prime Minister. He was sue-
ceeded by Tomasz Arciszewski, a Socialist Party leader who had been 
chairman of the Polish underground, Council of National Unity in Poland 
until July, 1944. Arciszewski demanded territories east of the "CUrzon 
Line" and was a staunch advocate of absolutely no negotiations with 
the Canmunis ts. 
Relations between the Polish government-in-e�ile and the Soviet 
Union only worsened henceforth. A major point of irritation to the 
Polish government was the Soviet failure to aid the Home Army in a 
heroic attempt to recapture Warsaw from the Germans. The Home Army 
inaugurated an effort to take the Polish capital before the Soviet 
troops could occupy Warsaw. However, the attempt failed because of 
the lack of Moscow's military support. The situation was disastrous 
23 Rakowski, 22• ill• P• 30. 
12 
for the residents of Warsaw. The insurgents and most of the civilian 
population were either murdered or taken prisoner by the Germans who 
managed to retain control of the city. The Polish capital was left 
24 devas·ta.ted, artillery torn and fire gutted . 
With the National Home Cbuncil serving as the provisional parliament, 
the PKWN proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of Poland on 
December 31, 1944. Only five members of the old Committee of National 
Liberation entered the new provisional government: Osobka-Morawski, 
a left-wing Socialist; Rola-Zymierski ,  Radiewicz, Skrzeszewski ,  and 
25 Rzymowski .  
The PPR with Gomulka a s  its leader was the dominant force in the 
new government. It was obvious that the new government was interested 
in exhibiting a government that was representative of several political 
factions. Gomulka, Radkiewicz, Skrzeszewski� Mine, and Zawadzki were 
Communists; Osobk:a-Morawski , Dabrowski, Matuszewski, and Piotrowski 
were Socialists; Janusz, Maslanka, Berthold, and Kaplinski were members 
of the Peasant Party; Rzymowski and Rabanowski represented the Democratic 
Party . Rakowski says, however, that the reputed representatives of the 
Peasant and Socialist Parties had absolutely nothing to do with 
24 Jerzy Hauptmann, "The Warsaw Uprising of 1944 in the American 
Press," � Polish Review, IV (Autumn, 1959), PP• 46-57. 
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25 For a complete list of the composition of the new Polish Provisional 
Government seez Rakowski , .2E• ill•t P• 31. 
26 the authentic Polish parties. 
By early. 1945 the provisional government was in nominal control 
of all Poland, as a result of the successful Soviet winter offensive. 
General Leopold Okulick1, commander-in-chief of the Home Army, and 
I 
several of his colleagues were arrested and imprisoned by the Soviets. 
This was standard procedure for anyone who demonstrated any sympathies 
or support for the Polish government-in-exile. As a result most of the 
London followers went underground. 
In February , 1945, at Yalta, Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt were 
again confronted with the Polish problem. The following decisions con-
cerning Poland resulted from the Yalta meetings: 
"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result 
of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the 
establishment of a Polish provisional government which can be 
more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation 
of western Poland. The provisional government which is now 
functioning in Poland should, therefore, be reorganized on a 
broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic 
leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new 
government should then be called the Polish Provisional 
Government of National Unity." 
.. Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are 
authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance 
in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government 
and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland 
and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the 
present government along the above lines. This Polish 
Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to 
the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as 
possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. 
In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have 
the right to take part and to put forward candidates ... 
"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity 
has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the 
Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations 
with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the 
Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the 
United States of America will establish diplomatic relations 
with the new Polish Government of National Unity and will 
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exchange ambassadors, by whose reports the respective govern­
ments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland." 
"The three heads of government consider that the eastern 
frontier of Poland shall follow the Curzon line with digressions 
from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor 
of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial 
accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that 
the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of 
National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of 
these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western 27 
frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference." 
15 
From the very outset the Polish goverrunent in London refused to recognize 
the validity of the commission's decisions, since the London government 
had not been a participant at Yalta. 
No invnediate decision was reached by the three-power commission. 
Ultimately a statement was issued on June 13, 1945, reconvnending that 
representatives of several political parties be invited to Moscow on 
June 15, 1945, to participate in a conference concerning the organization 
of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Those requested 
to attend were:: 
Boleslaw Bierut, Edward Osobka-Morawski, Wladyslaw Kowalski, 
and Wladyslaw Gomulka as representatives of the Soviet-backed 
Polish Provisional Government; Wincenty Witos, Zygmunt Zulawski, 
Stanislaw Kutrzeba, Adam Krzyzanowski, and Henryk Kolodziejski 
as representatives of the democratic circles in Poland; and 
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Jan Stanczyk, and2�uljan Zakowski as representatives of the Polish exiles. 
All those invited to Moscow attended except Wincenty Witos and Juljan 
Zakowski. 
On June 28, 1945, the composition of the new Polish Government of 
National Unity was announced with Edward Osobka-Morawski as Premier and 
Wladyslaw Gornulka and Stanislaw Mikolajczyk to serve as Vice-Premiers.29 
27 
Stephan Horak, Poland's International Affairs, 1919-1960: A· Calendar 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1964T;°'Pp. 241-242. 
28 Rakowski, .22• ill•• p. 33. 
29 
For a complete list of the new government see: Rakowski, .22• ill•, P• 35. 
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With the National Home Council (KRN) acting as the provisional parliament 
from Lublin, Stanislaw Grabski, Stanislaw Mikolajcyzk, Wladyslaw Kiernik, 
Antoni Kolodziej, Adam Krzyzanowski, Stanislaw Kutrzeba, Jan Stanczyk, and 
Zygmunt Zulawski were added to the KRN's membership. Stanislaw Grabski 
and Wincenty Witos were asked to become vice-presidents of the KRN. 
I 
However, Witos refused to cooperate with the new gove�ent in any 
capacity. Boleslaw Bierut continued as president of the KRN. Thus 
the new Polish government was organized. Great Britain and the United 
States immediately withdrew recognition of the Polish government-in-
exile in London and on July s, 1945, recognized the Polish Government 
of National Unity as the Big Three had agreed upon at Yalta. 
Of the twenty-one members in the newly organized government, 
fourteen were Communists and sixteen of the twenty-one were former 
members of the Soviet-supported Lublin Committee, and only five were 
30 former members of the London government. The five members who were 
not Soviet sympathizers were: Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Dr. Wladyslaw 
Kiernik, Jan Stanczyk, Czeslaw Wycech, and Dr. Franciszek Litwin. 
Stalin had accepted Mikolajczyk in the new Polish government because 
he "underst� only too well that the presence of a former Polish 
prime minister, though now only a private citizen, who contrary to 
the solemn protests of his government had publicly approved the Yalta 
decisions, would create the illusion that, after all, there was a 
31 merger of two Polish governments with appearances of legality." 
30 Joseph w. Zurawski,. Poland � Captive Satellite-� Study in 
National Psychology (Detroit: Endurance Press, 1962), p. 25. 
31 Oscar Halecki, � History .2!, Poland (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 
1966), P• 329. 
The influence of these cabinet members meant even less since the 
composition of the parliament, the former KRN, was even more ill-
balanced in favor of the Communists. Opposition to the Soviets within 
the ranks of the parliament was too weak to influence an¥ legislation. 
Despite the seemingly obvious defeat, the Polish goverrugf:!nt-in-exile 
•'\. 
tried to continue its existence and activities against �e Soviet 
government and the puppet government in Poland. 
Poland's fate was further shaped at the Potsdam Coqference, 
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July 17 to August 2, 1945. Poland's eastern frontier had been delineated 
along the "Curzon Line•• at Yalta. The new Polish-Soviet border was 
finally established in a treaty signed in Moscow by Polish and Soviet 
representatives on August 16, 1945. The problem remaining for the Allied 
Powers at Potsdam was Poland's western and northern frontiers. Mikolajczyk, 
� 
Bierut, and Rzym()'f(ski were chosen to attend the Potsdam Conference to express 
' 
the Polish government's views on the problems confronting the Allies. 
The following decisions concerning Poland were made a� the Potsdam Conference: 
0The Conference considered questions relating to the 
Polish Provisional Government and the western boundary 
of Poland." 
00n the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity 
they defined their attitude in the following statement: 
A. We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached 
among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which made 
possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions 
reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional 
Government of National Unity recognized by the three Powers. 
The establishment of the British and United States 
governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish 
Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of 
their recognition from the former Polish Government in 
London, which no longer exists. The British and United 
States governments have taken measures to protect the 
interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the 
recognized Government of the Polish State, in the property 
belonging to the Polish State located their territories 
and under their control, whatever the form of this property 
may be. They have further taken measures to prevent 
alienation to third parties of such property. All proper 
facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional 
Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies 
for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State 
which may have been wrongfully alienated." 
"The three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish 
Provisional Government in facilitating the return to 
Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who 
wish to go, including members of the Polish armed forces 
and the merchant marine. They expect that those Poles who 
return home shall be accorded personal and property 
rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens." 
"The three Powers note that the Polish provisional 
Government, in accordance with the decisions of the 
Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and 
unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of 
universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all 
democratic and anti-Nozi parties shall have the right to 
take part and to put forward candidates, and that 
representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full 
freedom to report to the world the developments in Poland be­
fore and during the elections. 
B. The following agreement was reached on the Western 
Frontier of Poland: 
In conformity with the agreement on Poland, reached 
at the Crimea Conference, the three heads of Government 
have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government 
of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in 
the north and west which Poland should receive. The President 
of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish 
Provisional Government of National Unity have been received 
at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The 
three heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the 
final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should 
await the peace settlement." 
The three heads of Government agree that, pending the 
final determination of Poland's western frontier, the 
former German teritories east of a line running from the 
Baltic Sea immediately west of Sinnemuende, and thence along 
the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse 
River and along the Western Neisse River to the Czechoslovak 
frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed 
under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at 
this Conference and including the area of the former free 
city of Danzig shall be under the administration of the 
Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered 
as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany." 
18 
XII. Orderly Transfer of German Population. 
"The three Governments, having considered the question 
in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Ger­
many of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining 
in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will have to be 
undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place 
should be effected in an orderly and humane manner." 
"Since the influx of a large number of Germans' into 
Germany would increase the �rden already resting on the 
occupying authorities, they consider that the Control 
Council in Gepnany should, in the first instance , examine 
the problem, with special regard to the question of the 
equitable distribution of these Germans among the several 
zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing 
their respective representatives on the Control Council to 
report to their Governments as soon as possible, the 
extent to which such persons have already entered Ger­
many from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to 
submit an estimate of the time and rate· at which further 
transfers could be carried out having regard to the 
present situation in Germany." 
0The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional 
Goverrunent, and the Control Council in Hungary are at 
the same time being informed of the above and are being 
requested meanwhile to suspend further explusions pending 
an examination by the G�vernments concerned of the 32 
report from their representatives on the Control Council." 
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Harry s. Truman, Clemet Attlee, and Joseph Stalin had not met at Potsdam to 
deal unconditionally with all the complex problems which had developed 
as a result of the war. The procedure laid down was indeed one which would 
postpone a general peace settlement and therefore allow time for special 
agreements on specific issues. The Polish Provisional Government of 
National Unity accepted the new Polish boundaries even though these 
borders were subject. t� further alteration in any subsequent peace 
settlement.33 · 
32 Horak , �· .s!J:. , PP• 242-245. 
33For detailed interpretations of the que�tions arising out of the 
Yalta and Potsdam Conferences wi th special rcgurd to the Polish compli­
cations see: Oscar Halecki ,  "The Sixth Partition of Poland," Review ,2! 
Politics, VII (April ,  1945),  142-156; J. B .. Hoptner , "Soviet Policy in 
Eastern Europe Since 1945," Journal 2!.. International Affairs, VIII 
(1954) , 95-106; Roman Michalowski, "Constants in Russian Foreign Policy," 
Review of Politics , II (Spring-Surruner, 1957) , 57-70; and Robert G. 
Neumann-;-"u. s. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Satelites," Review � 
Politics, II (April ,  1949) , 220-236. 
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Reassured by the Big Three' s  statements insinuating the success of Polish 
governmental reorganization at the Potsdam Conference in the fall of 1945, the. 
leaders of the Polish Government of National Unity moved to consolidate her 
position as clearly pro-Soviet throughout the late months of 1945 and early 
1946. Within the new government a so-called Democratic bloc was organized 
consisting of the PPR, the PPS ( the Polish Socialist Party) , and the 
Democratic Party. This bloc favored close cooperation �ith the Soviet 
Union and the establishment of socialism in Poland.3
4 
, / 
On June 30, 1946, a referendum was held to make judgment on three 
questions: Should the Senate be abolished? Should the future constitution 
consolidate an economic system based on �and reform and nationalization 
of the basic branches of the Polish economy, but allow private business 
to retain all legal rig�ts? Should the western Polish border by the Oder­
Neisse rivers? The Democratic bloc urged the Polish people to vote affirm-
' 
atively on all three questions. The PSL (Polish Peasant Party) suggested 
the rejection of the first question. There were some illegal organizations 
still operating underground in Poland that urged a negative vote on all 
three questions. When the official vote tally was made public the govern-
ment officially declared that 80.8 per cent of the eligible voters had gone 
to the polls. The results were 66.2 per cent, 77.3 per cent, and 94.2 per 
35 cent affirmative votes on the three questions respectively. After the 
referendum a strong minority in the PSL, led by Czeslaw Wyech and Jozef 
Niecko, contended that Mikolajczyk should compromise with the reputed 
Democratic bloc. However, Mikolajczyk refused to soften his opposition 
34For developments in Poland in relation to the Communist system 
see: z. K .  Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1967 ) ;� K .  Dzie�wski, The Communist Party !,!2 
Poland: � Outline of History {Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1959) ; and Richard Staar, Poland 12.!1-�=- .'.!:h£. Sovieti?.dtion .2f 
! Captive People ( New Orleans: Louisiana State University Press, 1962) . 
35 Staar, �· ill• •  PP• 46-49. 
to the Soviet influence. The confrontation continued to grow more 
acute. 36 
On January 19 , 1947, elections to the Polish Sejm were held. The 
PSL was served an almost fatal blow. The PPR and three c�osely allied 
· parties faced little oppostion except from the PSL. Officially 89.9 
per cent of the legal voters cast ballots with 80.1 per cent being cast 
for the pro-Soviet parties. Boleslaw Bierut was elected president of 
the Polish Republic by the Sejm on February s , 194 7 .  Jozef Cyrankiewicz 
of the PPS was elected premier and Wladyslaw Gomulka became deputy 
premier. The remainder of the cabinet posts were filled by former 
. .  t f th D . 37 minis ers o e emocrati.c bloc.· · The .Sejm instituted the "Small 
Constitution" on February 19, 1947, placing executive power with a 
Council of State comprised of the president, the marshal C speaker) . of 
the Sejm, the deputy marshal and any other members selected by the Sejm. 
From the very outset of the new Polish Government of National Unity, 
a left wing faction of the Socialist Party, led by Jozef Cyrankiewicz 
and Oscar Lange, was able to gradually assert enough power to prevent 
21 
any of the membership of the Socialist Party from supporting Mikolajczyk ' s  
attempts at democratic reo.rganization. 31:} Opposition to Mikolajczyk' s 
36For a contemporary account of developments in Poland in 1946 to 
1948 see: R ,  "The Fate of Polish Socialism," Foreign Affairs, XXVIII 
{October, 1949) , 125-143. 
37 . Staar, �· �. , p. 49-50 • 
. 38 
Brzezinski , �· cit . ,  p .  1 1 .  
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leadership within the PSL continued to increase. Of course such dissension 
within the PSL was encouraged by the Democratic bloc.39 Finally on October 
21, 1947, Mikolajczyk fled from Poland, fearful of being arrested on charges 
of cooperating with Polish underground organizations. With the aid of the 
United States embassy Mikolajczyk escaped, making his new home in England 
and then in the United States, where he died in 1969. After Mikolajczyk ' s  
departure the members of the PSL f�voring closer cooperation with the PPR 
took control of the party, which proceeded to �cupy a position of little 
significance in future Polish politics.�Q 
39 See Annex II , Documents No. 5 ,  No. 6 ,  No. 7 ,  and No. 8 ,  pp. 137-146. 
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different point of view of this period. 
CHAPTER I I  
POLAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS: 
AN ERA OF SF.MI-INDEPENDENCE, 1946-1947 
Out of ·the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and the 
chaotic conditions which it created domestically, emerged a pattern for 
the new Polish foreign policy. Not unexpectedly, there were many changes 
and constant reorganization within the Polish Foreign Ministry . New agencies 
were created and the number of employees grew; many old agencies were 
liquidated. After the Yalta decisions the inunediate recognition of the 
new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity posed serious problems 
for the new government because of the urgent need to establish embassies 
abroad and to appoint representatives to these posts. 
Initially there was no confirmed organizational statute for the Polish 
Foreign Ministry. There was a period of gradual adaptation to the organ-
izational pattern of the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union. Newly 
created agencies and already established ones were reorganized on the basis 
of the relationship of the individual heading the agency with the Communis� 
Party. If the head of a particular agency was a Communist, the agency 
would play an important role in the Foreign Ministry, if the head of an 
agency was non-Communist, the agency was bound to become powerless. These 
conditions resulted in extreme fluidity in the execution of foreign affairs. 
Related to the massive multiplication of employees and agencies was the 
increasing emphasis within the Foreign Ministry on propaganda and· political 
functions . Before World War II there had been a Political Department 
within the Foreign Ministry which dealt with political ,  economic ,  and 
public information issues and was headed by a Vice-Minister whose expertise 
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and experience in the field of international affairs served as a sufficient 
basis for the formulation of policy. This practice had been possible be-
cause of the quality of the individuals employed by the Political Department. 
An attempt after 1945 to substitute the quality of the experts in the 
Political Department with numerable less capable individuals proved to be 
impractical. These conditions led to a complete reorganization of the 
.Foreign Ministry. Two new departments, the Economic Department and the 
Press and Information Department, the latter being the major instrument 
of propaganda, were created within the Political Department. Also within 
the Foreign Ministry numerous separate bureaus were created to handle the 
innumerable postwar problems such as peace treaties,  repatriation of Polish 
citizens ,  and the resettlement of the fragmented Jewish populations.l 
Of course , an important factor in the formulation of foreign policy 
of any country is the execution of its economic and trade relations. 
Significant economic agreements foster the establishment of friendly 
political relations based on mutual commercial interests. Since Polish 
boundaries had been altered and Poland had acquired some industrialized 
western provinces ,  economics would now play a more significant role in . 
her foreign affairs. Also it was hoped that the Communists' economic 
policies on massive industrialization of a formerly basically agricultural 
Polish nation would add to Poland ' s  international economic importance. 
Areas of Silesia which were annexed to Poland were rich in coal and 
metal ore deposits . The postwar world witnessed a severe shortage of 
1Tadeusz Rakowski, Foreign Policy 2i, the Communist Regime in Poland� 
Techniques and Functions , �-� (New York: Mid-European Studies Center 
of the National Committee for a Free Europe , 1953) ,  pp. 50-51. 
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coal so Poland seemed to occupy a very privileged position on the international 
economic horizon. Howeverp Soviet pressure forced the Poles to conclude agree-
ments with the Soviet Union which ruined Poland ' s  chances to take advantage 
of the favorable world trade situation. From 1945 to 1947 Poland negotiated 
trade agreements with the u. s .  s. R . ,  Rumania, Denmark , Norway, Hungary, 
Yugoslavia, Switzerland , Bulgaria, East Germany, Finlaqd, France, Austria, 
2 Iceland, Holland, Great Britain, and Czechoslovakia. However, invnediately 
after the war Polish trade became largely dominated by the U. s. s. R. and 
other Communist-controlled states. The three major states in Poland ' s  
postwar trade relations were the u. s .  s .  R . ,  Czechoslovakia, and East 
Germany . It is believed that highly unfavorable trade agreements were 
forced upon Poland by the u. s. s. R. The most flagrant example of such 
agreements was one made concerning Polish coal on August 16,  1945. This 
arrangement required Poland to send large quantities of coal to the 
u. s. s .  R. at a price of about eight to nine per cent below the world 
market prices. These economic conditions indicate that the Communists 
probably also had firm control of Polish foreign relations.3 
Because participation in the foreign service of a nation demands 
extensive training in geopolitics, law, history, language, economics, 
and the social conditions of the country involved, the postwar Communist 
regime in Poland faced a serious shortage of diplomats and foreign policy 
2 Rakowski , .21?• ill• ,  PP• 61-69. 
3 James F. Morrison, The Polish People' s  Republic (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1968)', PP• 50-57. 
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experts within the ranks of the Cormnunist Party. Since the area of foreign 
relations is extremely critical to a nation, diplomats associated with the 
earlier anti-Soviet Polish regimes could not be retained in the new pro-
Soviet Polish government. These circumstances resulted in two types of 
representation in the Polish embassies abroad. One involved acceptance 
by the regime of a non-Communist representative whose political and diplomatic 
activities were closely observed by trusted Convnunist overseers whose only 
4 qualification was blind obedience to the Conununist Party. In other cases 
where qualified pro-Soviet diplomats could not be found, non-professionals, 
selected more for their loyalty to the Communist Party than for their 
ability in foreign affairs, were appointed to high positions in the foreign 
embassies. These s<:>-called diplomats were often extremely incompetent. 
"Under such conditions there was a strong tendency for each Conununist 
regime to become heavily dependent on the foreign policy direction of the 
5 Soviet Union and accept uncritically positions developed by Soviet experts." 
The structure of the new Polish diplomatic missions followed a certain 
pattern. The chief of the Polish foreign mission was usually a prominent 
Polish politician, scholar, or writer, not necessarily a member of the 
Communist Party. Because the eye of international politics would focus 
on the head of the missions, an outright Communist in such a position 
initially would afford bad publicity for the Communists. The deputy 
4 Rakowski , .22• cit., pp. 74-75. 
5 R. Barry Farrel l ,  "Foreign Policy Formation in the Communist Countries 
of Eastern Europe," � European Quarterly, I (March, 1967), 40-41. 
minister, who acted as supervisor of the embassy staff, however, was 
usually the confidence man for the Corrununist Party. There was a regional 
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party representative who usually traveled among several embassies to check 
on operations . He was also a trusted Corrununist. The regional party represent-
ative exercised disciplinary authority over the embassy staff. He was ex-
tremely alert to any indications of disloyalty to the Communist-dominated 
Polish regime . Staff members showing anti-Corrununist sentiments were taunted 
until they were forced completely out of the embassy. The regional party 
representative "had his informers among the janitors and probably among 
some clerks too and enjoyed the feeling of knowing everything about every-
body ."6 Each mission had its staff of experts, qualified professionals 
in the field of international affairs who knew the country and were 
frequently without political affiliations. These experts were usually 
not trusted completely, and therefore not fully informed by the Communist 
leadership. There were also so-called research personnel whose work 
actually bordered on espionage for the Communist Party. Of course each 
embassy employed a clerical staff. Some were brought from Poland; others 
were of Polish descent who had become naturalized citizens of the country 
where the embassy was located, and some were stateless Polish refugees.7 
Significant changes in the organization of the entire Polish Foreign 
Ministry were effectuated in February and March of 1948. In this reorgan-
6
Alexander w. Rudzinski, Inside Polish Postwar Diplomacy (New York: 
Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe, 
1953 ) ,  p.  211. 
7 
�· t p. s . 
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ization a new position, Secretary General of the Ministry of. Foreign Affairs, 
w 1 ;  created to which Stefan Wieblowski ,  former Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 
was assigned. The new minister was granted decisive authority in both foreign 
and domestic affairs. The former Political Department was divided into two 
independent bodies , each to formulate policy involving separate groups of 
countries. Each division was alloted significant influence in the Foreign 
Mi�istry . 
Zygmunt Modzelewsk i ,  �he Polish Foreign Minister since the establishment 
of the postwar Polish government, had been in failing health due to a heart 
condition since the summer of 1946. Modzelewski was gradually retired from 
his position within the Foreign Ministry and stripped of all governmental 
and party powers.8 Jozef Olszewski ,  the highly efficient head of the 
recently remodeled Political Department was also removed and divested of 
all political influence.9 Rakowski says that reports of Olszewski ' s  individ­
ualism could no longer be tolerated by the Communists. At any rate Wierblowski ,  
as a member of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) Politbureau , assured the 
Communists of a completely subservient and Soviet-directed foreign policy. lo 
It is also significant to note that Poland ' s  three major spokesmen in the 
United Nations during 1946 and 1947, Wincenty Rzyrnowski in the General 
Assembly, and Zygmunt Modzelewski and Oscar Lange in the Security Council ,  
were completely removed from any positions of ·influence i n  the Polish government .  
8see Annex No. I ,  Section 2 ,  PP• 118-1�9. 
9 
See Annex No. I, Section 6� pp. 122-123. 
10Rakowski ,  .2£• cit. ,  pp. 52-53. 
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by 1948. These changes within the Polish Foreign Ministry and the 1947 
elections, which had been coerced upon the Polish people by the Communist 
forces , resulted in a totally submissive and Soviet-dominated Polish 
government. 
The years 1946 and 1947 were a period of great i�stability and in-
consistency within the Polish Foreign Ministry when absolute Soviet 
domination of Polish international affairs had not �en completely con-
solidated. Because of this fluidity and uncertainty there were some 
possibilities for gestures of Polish independence in international 
relations. This can be observed in the activities of the United Nations. 
In order to examine postwar Poland' s  international affairs within the· 
framework of the United Nations, it is necessary to briefly review the 
structure of that organization. At Yalta the Big Three , the United States, 
Great Britain, and the u .  s. s. R. , had called for the "earliest possible 
establishment • • • of a general international organization to maintain 
11 peace and security." After months of careful planning, including the 
Dumbarton Oaks talks in August, 1944, and the more decisive Yalta meetings, 
a conference was scheduied to convene in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, 
to establish the United Nations. 
Representatives from Poland, however , were not in attendance at San 
Francisco. The Polish government, therefore , ·was unable to sign the United 
Nations Charter at the organizational meeting and did not become a member 
of the United Nations until the middle of October, 1945, because the United 
11 Oscar T. Barck, Jr. and Nelson M. Blake, Since 1900: � History E! � 
United States !!! � Times (New York: Macmillan, 1959-r:-pp. 658-659. 
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States and Great Britain recognized the Polish government in London until 
July, 1945 , while the Soviet Union recognized the Lublin Conunittee as the 
12 legal government of Poland. The Soviets demanded that Poland be solely 
represented at the San Francisco Conference by the members of the Lublin 
Conunittee. The United States and Great Britain objected to this Soviet 
proposal. As a result Stalin immediately declared that he would not 
allow Soviet Foreign Minister Vyscheslav Molotov to attend the San 
Francisco Conference. The United States and Great Britain did not want 
to antagonize the Soviet Union too severely and therefore did not invite 
the Polish government-in-exile to the conference. Later Stalin decided 
13 to allow Molotov to attend the conference. 
So even though Poland had been one of the original signatories of 
the Declaration by the United Nations on January 1, 1942, in Washington, 
O. c. ( a  declaration by twenty-six nations that were fighting against the 
Axis aggressors which called for an international peace-keeping body ) ,  no 
Polish representatives were invited to participate in the Charter conferences 
14 in San Francisco. The Foreign Ministers of the Big Three were unable to 
reach any conclusive agreement in discussions concerning Poland at San 
Francisco. Stalin had obviously directed Molotov to evade any meaningful 
12 Document No. 3 and No. 4 ,  pp. 132-136. 
13 Edward Rozek , Allied Wartime Diplomacy: � Pattern in Poland (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc . ,  1958 ) ,  P• 363. 
l4yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47 (Lake Success, New York: 
Department of Public Information , 1947) , P• 1. 
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conversations about the Polish problem. 15 On April 27, 1945, the delegates 
at the San Francisco Conference adopted the following resolution with regard 
to Poland: "The Governments of the United Nations express to the people 
of Poland their symp?thy and their admiration. They hope that the 
constitution of a Polish Government recognized as such by the sponsoring 
nations will make it possible for Polish deleyates to come and take part 
as soon as possible in the work of the conference. "16 It was in this 
manner that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, organized 
later that year after the report of the Yalta Conference ' s  Three Power 
Commission, was given a position in the United Nations. 
To review Poland ' s  role in the United Nations one must re-examine 
the functioning of this international structure . The United Nations 
is made up of two major bodies--the General Assembly and the Security 
Council.  The General Assembly is constituted of representatives of 
each member state and discusses "any questions or matters within the 
scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions 
of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and • • •  makes 
recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security 
Council or to both on such matters.1117 However,  the General Assembly 
is restricted from discussing disputes already being considered in the 
15 
Rozek , �· cit . ,  p.  375. 
16 . . 
Yearbook of the United Nab.ons, 1946-£, �· cit. ,  p. 12. 
17Barck and Blake, 212• cit . ,  P •  662. 
Security Council. The General Assembly has the power to initiate studies 
for the codification and strengthening of international law and is to 
reconunend corrective measures for any social , cultural ,  educational, or 
economic problems . In the General Assembly a two-thirds vote is required 
for any action. 18 
The more important and powerful of the two United Nations bodies is 
the eleven-member Security Council. The United States, Great Britain, 
China, France, and Russia hold permanent seats in the Security Council 
and are often referred to as the Big Five. The remaining six positions 
are chosen for two year terms by the General Assembly. The votes of 
seven members are needed for the approval of any action; however, on 
significant resolutions such as the issuance of military or economic 
sanction�, the Big Five have to be unanimous in their decision. This 
encompasses the much disputed veto power of the Security Council ,  in 
which an issue can be discussed involving one of the Big Five, but that 
32 
member can prevent the initiation of any major action with its veto power. 
The Security Council also has jurisdiction ov.er the Military Staff 
Committee, which is composed of the chiefs of staff of the Big Five . 19 
The Economic and Social Council is an agency of the United Nations 
which is elected by the General Assembly and is to report on international 
economic, social, cultural ,  educational, health, and related matters. A 
series of special agencies has been created and placed under the supervision 
18 
Ibid . ,  p .  663. 
19 
Ibid . ,  p. 662. 
of the Economic and Social Council these include: lhe International Bank, 
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the International Stabilization Fund , the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) , the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the United Nations 
Educational ,  Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESC0) .20 
A Trusteeship Council was established by the United Nations Charter. 
This Council was to. preside over lands taken from the Axis Powers during 
World War II 9 territories already held under mandate, and areas of which 
any nation might want to terminate supervision. Fifteen judges who 
convene at the Hague as the International Court of Justice, are elected 
by the General Assembly. The record keeping and assembling of needed 
materials and information for the United Nations is carried out by a 
permanent Secretariat.21 
Since the first two sessions-.of the United Nations C l946 and 1947) 
were the only meetings in which any Polish independence from Soviet 
domination was attempted, this will be the period considered in this 
study. After the return of Oscar Lange to Poland and the naming of 
Juliusz Katz-Suchy as the new permanent Polish delegate to the United 
Nations on January 1 ,  1948, Poland merely became an agent of the Soviet 
Union within the United Nations .22 
20rbid. ,  P• 664. 
21Ibid . ,  P• 663. 
22For a complete list of the members of the Polish delegation to the 
United Nations see: Official Records .2f � First � .2f � First 
Session .2f .!:b!:, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings .2f � General Assembly, 
Verbatim Record 10 January�l4 February, 1946, (Central Hall Westminster, 
London: United Nations, 1947) , PP• 20-21. (Hereinafter referred to as 
G. A. o. R. ( lst session) • pp. 20-21 .  
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Poland was active in the Economic Commission for Europe and had 
representatives on these specialized bodies in the United Nations during 
1946 and 1947: Security Council, International Labor Organization (ILO) , 
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UN�SCO} , 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) , International Cjvil Aviation 
Organization ( ICAO} , the World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO} , 
International Monetary Fund, Atomic Energy Commission (ACE} , Economic 
and Social Council ( ECOSOC) , World Meteorological Organization (WMO) , 
Universal Postal Union (UPO) , International Trade Organization (ITO) , 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) , Commission for Conventional 
Armaments (CCA) , the Committee of_ Experts, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 
Economic and Employment Committee, Fiscal Committee, Headquarters Advisory 
Committee, Social Commission, Transportation and Communications Commission.23 
As the Polish member of the Sub-Commission on the Reconstruction of 
Devastated Areas , Oscar Lange worked with delegates from the United States 
and Great Britain. These three nations presented a proposal calling for 
the establishment of the Econo ic Commission for Europe. The Soviet 
Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic objected to the fonnation 
of such a commission. The commission was established, however, and was to 
begin work immediately on short tenn economic difficulties in war-torn 
23 
Yearbook £!.. � United Nations, ill§.-£, .2.E• ill• , PP• 453-
454. 
24 Europe. 
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Waclaw Konderski, a Pole, was designated chairman of the Economic and 
Financial Committee of the United Nations. Cbncerning Kondersk i ' s  selection 
Oscar Lange declared to the � � Times that this action constituted 
international recognition of the important position a free and independent 
Poland was to occupy. According to Lange it was obvious that "Poland is 
25 to play a vital role in the economy of Europe." 
Poland in the United Nations General Assembly--
There were few occasions of Polish independence in the United Nations 
General Assembly . The few instances which did occur were found during the 
early years of the organization. The first Plenary Meetings of the General 
Assembly were held from January 10, 1946, to February 14, 1946, in Central 
Hal l ,  Westminster, London. As the General Assembly convened, Wincenty 
Rzymowski arrived as the chief Polish delegate. He signed the United 
Nations Charter on behalf of the Pol ish nation.26 Rzymowski , an original 
member of the pro-Soviet Polish Committee of National Liberation and later 
Minister of Arts and Culture in the Lublin Committee, had been Polish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs since mid, 1945. Even though Rzymowski 
had assumed the reputation of a devout Convnunist, prior to World 
War II he had published The Horizon, an anti-Soviet journal. 
24International Organization, I (February, 1947) , PP• 104-105. 
25 New ��E.!s, Times , 14 January 1946, p. 6 .  
£6 
Poland . · 114-1964 (Warsaw: Polish Government, Polonia Publishing 
House, 1964) , p:
· SI.-
In his early writings he denounced the wide ly circulated concept of 
Polish independence within the Soviet political structure . After the 
36 
outbreak of the war, however, Rzymowski shifted more toward a pro-Soviet 
position; perhaps this explains his eventual demotion." After the 1947 
Polish elections he became Minister without portfolio thus relieving 
him of any future political influence . In February, 1947, Rzymowski was 
replaced as head of the Polish United Nations delegation 'by Zygmunt 
27 Modzelewski . Rzymowski cast a vote contrary to the Soviets as early 
as the Second Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, January 11., 1946. 
A vote was taken on a Cuban amendment to the rules of procedure. Poland 
28 voted yes; the u .  s. s .  R .  voted no. In a somewhat conci liatory state-
ment to the � �· Times in March, 1946, Rzymowski declared: "There 
are many things which divide the United Nations but i'mmeasurably more 
unite us. The evil influence of capitalist interests should not be 
allowed to 'b.lild up Germany again, and peace is possible if we destroy 
fascism, secure the cooperation of the great powers, and plan on an in-
ternational basis to equalize the standards of civilization all over the 
29 world." However, in the succeeding meetings of the General Assembly , 
Rzymowski exhibited little independence with regard to Soviet suggestions 
with1n ·the United Nations General Assembly . 
27 Rakowski, 2£.• £!.t• , PP• 104-105. 
28 G. A. o. R. ( 1s t  session) , P• 65. 
29 New � Times, 17 March 1946, p. 12. 
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The issue of major importance for the General Assembly to act upon 
in the early meetings was the election of the members to the Security 
Council .  This issue· was brought u p  a t  the Fourth Plenary Meeting , January 
12 , 1946. Poland was nominated to serve as one of the non-permanent 
members on the Security Council by Dmitri z .  Manuilsky, the representative 
from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Poland rj:?ceived thirty-nine 
of the fifty votes cast on the first ballot. This was more than the thirty­
four needed for a majority. Poland had been assured of a seat on the 
Security Council, but there still followed a vote to decide which nations 
would get the three two-year seats and which would get the three one-
year seats. 30 
In the .l:'ifth Plenary Meeting January 12,  1946, Rzymowski hoping for 
a two-year term spoke to the General Assembly, " I  venture to hope , in the 
name of my country and with a view to furthering the welfare of the United 
Nations , that you will confer a two-year term on Poland. The Poles conunand 
a historic knowledge which they will place at the service of peace, the 
price of which they know better than anybody.11'31 Poland, however, did not 
receive a majority of the votes needed on the first ballot. Brazil and 
Australia were selected by a majority, but the third seat was left un­
decided . Neither Poland, which received nineteen votes, nor the Nether­
lands, which received twenty-three votes, had won a majority. On the 
second vote both Poland and the Netherlands received twenty-five votes. 
aou . A. O. R. ( 1st session) , pp. 79-82. 
31Ibid . ,  pp. 87-88. 
The President, Mr. P .  H. Spaak, of Belgium, then drew lots for the two­
year term, as was provided in the rules. Mr. Spaak drew Poland.'32 Poland 
thus became a two-year member of the important Se�rity Council. Poland ' s  
activities within the Council for these two years show some independence 
from the dictates of the u .  s .  s .  R .  The details of the Security Council 
meetings will be discussed later. 
In the Tenth Pl�nary Meeting, January 16, 1946, Rzymowski made his 
first major speech to the General Assembly on the tasks confronting the 
United Nations. 33 Despite numerous idealistic speeches ,  very little was 
38 
accomplished in the General Assembly until the Twenty-third Plenary Meeting, 
February 6 ,  1946, when judges to the International Court of Justice were 
selected. A Polish candidate for the court, Dr. Bogdan Winiarski, failed 
to be elected on the first ballot. In the General Assembly he received 
nineteen votes and in the Security Council he received five votes. In 
the Twenty-fourth Plenary Meeting February 6 ,  1946, Winia.rski again failed 
to receive a majority vote. In the Twenty-fifth Plenary Meeting February 
6, 1946, on the third vote Winiarski was still not elected. Finally on 
the fourth vote the Polish representative received twenty-six votes, the 
required majority.34 Now Poland not only had a two-year seat on the 
influential Security Counci l but also had managed to get one of her 
.32 
" 'Ibid. ,  PP• 87-88. 
·33 
See Annex II, Document No. 9 .  pp. '147-.157.. 
'34 G . A. o. R. ( 1st session) , pp. 342-343. 
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representatives on the world' s  highest tribunal. 
Actually there is very little variance between the Soviet voting 
record and that of the Polish delegation throughout the records of the 
United Nations General Assembly. Other than the one instance already 
mentioned , there are only four occurrences involving Polish-Soviet dis­
agreement. However, it is important to note that the tol lowing occasions 
of dissent occurred during the first two years of the United Nation ' s  
operation and also that on one occasion Oscar Lange, the key to Polish 
ind�pendence within the United Nations,was voting for the Polish del­
egation. 
At the Sixty-second P lenary Meeting , December 13 , 1946� in two 
votes on trusteeship agreements for the French Cameroons and French 
Togoland , Poland abstained and the u. s .  s .  R. voted no.
35 
In the Sixty-fourth P lenary Meeting , December 14, 1946, in a vote 
on a draft resolution on regional conferences of non-self governing 
territories •  peoples, Poland voted yes; the u. s .  s .  R. voted no.36 
In the Sixty-sixth Plenary Meeting , December 15 , 1946, in a vote 
concerning consultative arrangements with non-governmental organizations 
with the Economic and Social Council, Poland voted no; the u. s .  s .  R. 
abstained.
37 
35 Ibid . ,  P• 1287-1288. 
36 Ibid. , P• 1357 
37 
Ibid . ,  P• 1415 . 
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And finally in the One-hundred Fifth Plenary Meeting , November l ,  1947, 
in a vote on a Danish amendment that urged the Union of South Africa propose 
a trust agreement on South West Africa as soon as possible, Poland voted 
38 
no; the u .  s .  s .  R. voted yes. 
Thomas Hovet has attributed many of these examples of divergences in 
the Soviet and Polish votes as merely a case of mixed signals within the 
two delegations. This theory he has explained by the voting procedure in 
the General Assembly . On roll-call votes a member ' s  name is drawn by 
lot and the voting begins with that �ember and continues from there in 
alphabetical order. Therefore , the Soviet Union does not always vote 
before all her satellite countries. If, for instance, the Poles were 
uncertain about how they were to vote they could possibly cast a vote 
contrary to Soviet wishes. There have been occasions in which the pro-
Soviet nation would abstain on a vote and then later try to gain permission 
to change its vote after the Soviet Union had cast her vote.
39 It seems 
in relation to later developments and activities in the United Nation ' s  
Security Council, that the Polish delegation was not completely dominated 
during these early meetings .  Even if these deviations of the Polish 
delegation from the Soviet policy do not solely represent any corroding 
of the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, these irregular votes do 
suggest that if Poland had had the opportunity she might not have become 
38
G .  A. o. R . ( 2nd session ) ,  p. 650. 
39Thomas Hovet, Jr. , � Politics .!,!! � United Nations (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960 ) , p .  49. 
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so absclutely dominated by the u .  s .  s. R.40 Of more significance than 
these instances of slight deviations in the General Assembly ' s  voting 
record , are the records of the Security Council for 1946 and 1947. 
Polish Activities in the Security Council, 1946-1947 
Poland ' s  chief delegate to the United Nations Security Council from 
January to March, 1946, was Zygmunt Modzelewski. He went to London as the 
Polish representative to the Preparatory Committee on �he Formation of the 
Security Council and participated in the Council ' s  work uhtil the Security, 
Counci l moved to New York in March , 1946. As early as 1944 Modzelewski 
had b�come active in pro-Soviet organizations as Ambassador to Moscow , 
first from the Polish Committee of National .Liberation and later from 
the Lublin Conunittee. In July, 1945, he had been appointed Vice-Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. After Rzymowski ' s  fall from Soviet favor Modzelewski 
became Polish Foreign Minister. However ,  by early 1948 Modzelewski too 
was divested of all political influence and replaced by a less individ-
ualistic Communist, Stefan Wieblowski .  
From March, 1946 ,  to August, 1947, Oscar Lange served as chief 
Polish delegate to the United Nations Security Council as it convened 
at Hunter College, New York . It was Lange who seemed to have the courage 
and fortitude to implement the strongest pressures for Polish independence. 
He had been a member of the pre-war Ministry of Labor in Poland, but had 
come to the United �tates in 1937 and became a naturalized American citizen 
in 1943. Lange had a long and well-established reputation of being a pro-
Soviet Socialist, both in Poland and in the United States. 
In May, 1943, Lange had been scheduled to be one of the principal 
speakers at a New York meeting under the auspices of the National Council 
4°For further discussions of Poland ' s  voting record in the United 
Nations General Assembly see: Margaret Bal l ,  "Bloc Voting in the General 
Assembly," International Organization , V (February, 195 1 ) , PP• 3-31; 
and Hovet ,  ££• ill• 
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for American-Soviet Friendship. At this time Lange was a visiting professor 
at Columbia University . He had been one of the founders of the Olicago 
chapter of the National Council for American Soviet Friendship. However, 
he withdrew from the engagement because he feared that his statements 
might be misinterpreted , but he did endorse the objectives of the meeting. 
At this time Lange went on record as being opposed to the Polish government-
in-exile in London. He revealed that he had planned to urge the formation 
of a new Polish government-in-exile opposed to the legal administration. 
General Sikorski was at this time head of the government. Lange considered 
Sikorski "an honest but ineffective leader, sabotaged by the reactionary 
41 emigres upon whom he had to rely." Lange suggested that the liberals 
sever relations with Sikorski and form a new coalition government with 
the Union of Polish Patriots. As time proved this was exactly the type 
of resolution that the Big Three accepted when they discussed plans at 
Yalta to establish a coalition postwar Polish government .  The Polish 
Provisional Government of National Unity was constructed from elements 
of the Soviet-recognized Lublin government and some of the liberal 
members of the London government. 
In September, 1943, Lange recommended a five-point program for the 
organization of postwar Poland in a letter to the New York Herald Tribune. 
Introducing his program, he attacked "the follies of the anti-Soviet emigres"
42 
41 Current Biography, 1946, Anna Rothe, ed. {New York: H .  w. Wilson 
Company , 1947) , p. 323. 
42 New York Heral d  Tribune, 29 September 1943 , p. 4. 
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who were currently in charge of the London government-in-exi le, referring 
to Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who was then head of the London Government. 
Lange ' s  five points were: 
1 .  Poland should maintain a close military understanding with the 
Soviet Union , in a similar way as say, Canada and Mexico needs 
the military support of the United States; 
2 .  The Unitep States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union must 
establish a nuclear understunding , which is essential to the 
preservation of Poland' s  freedom. 
3. Poland must implement agrarian reform to eliminate the elements 
of feudalism and have a democratic form of government. 
4. Polish sovereignty over East Prussia i s  necess<iry for the 
peace of Europe. • • .A democratic Poland will have to expropriate 
the Junkers, to ship them out of the country and to settle their 
estates with peasants. This will break once and for all the social 
basis of Prussian militarism. 
s. T o  solve the Polish-Soviet border dispute, Lange, differing from 
the Soviet view, advocated giving the u. s .  s .  R. any areas with 
large White Ruthenian and Ukrainian populations, but expected cities 
with Polish majorities , even though situated in Ukrainian terriroty, 
to remain part of Poland. The Soviets wanted these former Polish 
cities to remain part of the u. s .  s .  R.43 
The most essential part of Lange ' s  plan was for Poland to become 
part of the Soviet military security system . This should al low the 
Soviet Union to be more understanding in regard to territorial settle­
ments since, in the final analysis ,  the entire plan would be to the 
advantage of the Soviets. Lange was evidently correct in his feelings 
because newspapers reported the following year, after Lange had been 
granted an interview with Stalin, that their ideas on the structure of 
44 postwar Poland were similar. 
In February, 1944, it was reported from London that "Moscow is 
said semi-officially to have intimated a desire for the inclusion in a 
reshuffled Polish cabinet of three or four Poles whose good faith to­
ward Russia is thought to be assured . These include Professor Oscar 
Lange of the University of Chicago.••4
5 
Then in Apri l ,  1944, Premier 
Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union invited Lange and Father Stanislaus 
Orlemanski, a Catholic priest who favored Polish-Soviet friendship ,  
to visit Moscow. The United States Department of State furnished the 
passports nit strongly asserted that Lange and Father Orlemanski were 
acting purely as private citizens. 
Lange spent six weeks in the U. s .  s .  R. and was allowed a two 
hour and twenty-minute discussion with Stalin. Lange also visited the 
44 
Polish army, organized by the Union of Polish Patriots inside the Soviet 
Union , who were stationed along the Soviet-Polish frontier. He conferred 
with Polish leaders in the Soviet Union, talked with Polish soldiers, 
44current Biography, 12i§., op. cit . ,  P• 323. 
45 Ibid . ,  P •  324. 
and visited schools that the Soviets reputedly had built for Polish 
children. On his way back to the United States, Lanqe stopped in London 
to impress upon the Polish government-in-exile his belief in Stalin ' s  
sincerity. Lange believed that "Stalin was interested in a strong and 
independent Poland, that Stalin had not the slighte�t intention of 
dictating the political� economic or social fonns of the Polish state, 
but wanted only the resignation of certain anti-Soviet people in the 
Polish government-in-exile, the inclusion of Poles from the Moscow Union 
of Polish Patriots in the new Polish cabinet, and territorial adjust-
ments.1146 In August, 1945 , just one month after the recognition of 
the Polish Provisional Government of National Liberation by the Western 
45 
Powers, rumors started to circulate that Lange would be appointed postwar 
Poland' s  first qmbassador to Washington. It was reported in the � 
York Herald Tribune by John c. Medcalfe that "the State Department would 
probably accept him but would be far from enthusiastic if Lange were 
chosen."4·7 Medcalfe further stated that the State Department feared a 
man "who is a citizen of one country today, another tomorrow, and relurns 
to his native land the third.1148 In the fall of 1945 Warsaw offered Lange 
the ambassadorship to Washington, which he �ccepted . Lange immediately 
left for Poland to regain his citizenship and receive further instructions. 
46 
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Lange said that he had taken the position to "better relations between 
the land of his birth and the land of his adoption.11 49 Lange returned 
to the United States as the new Polish Ambassador in December, 1945 . 
During 1946 and 1947 there were numerous instances when Lange was the 
only supporter of the Soviet Union ' s  p�sitions and so Lange has been 
labeled by many observers a mere Soviet puppet. Many of these attacks 
against this reputedly Soviet-dominated Polish delegate were in the 
newspapers and especially in publications of Polish groups still seeking 
to have the official pro-Soviet Polish regime abolished. so To these 
accusation� Lange simply replied, "anything that creates understanding 
between the big powers and keeps us friendly with our closest neighbor, 
Russia, and with the Western powers, too, we favor. Our very life and 
existence depend on it ( peace between the Western Powers and the Soviet 
Union) . Any conflict will be fought on our soil. Even a diplomatic 
conflict involves us . 1151 In regard to Lange ' s  attempts at conciliation 
between the West and the Soviets th� Christian Science Monitor observed: 
"His actions so far have shown th�t he is under stringent instructions 
from Warsaw not to find himself in opposition to the Soviet Union in 
Council deliberations . At the same time , however , as a former United 
States citizen, Dr. Lange is personally drawn to the latter country and 
so 
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to the viewpoint it expresses.1152 However, as the following record 
shows Lange did not always support Soviet aims, especially on issues that 
were not so widely publicized as the major crises, in which Lange usually 
supported the Soviets.53 
Against this background one should consider Poland ' s  activities in 
the United Nations Security Council from the spring of 1946 to the fall 
of 1947. Zygmunt Modzelewski,  Polish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
was the first delegate sent to the Security Council which convened in 
London for its preparatory meetings in January and February, 1946. 
�ring these early months , Modzelewski was allowed ample time to 
clearly express his feelings and establish his position with regard 
to what Poland's  role in international politics should be. In �arch, 
1946, as the Security Council reestablished itself in New York, Oscar 
Lange became the permanent Polish representative on the Security Council. 
On January 17, 1946, Modzelewski made his first appearance before 
the Security Council saying:. "Poland can look back on a long history 
devoted to the defence of justice and peace. The very life of Poland 
depends on the preservation of peace. The truth of this was shown to 
us in a sad and painful manner during the recent German occupation. 
This is but an additional reason for our endorsing whole-heartedly the 
statements in favor of peace made by the representatives of the great nations ."54 
52 
Ibid. 
53 . p . For a good summary of Lange' s  attitudes concerning post-war olish 
foreign policy see: Annex II, Document No. 10, pp. 158-162. 
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This statement, and the numerous similar ones that Modzelewski presented , 
perhaps encouraged the Western Powers in their illusory hopes that Poland 
would distinctly attempt to establish her own foreign policy decisions as 
a non-permanent, and therefore , potentially very significant, member in 
the United Nations Security Council and in world affairs. But Modzelewski ' s  
positions in the actual voting procedure of the Counci l  soon proved that 
Poland would obviously not exhibit any independent opinions under his leader-
ship. 
The first issue of major importance to be considered by the Security 
Counci l  was the application for admission to the United Nations by.Albania. 
Throughout January and February, 1946, Modzelewski arduously supported 
Soviet statements favoring A lbani a ' s  application for membership, and repeat-
edly stressed the importance of the Albanian admission into the l l 1 1 i  ted 
Nations. On February 13 , 1946, in a long, emotional speech Modzelewski 
assumed the role of "great defender" of new states and quite dramatically 
appealed to the Security Council to accept Albania as a United Nations 
member.SS Because of vigorous opposition to Albanian admission from the 
Western Powers, however, Albania was not admitted into the United Nations 
in 1946 or 194 7 .  
On January 30, 1946, the Iranian issueS6 was brought before the Counci l  
SSibid . ,  pp. 268-270. 
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··rhis concerned the withdrawal of Soviet troops which had remained 
stationed in Iran after the end of World War II.  Iran had filed a co·rrplaint 
with the Security Council stating that Soviet officials were interfering in 
Iran i:m domestic affairs, and they now sought United Nations action to correct 
the situation. 
for debate. In the extremely heated ensuing ;discuss:i;ons :.the- Soviets ; ,  
quite expectedly, took the position that no action should, or could, be 
taken toward the u .  S .  s .  R .  Under the leadership of Ernest Bevin, a 
United Nations delegate from the United Kingdom, and Wellingtion Koo, . 
the Nationalist Chinese delegate, the forces that sought to adopt some 
type of resolution ordering that the Soviet troops with?raw from Iran, 
continuously referred to the United Nations Charter as the source of 
their demands for corrective action against the Soviet qpion. Speaking 
in support of Soviet statements and against American, French, British, 
and Chinese proposal s ,  Modzelewski suggested that Iran aqd the Soviet 
49 
Union be al lowed to solve their own problems. He stated that the involve-
ment of a third party could not result in a satisfactory solution. 
In response to British and Chinese statements, Modzelewski declared, 
"If we start referring to the various Articles of the Charter, as one 
speaker did a little while ago, we can find justification for anyth.ing . 
The Charter contains a wealth of provi sions designed to meet many cases; 
it is easy to invoke such and such an article to prove that one· is right.1157 
The Council members' obvious disagreement over the type of action to be 
implemented in the franian affair resulted in a resolution recognizing 
the Soviet and Iranian agreement to negotiate, and accepting the Counci l ' s  
request for frequent reports on the progress of the negotiations. The 
Iranian issue was not completely settled during Modzelewski• s .. tenure; howev.�r, 
he had certainly demonstrated his support of Soviet aims on the issue. 
:57 �. , pp. 59-69 . 
so 
Later Modzelewski' s successor, Oscar Lange, would not be so unfailingly 
cooperative . 
Modzelewski was not quite so vigorous in his support of the Soviets 
in relation to the Greek issue. SS On February 4 ,  1946, referring to the 
problems in Greece, Modzelewski did not exhibit the same inflammatory and 
denunciatory tone he had so markedly shown in earlier debates in the 
Security Counci l ;  in fact, he conducted himself in an almost concil iatory 
manner toward the United Kingdom. In concluding a speech reviewing his 
opinions concerning the Greek situation, he stated " that the British 
troops should be withdrawn from Gi:eece in due course. This opinion is, 
moreover ,  in agreement with the statement made several times by the 
representative of Great Britain.0 59 The Greek issue was thus left to be 
dealt with independently by the British and Greek goverrunents; however ,  the 
situation erupted with even more hostility an,d complexity in Auglist, 1946. 
By this time Polish leadership in the United Nations had changed , and 
Poland ' s  opinions occasionally varied from those of the Soviets on some 
minor issues. Before the Greek issue is further considered , let us look 
at Modzelewski ' s  activities concerning other issues while the Security 
Council was in London. 
58The Greek issue involved complaints by the Soviet Union that Great 
Britain was violating the Charter by allowing her troops to remain in 
Greece in 1946. The Greek situation later developed into a civil war 
involving Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav guerri llas. The problems 
were not completely solved until 1954. 
59 
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In early January , 1946 , problems began to emerge i n  Indonesia, which 
were brought before the Security Council by the Ukrainian and Egyptain 
60 delegates. As could by now be expected Modzelewski, on February 1 1 ,  
1946, pledged strong support to the Soviet demands for the removal 
of British troops from Indonesia and called for an immediate end to the 
deplorable condi�ons for which the Dutch imperialists were responsible. 
The following day Modzelewski continued his emotional denunciations of 
the Dutch and British governments with a very innovative comparison 
f I d . • l p l d' l d . t ti • t  6 1  o n onesia s ens avement to o an s ong an unJUS cap vi Y• 
A lessening of the tension i n  Indonesia came i n  March, 1946, a s  
negotiations between the Nationalists and the Dutch were initiated. 
The only other issue of major importance discussed in the Security 
Cbuncil while Modzelewski was chief Polish delegate was the trouble which 
62 developed in Syria and Lebanon regarding the withdrawal of postwar 
Allied troops. On February 15, 1946, Modzelewski energetically supported 
Syria and Leban.on in their demands for the immediate withdrawal of French 
and British troops from their countries. When no action was taken by 
the Security Council on a draft resolution denouncing the French and 
60The Indonesian difficulties involved accusations that British 
and Dutch troops in Indonesia were fighting against the Indonesian 
Nationalists. Negotiations were carried out from 1947 to late 1949 
with a final settlement establishing an independent Indonesia. 
6 1s .  c .  O. R. , No. 1-49, PP• 245-246. 
62This situation concerned French and British troops that had not 
been withdrawn from Syria and Lebanon after World War I I .  The Soviets 
and the West clashed over the issue in the Security Council but, because 
of their failure to agree upon ar.y measures to be taken , no action was 
taken. French and British troops, however, were satisfactorily withdrawn 
by the end of 1946. 
52 
and British governments for their refusal to withdraw quickly Modzelewski 
declared: 0to be in the minority does not necessarily mean that one i s  
63 wrong ." The u .  s. s. R. and Poland had been the only members supporting 
the resolution. The following day, the United States• delegation introduced 
a resolution suggesting that the issue be privately negotiated by the 
parties involved . Modzelewsk i ,  continuing to display enthusiastic support 
for an immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon , 
violently attacked the United States• delegation for confusing the issue 
with so many proposals. The Soviet delegation was also vigorously defending 
the rights of Syria and Lebanon against the "devious Western imperialists.0
64 
Wi thout any meaningful Security Counci l  action, the Syrian-Lebanese issue 
was thus left to be settled independently. 
As noted earlier at the end of February, 1946, Modzelewsk i ,  preparing 
himself for promotion as Polish Foreign Minister to replace Wincenty 
Rzymowski ,  returned to Warsaw, surely feeling that he had distinctly 
established a permanent pattern of complete Soviet domination for the 
Polish government' s  actions within the United Nations. However, the 
selection by the Polish government of Oscar Lange as the new chief Polish 
delegate in the United Nations , now permanently based in New York , resulted 
in a very significant alteration of Polish foreign policy within the Security 
Council. On some of the same issues in which Modzelewski had so faithfully 
supported the Soviet Union , Lange quite early showed the world that he had 
63
Ibid . ,  PP• 313-314. 
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his own ideas about the conduct of Polish diplomacy. Lange managed to 
remain chief Polish delegate in the United Nations officially until 
January, 1948, actually until August, 1947, when although not completely 
censured by the Warsaw government, he was relieved of his duties in the 
Security Council and Juliusz Katz-Suchy was named acting Polish delegate to 
the Security Council, amid i:umors that Lange' s  health wpuld no longer allow 
the strenuous demands which the work of the Council required. 65 
Although Modzelewski expressed unfailing support for the u .  S .  s .  R . ,  
during January and February , 1946 , in her objections to efforts by the 
Western Powers and Iran to expedite the evacuation of Soviet troops from 
Iran, Lange shortly after his appointment to the Security Council, 
clearly exhibited that he had no intentions of unquestionalby supporting 
the u .  s .  s .  R .  in her harangues with relation to the Iranian issue. 
On March 26, 1946, in deliberations concerning the adoption of the Council ' s  
agenda,  which included consideration of the Iranian issue, clearly to the 
dismay of the Soviet delegation who had introduced a resolution which was 
to amend the agenda by deleting the time al lotment for discussion of the 
Iranian issue, Lange stated: "I have to disagree with the position of 
both the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of 
the u .  s .  s .  R. that we have to do anything here with an amendment.  I 
think we have an agenda presented by the Security-General which we have 
either to accept or reject. If we reject it; then we can vote on the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republic' s proposal. I therefore move that we vote 
;6�udzinski ,  2£. ill· , p. 40. 
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on the agenda as proposed by the Secretary-General, either accepting 
it or rejecting i t . 006 This Soviet-opposed agenda was accepted by the Counc i l .  
The following day, still upset over the Counci l ' s  approval o f  an agenda 
which included time to study the Iranian issue , the Soviets introduced a 
resolution to postpone indefinitely debate concerning the Iranian complaints 
about the Soviet disturbances in Iranian internal affairs. The Australian 
delegate then proposed a counter-resolution calling for postponement of 
the discussions concerning the problems in Iran for a very limited time. 
Unexpectedly, Lange chose to support the Australian proposal and opposed 
the earlier Soviet resolution.61 While Lange asserted that the Polish 
delegation sympathized with the Soviet view, he maintained that Po land 
would not withdraw from the Security Council meetings as the u .  s .  s. R .  
had threatened. When asked if Poland was planninQ to align herself 
with the Soviets on the Iranian issue, Lange replied, "No, Poland is not 
going to withdraw . "  Legal advi sers trying to minimize Lange ' s  statements, 
hurriedly added , "Poland has no reason to withdraw . "�� 
The Iranian problem was intermittently discussed throughout the 
remainder of March. Early in Apri l ,  1946 , the Soviet delegation submitted 
a letter to the president of the Security Council which labeled the recent 
Council action of April 4 i l legal and incorrect� The Council had scheduled 
6"6's . C . O. R.  ,. m?• ill• , pp. 24-26. 
&7.rbid . ,  pp. 43-44. 
5·9 
The New York Times, 28 March 1946 , p .  2. 
discussion of the Iranian complaints for May 6 ,  1946, as a result of an 
American proposal by James F. Byrnes, which Lange had supported . Dur- '  1 
the April 1 5 ,  1946, meeting Lange took this position concerning the 
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Soviet allegations: "I should like the record to show that the Polish 
delegation does not share the view that the action of 4 April was incorrect 
and illegal." 
"We believe i t  was perfectly legal because the resolution was taken 
after a study of the writ ten s ta temen ts subrni tted to us by both Governments,. 
the Government of Iran and the Government of the u .  s .  s .  R. I think that 
this disposes of the argument." 
"We voted for the resolution because we believed it to be correct 
and i t  serves a useful purpose.11 69 At this meeting Lange, in a seeming ly 
conciliatory mood, spoke in favor of a Soviet proposal calling for the 
removal of the Iranian complaint from the agenda, since Iran now wished 
that her earlier statements be retracted . But the Council refused to 
allow the passage of the resolution; therefore , the Iranian issue remained 
to be considered on May 6 ,  1946 . 70 
During the next several Council meetings Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet 
delegate, continued to condemn and attack the Council ' s  action which had 
schedu led consideration of the Iranian problem for May 6 .  On April 23, 
1946, i n  deliberations concerning the Soviet charges against the United 
States resolution to continue discussion of the 1ranian issue, Lange 
69s .  c .  o .  R.,.2.E.• cit . ,  p .  137. 
'70ibid . , p • . 138. 
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again spoke in opposition to the Soviet position: "There is no question of 
rescinding the resolution which was adopted on 4 April .  That resolution we 
consider is both perfectly valid legally, and also useful politically. I 
would remind the Council again that we voted for the resolution. On the 
question of its legality, we do not share the opinion of our colleague, 
the representative of the u .  s .  s .  R." Lange later asserted his confidence 
that the Soviet pledge to withdraw her troops from Iran would be fulfilled. 
Reinforcing this belief, he pointed out t:-iat Iran had accepted the Soviet 
evacuation commitment; so apparently there would be no need for the Council 
to discuss the issue. 71 
Late in May, 1946, the Iranian issue faded from the international 
scene as Iran reported to the Security Council that the Soviet troops had 
been completely withdrawn from Iranian territory . It is significant to 
note the obvious shift in Polish policy as Lange succeeded Modzelewski 
as chief Polish deleg�te to the United Nati· 'ns in March, 1946. The latter 
unquestionably supported all Soviet positions, while Lange refused to echo 
the Soviet statements. 
Another issue on which Modzelewski exhibited support of the Soviets 
was the debate� in relation to the problems involving the civil war con­
ditions in Greece. In February, 1946, Modzelewski had expressed a con­
ciliatory attitude toward Great Britain in her pledge to immediately 
withdraw her troops from Greece. Perhaps this seemingly conciliatory 
attitude on Modzelewski ' s  part toward Great Britain fostered Lange ' s  
71 
Ibid. , pp. 208-210. 
subsequent actions concerning the Greek problems, which frequently did 
not coincide exactly with the policies of the Soviet delegation. The 
57 . 
Ukrainian delegate brought the Greek issue before the Council for a second 
time in August, 1946. On September 17,  1946, Lange delivered a lengthy 
speech concerning the subject. Lange emphasized his record of open-
mindedness in earlier considerations of the Greek issue and cited his 
delegation ' s  earlier support of action allowing Great B�itain the 
opportunity to remove her troops from Greece at her own discretion. 
Lange, while still wishing to allow Great Britain time to withdraw her 
troops , also expressed his support of a Soviet proposal which demanded 
that Greece terminate her state of war with Albania and that the Greek 
government stop persecution of her own minority groups. The Greek govern-
ment , in counter-arguments, claimed that Albania ,  Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria 
were sending guerri llas into Greek territory and interfering in her 
domestic affairs .�2 
The numerous ,  varied accusations and al legations over the problems in 
Greece finally resulted in the passage of a resolution by the Security 
Council arranging for the selection of a commission to investigate the 
turmoi l  in Greece. During the December 19,  1946, meeting the Mexican 
delegate proposed an amendment to the earlier resolution establishing a 
Greek Investigative Commission, which suggested that the commission be 
composed of eleven members, a member from each of the nations represented 
on the Security Council .  Lange voted against the Mexican amendment ,  while 
Gromyko abstained. "1·3 
rn. S . C. O. R . ,  No. 50-88 , pp. 344-353. 
·73rbid . ,  p .  681. 
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At this same meeting in further discussion of the Greek issue, Lange 
introduced an amendment to the Greek Investigative Commission resolution 
which would permit free passage of the members of the Commission within 
Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. This Polish amendment was 
not satisfactory to the Soviets, because they did not want representatives 
of the West observing activities in the Soviet satellite nations; so 
Gromyko introduced an amendment allowing the commissio� members passage 
on ly in the border areas of her satellite nations therefore curbing 
free movement throughout the area. The Soviet amendment was later with-
drawn as opposition from al l members, even the Polish delegation, arose • 
. 74 The Polish amendment was finally adopted by the Council . · · 
As the Commission to investigate the .Greek problems returned in 
Apri l ,  1947 , the United States delegation introduced a resolution sug-
gesting massive aid for Greece. Lange opposed any such action declaring 
"that the United State s ,  opposing continuation of the UNRRA (United Nations 
Relief and Rehabi litation Administration) ,  c.i.ted' lack of funds for relief, 
yet now was providlng funds unilaterally, and in his opinion, to support 
an irresponsible, corrupt, inefficient, and unpopular �egime which was 
itself creating instabi lity; such aid constituted a direct violation of 
the Charter.•�5 Throughout June and July , 1947, Lange positioned himself 
more in support of the Soviets and in opposition to the West in all questions 
'74rbid. ' pp. 684-686. 
75 
International Organi zation , I (September, 1947) , p. 332. 
involving the Greek issue.76 Finally in a series of votes on July 29 , 
77 1947, on an American draft resolution concerning the Greek problems, 
�,,mge and the Soviets voted differently on several of the articles of 
the proposal, put both were against the entire resolution in the final 
59 
analysis. Lange managed through this series of votes , however, to show that 
his opinion of the resolution was not completely identical with that of the 
Soviet delegation, as can be seen by studying the section-by-section voting tally. 
76 S .  C. O. R. , No. 121-146, PP• 768-785 .  
77The voting record of Poland and the u. s .  s .  R .  was: 
78 
Prea'nble--Poland, no 
u. s .  s .  R . ,  abstain 
Article II, Paragraph 1--Poland, yes 
u .  s .  s .  R . ,  .abstain 
Article II, Paragraph 2--Poland, no 
u .  s .  s. R . ,  abstain 
Article II--Poland, yes 
u. s. s .  R . ,  abstain 
Article III--Poland, yes 
u .  s .  s .  R.,  abstain 
Article IV--Poland, abstain 
u. s .  s .  R . ,  abstain 
Article V--Poland, abstain 
u. s. s .  R. , abstain 
Article VI--Poland , no 
u. s .  s .  R. , abstain 
Article VI, Paragraph 6A--Poland, no 
U. s. s. R. , abstain 
Article VI, Paragraph 6B--Poland, abstain 
U. s .  s .  R. , abstain 
Article VII--Poland, yes 
u. s .  S. R . ,  abstain 
Entir� Draft Resolution--Poland , no 
u. s .  s .  R. , no. 
S. C. O. R . ,  No. 147-173 , pp. 1693-1613. 
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On August 4 ,  1947;  the Commission of Investigation on the Greek 
Frontier Incidents made its final report .tq the Council. Poland, with 
Lange by this time already in semi-retirement and not participating 
in the Security Council ' s  activities, voted with the U .  s .  s .  R .  
continuously, placing the blame for all the difficulties in the area 
on Greece, while vigorous ly trying to exonerate the �lbanian government. 19� 
On August 6 ,  1947, however, for no apparent reason, Juliusz Katz-
Suchy voted in favor of a Columbian resolution which called for further 
study by the Investigative Commission in the Greek area while the 
U .  s .  s.  R .  abstained . Perhaps this vote was merely a case of mixed 
signals between the Soviet delegation and Katz-Suchy, the new acting 
so . 
Polish delegate to the Security Counc:Li . -·· � 
. 
The Greek issue was a good example of Polish activity in the United 
Nations during 1946 and 1947 , showing most of the facets of Polish 
political activity in the United Nations during this period. During the 
first two months of 1946, with Modzelewski as the chief Polish spokesman, 
the Polish delegation exhibited ardent support of any Soviet policy; then 
for awhile during mid-1946 and early-1947, because of the boldness of 
Oscar Lange, Polish diplomacy in the United Nations underwent a period in 
which attempts were made to establish a semi-independent role for Poland 
in world politics by not completely mimicking the Sovlet statements toward 
the issue; then by mid-1947, with his demotion eminent, Lange chose only 
1.a9 
s .  C .  O. R . ,  No. 174-196, pp. 1715-1741. 
' I  89. 
Ibid . ,  p. 1806. 
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to show opposition to the Soviets in a very limit0d and meaning less way; 
and finally, after Lange ' s  removal from active participation in August, 
1947, one again finds absolute and energetic support of all Soviet policy. 
Such was the pattern for most of Poland ' s  foreign policy attitudes on 
the major issues brought before the United Nations during 1946 and 1947. 
In considerations of the applications of new members to the United 
Nations, Polish policy follows the same kind of pattern as has been out-
lined with regard to the Greek issue. The Polish delegation, however, 
regardless of leadership consistently adhered to the Soviet assertion that 
Albania should be immediately accepted as a member in the United Nations, 
but Albania failed to be admitted during 1946 and 1947 because of staunch 
objections by the West. Poland and the u. s. s. R. voted identically on 
all applications for membership on August 29, 1946, except that of Ireland. 
With Lange voting for the Polish delegation, Poland voted in favor of 
I l d .  . . h . l  S R bl l d I . h dm . . 81 re an s admission, w i e the u. s. • • atant y oppose ris a ission. 
However ,  by the time applications for admissions were again discussed on 
August 18, 1947, and Lange had been replaced by Katz-Suchy , the Polish 
delegation refusing to display any support for Ireland only abstained in 
the vote on the Irish application for membership, again substantiating the 
fact that the u. s .  s. R. had gained firmer control of Polish policy by late 
1947.82 
81soth the Soviet and Polish delegations supported, Mongolia, which 
was not admitted; Afghanistan, Iceland, and Sweden , which were admitted; 
and both were opposed to the admitta�ce of Transjordan and Portugal ,  neither 
of which were admi tted during the 1946 session. S .  c .  o. R. , No. 50-88 , 
pp. 132-140. 
82s. C .  O. R . ,  N o .  174-196, PP• 2027-205 5 .  
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In January, 1947 , the Security Council was involved in debate concerning 
general disurmanrnent and weapon reduction . Lange ' s  extreme desire to accomp-
lish some kind of armament agreement between the East and West was shown in 
some of the votes and debates concerning this issue. In many cases Lange 
seemed to be attempting to function as a mediator between the World Powers. 
On January 15, 1947 , three proposals . had been placed before the Security 
Council members concerning this issue. One proposal from each of these 
nations; France, Australia, and the u .  s .  s .  R .  had been introduced and, 
quite surprising ly, Lange did not choose to support the Soviet plan. He 
suggested that "the one presented by the representative of France might 
be the easiest for all of us to agree upon. I think i t  contains everything 
which appears in the draft resolution pre��nted by the u .  s .  s .  R . ,  and I 
hope , therefore , that he may be able to agree to i t .  I t  also contains 
essentially what is the chief concern o� the representative of the United 
States, namely, that we do not forget about considering the report of the 
Atomic Energy Commission . "  Lange ' s  speech continued in an extremely 
conciliatory tone . 83· 
Lange ' s  spirit of compromise was again expressed on February 1 3 ,  1947, 
as he voted in favor of a final Security Council resolution concerning 
general regulation and reduction of armaments which included an article 
requiring all nations to contribute information concerning their military 
capabilities to the United Nations. The u .  s .  s .  R. refused to support the 
resolution , obviously not wanting the Western Powers to know anything about 
d3 . c 0 .:> . • • R . ,  No. 89 to 120, p .  90 • 
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their military establishment. The question of armed forces seemed to 
be of paramount importance to Lange as was shown by vestiges of independence 
as late as mid 1947. Lange, his authority already in sharp decline, still 
had the courage to exhibit outright opposition to the u. s. S .  R. on June 
24, 1947, as the Security Council discussed a series of Belgian amendments 
to the United Nations Charter concerning the organization of the United 
Nations • armed forces. On the first amendment to Article 6, under Article 
43 of the Charter both Poland and the u. s .  s .  R. voted yes, but on the 
second Belgian amendment, this one to Article 10 of the Charter, Poland 
voted yes and the u .  s .  s. R .  abstained, and finally on the third Belgian 
amendment, this one to Article 13 of the Charter, Poland voted yes, and the 
85 u. s. s. R. voted no. This was Lang e ' s  last attempt to slow down the 
growing arms race, as his authority and influence in Polish foreign affairs 
was soon to end. 
Early in January, 1947, another instance of Polish insubordination 
toward the Soviet Union can be cited. Trouble had arisen in the Corfu 
Channel off the coast of Albania .86 On January 20, 1947, the British 
delegation, still uncertain of the course their nation would pursue in 
this matter, did not want the issue placed on the Security Council ' s  
agenda, but the Soviet delegate initiated efforts to place the incident 
on the agenda. Lange voted with Great Britain in favor of an agenda which 
84Ibid . ,  P •  247. 
85 S. C. O. R . ,  No. 121-146, pp. 1067-1073. 
86sritish ships had been damaged by mines in the Corfu Channel 
allegedly laid by the Albanian government. The United Nations Security 
Council was never able to agree upon where the responsibility for the trouble lay. 
64 
. ,, 
did not include the Corfu Channel incidents; the Soviet.: Union abstained. 97 · 
After the British had submitted letters to the Security Council accusing 
Albania of placing the unmarked mines in the Corfu Channel which had caused 
damage to British property and a loss of some British personne l ,  Lange again 
deviated from the Soviet delegation ' s  policy on January 2�, 1947. Gromyko 
wanted the Council to require by a vote that the president of the Counci l  
inquire of the Albqnian government as to when Albania wou ld make a reply 
to the Council concerning the British charge s .  Lange refuted Gromyko 
by stating: "I already said earlier that I quite concur with your proposal 
to inquire from the Albanian Government the possible date of the arrival of 
its representatives .  However, I wonder whether the matter is of sufficient 
importance for us to take a formal vote on this subject. I think it is 
really in the normal prerogatives of the President to take whatever action 
he seems necessary, since this is simply a matter within, so to speak , the 
administrative field of the President. I suggest that we leave this to 
the President without taking a vote on i t . "  The Counci l  president adhered 
to Lange ' s  suggestions and the vote was not taken as the Soviet delegation 
88· 
had desired . .. ' '· 
On February 10, 1947, in further discussion of the Corfu Channel 
incidents several amendments to a major resolution calling for an in-
vestigation of the Corfu Channel affair were introduced. In a vote on a 
Soviet amendment Poland abstained and the u .  s. s. R. voted yes, while the 
vote on a Polish amendment was just the reverse. On an American amendment, 
�.·87s . c. o. R . ,  No. 89-120, p. 128 • 
. ea 
·Ibid . ,  p. 135 . 
however, both Poland and the u .  s. s .  R. abstained . A Security Council 
sub-committee was then selected to study the incidents, and Juliusz 
Katz-Suchy participated as the Polish representative.89 Katz-Suchy and 
65 
the Soviet representative on the sub-committee submitted a minority report 
concerning the incidents which refused to place any blame on the Albanian 
government, while the majority report placed all responsibility on Albania. 
Because of the Soviet Union• s veto power no action could be taken against 
Albania; so the case was eventually referred to the International Court 
of Justice, which later assigned all responsibility to Albania. 
After World War II another problem which had to be settled by the 
United Nations concerned the administration of the mandated islands of 
defeated Japan. Oscar Lang e ,  acting for Poland, seemed destined to mold an 
independent Polish policy concerning this issue, perhaps because of the 
initial Soviet attitude of disinterest in the Pacific area. Deliberations 
relating to a draft trusteeship agreement for the former Japanese mandated 
islands began in early March, 1947, with Poland, and the U .  s. s. R. allowing 
the United States, in accord with American security aims, to take the in­
itiative in outlining a settlement to the problems involved in· the future 
administration of these islands. However , by April 2, 1947, when final 
votes were being taken the u .  s .  s .  R. had evidently decided to object 
to any postwar American ambitions to control the Pacific area. In a 
vote on a resolution which merely called for the termination of the 
Japanese mandate on the islands, Poland voted yes , while the u. s. s .  R. 
chose to abstain. The American representc. i� 1 ve with the support of the 
89 Ibid . ,  P• 188. 
Polish delegation then introduced an amendment to the original resolution 
which called for the establishment of American control of the former 
Japanese mandated islands , but the u .  s .  S .  R .  vetoed the amendment . 
the Soviet delegation introduced an amendment, without the supr>ort of the 
Polish delegation, which would have denied American dominance of the 
islands, and not surprisingly this amendment was vetoed by the United 
States. Finally the Polish delegation introduced an amendment which 
established an American a:iministered United Nations trusteeship over the 
66 
former Japanese mandated islands. Since this plan was acceptable to both 
the United States and the u .  s .  s. R. it was adopted by the Security 
Council, thus solving temporarily the problems in the Pacific area . 90 · 
As stated earlier, in February, _1946, Modzelewski had consistently 
supported all the Soviet denunciations and accusations of the British and 
Dutch in their activities in Indonesia. The Ukrainian delegate had charged 
before the Security Council that British and Dutch troops were jointly 
attempting to repress the Indonesian Nationalists' efforts .to establish a 
free Indonesia, but by March, 1947, the controversy had cooled down as the 
Dutch and Indonesian Nationalists met to negotiate a settlement. By August, 
1947 ,  however, the trouble in Indonesia again erupted full scale. As .the 
principal castigator of the British and Dutch the Soviet delegation had 
introduced a resolution which called for the immediate withdrawal of the 
British and Dutch troops in order to permit complete Indonesian independence. 
' 
Whereas Modelezewski had earlier ardently and indiscriminately supported . 
any Soviet proposal concerning Indonesia, Lange displayed perhaps lightly 
; 90� . c. o. R . ,  No. 121 to 146, pp. 658-679. 
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to the world, but undoubtedly stinging ly to the Soviets, that he cou ld 
sti l l ,  even as late as August 1 ,  1947, correct the Soviet delegation , 
as he delivered the following speech with relation to the Soviet resolution 
concerning Indonesia:. "As regards the addition suggested "t:rj the u .  s. s .  R . ' s  
representative , I had myse lf prepared an amendment which demands the same 
thing, though in other words .  Reading the addition to the draft resolution 
proposed by the 4 .  s. s .  R . ' s  representative , however, I· find that there 
is one point which is not covered, but which I had in;ended to present. 
The u .  s .  s .  R. ' s addition states that • troops should immediately be 
withdrawn to ( their) previous positions , •  and so on. As a minor point 
I should rather prefer to use the term • armed forces• since we are informed 
that naval forces, aircraft and so forth are used. I should suggest the 
inclusion of the words • armed forces and administrations ' ." In a later 
vote on the Indonesian resolution amended by the United States, Poland 
and the U .  s .  s .  R. voted together, except on the first paragraph of the· 
preamble in which Poland voted affirmatively while the U. s .  s. R. abstained . 91 
Eventually an independent Indonesia was created in December, 1949, as the 
Dutch withdrew from the area. 
Lange was able consistently to exhibit his difference of opinion with the 
Soviet Union ' s  policy with little fear of chastisement by frequently opposing 
the u .  s. s. R. on procedural matters. Perhaps Lange felt that he could 
continue to trouble the Soviets and show his dislike at always being labeled 
a Soviet puppet by deviating from the u. s. s. R . • s  directives on these �ess 
91 
S .  C. O. R . ,  No. 147-173, pp. 1686-1700. 
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publicized matters. Lange could contradict the Soviets on procedural votes 
with nominal international publicity, but had he taken such distinctly 
opposing positions on the more significant international political issues, 
he probably would not have survived as chief Polish delegate to the United 
Nations as long as he did. By continuously disagreeing with the Soviet 
delegation on procedural matters, Lange surely disquieted the Soviets and 
forced them to maintain interminable fears about the degree of authority 
they actually possessed over Lange, and Poland ' s  foreign policy at this 
time. 
On September 23, 1946, in a debate on the adoption of the agenda 
Lange opposed the Soviet delegation ' s  efforts to leave consideration of 
the border disputes in Greece off the Security Council ' s  agenda. Lange, 
obviously to the Soviet ' s  dissatisfaction, declared: "In the view of the 
Polish delegation, the question of the adoption of an item on the agenda 
is not a matter of passing judgment on the merits of the case, but is 
simply an expression of the view that the item is of sufficient importance 
to be considered by the Council. I would contend that the very fact that 
a government which is a member of the United Nations brings an item to 
our attention indicates that it is of sufficient importance to be con­
sidered. The government may be right or wrong , that is another matter.1192 
In such statements as these Lange was able to - display his annoyance with 
the Soviet' s  continual attempts to control the Council ' s  activities. The 
Soviets never seemed to gain complete control of Lange' s  actions concerning 
procedural matters. 93 
92 
93 
s .  C. o. R . ,  No. 50-88 , p .  429. 
Lange stated that, npoland is not, and will never consent to be, 
a satellite of any power, near or distant... For further information see: 
Annex II , Document 10, PP• 158-162. 
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Numerous occasions can be cited illustrating Lange ' s  opposition 
to the Soviets. On December 16 , 1946, in a vote on an Australian resolution 
to extend the term of the Council president, H .  v .  Johnson, until the end 
of December, Lange voted yes and the u .  s .  s .  R .  voted no • . .94) Rudzinski 
states that during this period when Gromyko "indulged in vicious and 
constant verbal attacks repeated on every occasion, anq even without 
occasion, directed against the Australian delegation" Lange remained 
a close friend of Herbert V .  Evatt a major Australian representative to 
the United Nations. 95' On January 20, 1947, Lange also favored the 
Australian delegation in a vote on a proposal to al low the current 
Council president, N .  J .  o. Makin of Australia, to determine and 
convene the next Council meeting , in which Lange voted yes and the 
u. s. s .  R. abstained, because of the Soviet ' s  dissatisfaction over the 
Council ' s  conduct concerning the Corfu Channel incidents. 96 .. 
On January 20, 1947, Lange again voted in favor of the adoption of 
an agenda, in line with policy of the United Kingdom, and against the 
desires of the Soviet delegate, who abstained in the vote because of 
Britain ' s  refusal to allow investigation of the trouble which had just 
arisen in the Corfu Channel .  On June 20, 1947, in a procedural vote for 
the adoption of an agenda, Poland again opposed the u. s .  s .  R . ;  Lange 
voted affirmatively and the Soviet delegate voted no. Also at this 
.. 9� 
• · Ibid. ,  p.  587. 
' �? _) d . k .  . 199 h.u zins l. , �. _S2J:.. , p.  • 
. .  96 
.t... .. : 
S .  C .  O.  R . ,  No. 89-120 , p.  128. 
meeting Lange supported a proposal to consider privately the appointment 
of a governor for Trieste, which the Council had established as a free 
port in January, 1947; the U .  s. s.  R. abstained on a final proposal 
97 which arranged to leave the Trieste issue off the agenda. In the 
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July 10, 1947, Council meeting Gromyko wanted to leave a letter of appli-
cation to the United Nations from Austria off the agenda because no 
formal peace treaty had as yet been signed between all the All ied Powers 
and Austria. In the final vote on the adoption of the agenda, however, 
which included consideration of the Austrian letter of application for 
membership, Poland voted yes, and the u. s. s. R. abstained.98 On 
July 29, 1947, one of Lange ' s  last actions in the Security Council be-
fore he was replaced by Juliusz Katz-Suchy , was to vote no on a proposal 
99 for adjournment while the u. s. s.  R. voted yes. 
This was the last account of any divergence between the balloting 
of the Polish delegation and the Soviet delegation in the Security 
Council. During the latter part of 1947, Juliusz Katz-Suchy became the 
acting chief Polish representative on the Security Council. Katz-Suchy 
was later named permanent representative to the United Nations from 
Poland as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary . Katz-Suchy 
had been a Communist since he was about fifteen and his appointment to 
975 . c. o. R. , No. 121-146, p . 1052-1053. 
98c .:.> . c. o. R. ' No. 146-173, p • 1260. 
99 T b" . - 10 . ,  pp. 1603-1613. 
l 
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this high position within the Polish Foreign Ministry was the first instance 
of an outright Communist being designated as head of a foreign ambassadorial 
delegation from Poland. lOO 
Katz-Suchy had been an alternate representative of Poland to the 
United Nations Security Council since March; 1947. He was a member of a 
Security Council sub-committee which investigated Great Britain' s  charges 
that Albania had laid mines in the Corfu Channel which had resulted in the 
destruction of two British vessels in 1947.101 Katz-Suchy urged the 
Security Council members to support his position that there was not 
sufficient evidence to confirm the British accusations against Albania. 
As acting head Polish delegate to the Security Council after August, 1947, 
Katz-Suchy exhibited unfailing support for the Soviet Union: By supporting 
u. s .  s .  R. and Egyptian demands that British troops be withdrawn from Egypt 
and the Sudan; in votes against United States and Australian resolutions to 
cope with the problems in Greece; and by continually holding to the position 
that he would support admission of Finland and Italy into the United Nations, 
102 only if Rumania, Bulgaria ,  and Hungary were admitted. Katz-Suchy was also 
named alternate Polish representative to the Economic and Social Committee 
and began a long series of attacks on United States President Harry s .  
Truman. The New York Times declared that "his denunciations of the West 
have more than matched Andrei Vyshinshy' s" ( a  Soviet delegate to the United 
100 Ruth Karpf, "The Big Brain From Poland," United Nations World, 
III (May, 1949) , P• 60-62. 
101 See Annex I I ,  Document i-:o. 13, pp. 166-177. 
1020?ersonali tier; of the General Asse::-.bly," United :,tat� \':eekly 
Bu11�tin, rv· (May l ,  1948 ) , P• 371. 
Nations) .  Katz-Suchy had become "Poland' s best known representative 
103 abrocid." 
Katz-Suchy energetically continued his vehement verbal outbursts 
against the West as Chief Polish United Nations delegate until August, 
1951. He was then replaced by Henryk Birecki. I t  was rumo=ed that 
Katz-Suchy had been recalled because he was too Western-minded for the 
Soviets, since he had lived in England for several yeqrs during the 
war and had marri�d an Eng lish woman, Elizabeth Nenkes.104 However, 
Katz-Suchy denied all such rumors as "stupidities" and said that he 
had requested transferral back to Poland where he would pursue some 
academic interests. The � York Times stated that the suggestions 
that Katz-Suchy had been recalled to Poland because he was too western-
minded "should s14rprise anyone who has listened to his speeches during 
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the last few years. For sheer vitriol they are unsurpassed by any 
Communist oratory so far heard in the West."105 Despite his enthusiastic 
defense of the most radical forms of Communism, Katz-Suchy was labeled 
as a "London Pole" by the Soviets.106 In spite of these contradictory 
interpretations of Katz-Suchy ' s  behavior, after August, 1947 the Polish 
contribution to international affairs through the United Nations became 
nothing more than a series of unrealistic verbal attacks and denunciations 
of the West, especially directed toward the United States.107 
103�ew � Times , 26 August 1951, IV-2. 
104N�w � T�mes, 24 August 1951, p .  1 .  
l05Ibid. 
-
l06�b· d .:!:...2:....• 
107 See Annex II , Document No. 14, pp. 172-182 . 
Votin9 Record on Major Unite'! �.,,, 'ons Security Council 
1946-1947 • 
---U. S. S. R. 
--Pol end 
73 
' 
·-;II�� I � - Corf•� - - - t ---- -
- -----:,..---------.r--"G1'u.,�, .. .,P-rF-a'11r- .-.-- -----;-,,--- ----.,,..--------,--------I 
M ate 1 soanish Channel Grcelc Ifanian Albani \n I.rish ls�ment Tfieste Indonesian Sfil!!? and I A�endW Islands • issue Incidents Issue ssue l.dmiss on Admission Weapon°ltE!ducUon , ssue Issue -1sS� f�esral ! -- -·-�--· ___. .-- ·-- - .. . - -- � --- - ---� --++---..--�---1-- -.---,.----+-----:---.-- +1t--ir---,---++---r--.,----+11--- ---- · Yes No Ab'.: Yes No Ab Yes No Ab YPS No Ah 1 v - .,n ..... 1 I Yes No Ab Yes No Ab Yes No Ah Va• .,� ,.. Va• "'n •'- Yes "'- '"' Yes No Ah I "" 
I - . -- - --rt-'""'·-r--r--- -+--+---H--+--�--t-1----l'---+- +---.j---+--+4--+---+---M---+----1---H---4---1--__. �-- I - - -� -- - - ·  - � --.j--+--+.j---+--.j--�---1---+--�'---1---+--�--+--+--+.j--+--.j--��-+---+-�• I DU 
l+-- +--.J----',l---1---l-- -U--1- PU PU I I 
H----1- -*-----'l i----- - - ---· . - --- - ----· U .. ·-;--t- ! PU 
l j  U D >-+---<-- ->-----�.f!L-
.. -'---'-· � ·-=-=--__ =- P .
. 
-. U 
- - - --+---++---1---1--
1
. -· � - -• '---- , - '-- >--· - �,·-+ =-U-.i--++---11--j"_'.._ _ _ -- -·-"---· _ -· _ -· -- ·--+---+--+t-P--t-_u +---Hl---t---+--+---''--+---t-.j--lf---+--Hf--+---+--H---1---1-
---· 1 . ; .. ·- - . I- - _  ,_ ,  p u ,- -'--· --- _ll _...;.'--+---+-1---1---1---l+--l�-+--Jl-l-.-4--1--
I I I p u 
-
I 1 . -LJ__ I p u 
+r--+--+--+--1---1- u P .• I 
- - -. 
p u 
I 
_ 
. 
P u -,___ ·1 - ---4---!-- �-++--1---1--+1-- t--+---tt--t--t-
i i' - p u 
I -, P u 
+---1-- -l- -!1-l-- -1---- �--p- ---- , -
� _ I u P I 
F
i_'--_ _  _J p u I 
·--· l u p I - p 
u 
I -
PU I I 
p u ! 
. ..J_�-l-�-l-�-1--' -+---l--+l-�-l--�-t----1H-�+-�+-�-tr�-r--t-p u I -
u p I 
Jt_-� �- i - ·!=_ _- - 1-_ r-� -_
_ 
1 - ' -= .. " i . " : , :- -II u IT I I i  - - �-- p u l --'-+---+---'" - ->---. � -+�-!-- l - J__..Ul--L�-L-l-+..:'....4--l--1-1---1�-t-�tt--t--+-H--ll---+--tt-::-��, l I_ � 1 -- . - - 1 · -----·- -- ou' - ,, ,--� .•. P •J 
PU - I -� - ·--- ' i-.- l _ _ I 
- PU i I I I 
_.__,  _L_.U---1-=p�...:U:_j__ - I I . ' I I I I 1 1  -I 
I I  _L _II I I I L 11 I I 11 I I ·1 11 I I I I I I 11 I I I  P I u 
--·-· --· · - - -- -u p u p p u I u p 
I I --· -·- --1
-
· ·--· -
.r· 
·1-
---·---
IL - ·1 I · ·L-:• I . L I I - i -
. 
-
- I I 11 I 
"1 '1 ' ' 1 1 'I 
---
11 I 
p u 
I 
t 
11 I u I 
. I 
• I 
- , " 
� " I 
, " .  
p I 
I 
- u 
. 
PU 
--·Ji -+-_l[ __ 
_
I _ . . l · - I 11 
__:i-J--t- . -I--'-
=..--J +··- - · --
---·- . .  
�rn=t=F-11 L I lid I 11 · ]�-h, i.IJ=I , =t= I . . II L_ I JI 
- - - �- -
I 11 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1  - - -
II . I ! 11 I I 11 
I 11 , 
P I u I II I �---•--- - • -
I  p I P_l.� -p u u 
-1---J-!--t---1--H----���--
PU 
PU P I I U 
P I I u 
ntically with those of the u. s. S. R. 
y vote taken in the Security 
, foreign policy took in the 
_L I 
I I . .  
�--�·11-
. �l I 
I I 11 I I 'I I I I 11 I 
I 
I 
: 
I I 
I i 
I I 
I I I , · I 1 1  u I P p i u / 
I ' I I 
' '  , l :  Poland's Voting Record on Major Unitc:d '�" """ Security Council 
Issues, 1946-1947.• 
U----U, S .  S .  R. 
P---Poland 
' ( ·---- -------·· Ja�;;;e , - -C�rfll ' .. - -- - , - - -- ---- nb l I · Date Mandate 1 Soantsh Channel Grc-ek Ifanian · an "' n 
Islar::� ___ : __ - -�:.:'.':: -·- _ , �c�d.en�� - ·  ,. I Issue__ ssu� 
_
_ 
.' dmiss on Admi� -H--------1+---'--
I -
-- -
Yes No Ab-' o; Yes No Ab Yes No Ab Yes No Ah Yos NA .... Yes No nb Yes Ne 
1-30-116 I - · ·--- - · -·- - -----·--'?'-'U'-�---t--- -1---+---++---1--2-4-46 I PU ' 
I 2-11-46 I -
· 
-
·
-
--- - - -· - - i - -- - - - .. · 
2-13-46 I ;;;- PU 
2-15-46 ··-� __ ____ _ _  �-___ _ _ _ _ .  -.. -. _ __ I . ... _ -·- ·----1----1---1-1---1--
3-26-46 I U --!--'(>'---!--� ---1---+---++---+--I 3-27-46 I I � ., 
4-17-46 PU 
_ I 4-23-46 
--· 
-_ ·1-·--- - -- ... .. --- j �· - u 
_ LJ.::�::46 j__ .L___ _ --=-=-=- --· - -
-�--'<--i----· --1----1---IH---lf--
j 0-29-46 I ' p u - i - -- -·-- ----·-- ·- - ·--- - -·- - - - ·-- ·-·-- .. __ -1---1---114---lf--
9-l 7-46 ' (> u - - - , . . - -
-
- · -
-
-
··
-
-
-- - --- - - --- -- --- - -- --
12-16-46 • 
I 12-19-46 I ' I I p u 1 1  --
_ I i2-19-46 I _ . r u P - j-� --'-- --· 1 · _,_ 
1-15-47 
JJ i-20-47 p u T 
_[ ! i-20-47 I . ·- .. 
I 1-20-47 I I -l---++---+---l-·-·---
1-28-47 I l ---·-- -;- -p- --- 1  I ... -1--+--+-1--+--
- 2-10-41 '._ I u P 
2-10-47 : - - __ J. p u 
2.:.10-47 -1 u p -
i 2-13-47 -·-- I 
l 3-7"-"47 PU I 
4-2-47 P. u T 
·--
4-2-47 P u I 
4-2-47 u p l 
:=:�=:: �--. 1- -· l --- � -. . - - - --- . - :· ·--· ! I - -- I I - , 6-24-47 --J -r ;,- --- - ·- 1·· - - - -- - . --;--i-1·6-24-47 d I . ii _ --,, - ------ .I - , __ _,_ _ __, ___ J�-- ! 
I ... -.. -- ---. 6-24-47 ' _ - �; -'-- . _1 __ 1 __ __ ...
. 
I 
7-10-47 I _j - - 1--·· ___ _ ,___. --·· . 'P -··1--. . ' . .,... �I - - <4 • • • .,.4"' "I 1 I ""1·1"F>� "'fl ;;.:;;..�-· ' 
7-29-47- : 
1 
-
· 
_ _ PU -
��7 
-
� 
1-29-47 p u I 
�=�:=:� 
- - - · --- .. - � p � j� - l --1+,---1-
7-29-47 ---· _,._ P u . T I _ , 
1-29-47 I P u 
7-29-47 
p U 
· 
•·' I 
7-29 4 7 P" ·U Jii ti"� ---4---,�-f+--i-
I 7-29-47 I PU 
. 
j: &. 
l 7-29-4 7 i 
-
p u 1'"'-.. 1 -+---+-�t---t-. � .. .. . 7-29-47 .. :_; .;: -"�i'T1't--tt--1r-
8-l-47 
8-4-47 PU 
I I --.i;.;-.H----t-
8-6-47 P u ·'·..i .,.,r.,.1 H"Hi++--t--
e-1e-47 
8-18-47 1 � �--+--!_'.'11 Polish votes '\fter 8-18-47, conincided identically with those of the u. s. s. R, ., ;;�;.i.,1_;:._, _ 
. does not a ; show the p 
O. R. S. C. 
11 
In 1953 Alexander w. Rudzinski wrote a detailed account of his years 
in the United Nations n s  a Polish adviser and member of the United Nations• 
Committee of Experts. Rudzinski came to the United Nations in March , 1946, 
as a legal adviser to Oscar lange upon Lange ' s  appointment as chief Polish 
delegate to the United Nations Security Council .  Rudzinski had discussed 
in detail his experiences within the United Nations until 1950 ,  when he 
was relieved of his duties by the Polish government. As an influential 
member of the Polish delegation to the United Nations, Rudzinsk i ' s  
observations are invaluable, but, the information must be accepted as 
personal statements. In comparison with the complete official account, 
Rudzinski ' s  conclusions appear basically accurate. 
Rudzinski states that Zygmunt Modzelewski was actually the power in 
the Polish Foreign Ministry initially and that du.ring these early years 
the Soviets were apparently willing to allow Modzelewski a certain margin 
of freedo� in the inst.ruction of the Polish diplomats. Modzelewski was 
a Moscow-t.rained Communist, whom the Soviets completely t.rusted in the 
beginning . To the subsequent consternation of the Soviets, however, 
Modzelewski was convinced that even though i t  was desirable for Poland to 
closely adhere to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, she could still 
maintain friendly relations with the Western Powers. Oscar Lange had 
had lengthy conferences with Modzelewski and realized that according to 
Modzelewsk i ,  Big Three cooperation was to be a major goal of Polish 
108 
diplomacy . 
lOSR 
d . k "  . 100 101 u zins i ,  ££• �. , PP• - • 
Lange did not receive specific instructions from Warsaw concerning 
the position he was to adopt in the votes dudng the months from March 
to June, 1946. During this period Lange merely voted according to his 
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own judgment, then reported his actions to Modzelewski and Jozef Olszewski, 
head of the Political Department in the Polish Forei�n M�nistry, and sub-
mittcct explanations of his final decisions. On certain occasions Lange 
would also send reports to the Foreign Ministry on fut�re issues to be 
discussed in the United Nations so as to allow Warsaw enough time to 
dispatch specific instructions to him if the Polish government desired. 
However,  Warsaw usually reacted slowly on these advance requests, 
therefore granting Lange more frequent opportunities to use his own 
judgment successfully. In late summer, 1946, Lange went to Warsaw 
and was severely criticized by Olszewski for the. instances in which 
Lange had not voted in accordance with the Soviet delegation. After 
this confrontation Lange was more reluctant to exhibit as much outright 
. Jl09 opposition to the Soviet point of view as before. 
In April, 1946, Lange received directives from Warsaw instructing 
him to submit letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
requesting that all members of the United Nations sever diplomatic 
relations with the fascist government of Gene�alissimo Francisco Franco 
in Spain. �lf> Rudzinski says that he is certain that Lange did not think 
·u.09 . . -:rbid. ,  pp. 101-10 3 .  
illO 
See Annex II , Documents No. 1 1  and No. 1 2 ,  pp. 163-169. 
that this request from Warsaw was actually a Soviet order, as � c  appeared 
to be to the rest of the world. The West felt that this move by Lange 
was simply another indication of Poland ' s  subservience to Soviet dictates. 
Lange swayed from Soviet policy on the Spanish issue, however, when he 
cKpressed his willingness to accept the sub-committee ' s  report on the 
Spanish situation which suggested that discussion of the Polish resolution 
calling for emendatory action toward Franco ' s  regime be terminated. Lange 
actually tried unsuccessful ly to persuade Gromyko to accept the sub-com­
mittee' s negative report.ll'l.! 
\ 
During the first half of the United Nations sessions in 1946, the 
control of atomic weapons was discussed on several occasions. Lange 
had sent advance corrununiques to Warsaw informing the Polish government 
that the Polish delegation in New York had agre·.�o to accept the American 
plan for international control of atomic energy, subject to several 
Polish reservations .. However, the day before Lange was scheduled to 
deliver a speech to the United Nations outlining the Polish delegation ' s  
position concurrent with these principles, orders arrived from Warsaw 
directing Lange to adopt a negative attitude toward the American plan. 
In this case Lange was forced to alter his own earlier decision and re-
place it the following day with an inflammatory and derogatory speech 
against the attempts by the United States to reach meaningful agreement 
for international control of atomic energy . li2 
P1 
�udzinski ,  .££· cit . ,  pp. 103-104. 
114 
Ibid . ,  p .  104. 
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Rudzinski states that again during February, 1947, Poland and the 
u .  s. s. R. disagreed over �he general reduction of arm;,·· nts and control 
of atomic energy • . At this time Lange decided to introduce a resolution 
before the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The Polish proposal 
would have reduced the armed forces of all member states in the United 
Nations to small contingent forces to be placed at the disposal of the 
United Nations under Article Forty-Three of the Charter and would limit 
internal military capabilities of the members to small forces for police 
obligations and forces necessary for the occupation of Japan, Germany, 
and Austria until peace treaties were signed. Lange took the proposal 
to Gromyko for Soviet approval. Gromyko firmly rejected the plan; 
therefore, Lange abandoned the entire idea. Gromyko offered the following 
explanation for his negative position: "such a reduction of armed forces 
to internal police only as suggested would deprive the Soviet Union of 
its present preponderance on land and would not affect significantly 
W t d th .. 113 es ern prepon erance on e sea. Rudzinski says that the Polish 
delegation tried to arrive at some kind of compromise resolution for the 
control of atomic energy, but Gromyko made it quite irrevocably clear that 
the Soviets were not desirous of any atomic agreement which even slightly 
f d t tu l . i f t . . t 11 t •  114 re erre o mu a inspect on o a omic energy ins a a ions. 
Rudzinski was Poland ' s  permanent representative on the Committee of 
Experts; he was also a member on the Committee on Rules and Procedure of 
113Ibid., P• 172. 
the Atomic Er.�rgy Commission, a special committee to negotiate with the 
United States concerr.ing the establishment of the United Nations seat 
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in the United States , the Committee on Procedure in the Commission for 
Conventional Armaments , the Commission on the Codification of International 
Law, and the Committee on the Admission of New States during 1946 and 
1947. He states . that at no time during the first two years of the United 
Nations activities did he receive any orders from superiors in Moscow 
concerning which . positions he was to accept. 
During August ,  1946, in discussions involving the applications of 
new members to the United Nations, the Polish and Soviet delegations 
differed on the application of Ireland. Gromyko was ardently opposed 
to Irish membership in the United Nations. Rudzinski discusses the 
circumstances surrounding this unusual development. Officially the 
Soviet U�ion opposed the Irish application because of the lack of dip­
lomatic relations between Ireland and the u .  s .  s .  R . ;  in fact , the re­
fusal of Sovi�t support was due to the antagonistic attitude of Ireland 
toward the Communistic Soviet regime. Oscar Lange, however ,  despite 
the obviously imminent Soviet veto, favored Irish entrance into the 
United Natio�s "in view of the strong and traditional sympathies of 
Polish public opinion (based on common Catholic religion and similiar 
history) for the Irish people and for its fight for liberation from the 
British rule.0 11
5 On August 29, 1946, Lange voted affirmatively on 
Ireland ' s  application for admission, but Ireland was not admitted to 
115Ibid . ,  pp. 166-167. 
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the United Nations because of the Soviet opposition. In August, 1947 , 
with Juliusz Katz-Suchy voting for the Polish delegation, Ireland ' s  
admittance was again considered . A t  this time, only a year after Lange' s 
affirmative vote, Katz-Suchy felt that abstention was his government's 
wisest choice. 
In July, 1947, while Rudzinski was acting chairman of the Cor..mittee 
on the Admission of New States, it was suggested by the Soviet delegation 
that he attempt to arrange a deal that would allow for the admittance of 
all the applicants for membership, both those sponsored by the West� 
Ireland, Portugal, and Transjordan,�and those sponsored by the Soviets� 
Albania , . Hungary, Bulgaria ,  Mongolia, Romania, and Hungary. However, no 
arrangement was ever agreed upon because of the West' s  strong objections 
to any arrangement which included Albanian admittance into the United 
Nations . The Albanian government was at this time before the International 
Court of Justice defending herself against the British charges over the 
Corfu Channel incidents.116 
In July, 1947, Rudzinski , substituting for Juliusz Katz-Suchy in the 
Committee for the Admission of New States, was instructed by Lange to vote 
identical with the 1946 Polish votes on the admission of Albania ,  Mongolia, 
Trans jordan, Ireland, and Portugal, and to support the recent applications 
of Italy, Hungary, and Austria. However, in early August, 1947, Katz-Suchy 
returned to the committee, and following directives from Warsaw voted against 
the admission of Portugal and Austria, and abstained on Transjordan and 
Ireland . In 1946 Poland had supported the application for admission of 
Ireland. This suggested that by mid 1947, Lange' s  authority within the 
116Ibid . ,  PP• 118-119. 
Polish delegation had already diminished greatly . � 17 
On June 5 ,  1947, United States Secretary of State George Marshall 
had proposed massive economic aid for general European recovery from 
World War I I .  Lange had instructed Rudzinski to accept the plan. On 
June 1 7 ,  1947, in the Economic and Employment Commission Rudzinski 
expressed readiness on behalf of the Polish government to cooperate in 
the ;-�: .. .-.rican arrangements for postwar recovery. In personal conversations 
Lange expressed his intentions to energetically support the Marshall 
Plan. "Lange enthusiastically favored its acceptance by Poland realizing 
fully and expressing it in private conversations that financial assistance 
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which the Warsaw regime might receive from the United States would certainly 
be accompanied by political demands for change in Polish internal policy 
and obviously would bring also a political even if partial shift in the 
international field in the Western direction .11 118 However, Lange withdrew 
Polish acceptance of the Marshal l  P lan "refusing to fall for the American 
bait ,11 1·19 after Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov so. violently rejected the 
plan in Ju ly, 1947. This is one of the most notable manifestations of the 
Soviet influence on postwar Polish diplomacy .120 
117 
11� 
119 
Ibid . ,  pp. 109- 1 1 1 .  
Ibid . ,  p .  192. 
Otakar Odlozilik, "Integration of Western European Nations , "  Central 
Europe , IV (Winter, 1950 ) , p. 29. 
1 20 
· Leon Goure , "The Eastern Europcnn l3loc and the Uni tcd Nations Charter , "  
Journal of International Affairs, III (Spring , 1949 ) , p .  4 2 .  
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Rudzinski says that there was no question that Sovi�t representative 
. . .. 
Granyko informed Lange of .the Soviet position and requested Lange• s  support. 
"At the very beginning .during the first months a spirit of cordiality pre­
vailed. Even. afterward with increasing exceptions outward appearances of 
good will and friendship were maintained. Nevertheless the author had the 
fee�ing that relations between Gromyko and Lange were never close and n�ver 
really friendly. They worsened, naturally, after July, 1946, when Lange 
learned in Warsaw about complaints submitted against him."121 
Ruozincki advised Lange during the Security Council'• debates of the 
Greek problem in 1947. The Soviet Union took the position that the sub­
committee selected to inveatigate the dispute could not force Yugoslavia 
to allow the CocmnissiQn of Investigation canplete f reedan of entry in 
Yugoslav territory. Lange, after having Rudzinski conduct a legal: 
inquiry into the matter, sta� that the parties to the dispute were 
obligated to submit to canplete· and unrestricted investigation. Of 
course, this position was not sa·tisfactory to the Soviets. The result 
was Soviet withdrawal of her own amendment calling for limited access 
in Yugoslavia and Albania and the acceptance· of a Polish amendment which 
allowed free passage of the Commission members in all the nations involved 
in the dispute.122 
In the autumn of 1946 Poland accepted the General Convention on 
Privileges and Inaun!Ues of the United Nations. The Soviet Union was 
121 . Rudzinski, .22• ill• ,  P• 115. 
122Ibid. ,  P•  116. 
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opposed to this. convention which granted diplomatic privileges and immunities . 
not only to United Nations representatives, · �t also to the United Nations · 
Secretariat and experts who were involved in official missions. The Soviet 
delegation was not anxious to have any uninvited observers in ·their nation. 
Even. though Lange had accepted the Convention and expressed ·international 
friendship toward the United Nations missions for the Warsaw regime, by 
late 1947 "a freezing Eastern wind started blowing • • •  from Moscow after . . 
the Marshall Plan was violently rejected by Moscow in July, 1947 and the 
r:;;,711.nfcn:m created in September, 1947 and the traditional Polish hospi tality 
for foreigners changed abruptly' into official Russian suspicion and 
hostility."123 · · 
Rudzinski says that the conferences of the Polish delegation held in 
the fall of 1946 were · very · routine. Wincenty Rzymowski, Polish Foreign 
Minister, came to New Yo� to. plan and coordinate the forthct>ming work of 
the delegation. During the 1946 conferences there were no major political 
or diplomatic decisions concluded; however, by the fall of 1947 Poland' s  
diplomatic situation had been modified. Zygmunt Modzelewski had arrived . 
in New York to head the United Nations• General Assembly delegation. · 
"Modzelewski . explained that the political situation had changed after · the 
Mar�hall Plan was rejected by Molotov in Paris in July, 1947, and accordingly 
the role of Polish diplomacy is now altered. No further attempts to arrive 
at �ompromise solutions of problems dividing the West from the East should 
, 
be made by Polish representatives, and no further efforts ·of coneiliation·. 
123Ibid.,  P• 170. 
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It was clearly implied that Russia considers such moves as undesirable.01.24 
After Modzelewski' s  retu. t:o Warsaw in late 1947, Lange assumed the duties 
of chairman of tne General Assembly conferenc�s for a time . But already 
aware of his approaching return to Warsaw, Lcµige had become ineffective 
and indecisive within the delegation. 
Another instance of differing views which Rudzinski discusses is 
J 
the votes in Marc�, 1947, concerning Japanese mandate islands in th� 
Paci.fie. At first the Soviets seemed to willingly accept the. fact that 
t-.h"! lJ:ii. f <?rl States would incorporate these islands into the Americrin 
security system, perhaps expecting American reciprocity toward the 
Soviet initiatives in · Eastern Europe. Therefore, in the early stag.es 
of the deliberations Lange moved quite freely; however, in a final vote 
on a Polish resolution concerning the Japanese mandate islands on April 
2 ,  1947, the Soviet dele�!'tion was explicity opposed to the Polish efforts 
at leadership. This resulted in a joint Polish-Soviet approach to the 
situation • .  l25 
In the fall of 1947, Rudzinski had replaced Manfred Lachs on the 
Sixth (Legal) Conunittee which was. drafting the. statute of the International 
Law Commission. A proposal was under discussion whi�h called ·for consultation 
between the International Law Commission and the Pan American Union on the 
codification of international law. Vladimir K. Koretsky, the Soviet 
representative on the committee , informed Rudzinski that the Soviet delegation 
would not support a Latin American proposal which the Soviets believed was 
1'2'4_rbid. ,  P• 132. 
1:26 lli!!!' , P• 135. 
an outright attempt to grant special privileges to� the Latin American 
nations in direct violation of the theorized equality of international 
legal systems . �oweyer, Rudzinski replied to Koretsky that the Polish 
delegation did not Wish to alienate the countries of Latin American on 
a matter of such insignificance , since Poland was up for re-election to 
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the Economic and Social Cou.ncil at this time. Rudzinski then introduced 
an amendment which made consultation with the Pan American U�ion optional. 
The proposal was then adopted by the Sixth Committee without the support 
1 1 • • ···.::i.1' l· Union. 1Z6 
According to Rudzinski Soviet requests during 1946 and 1947 were 
infrequent and not strictly imposed upon the Polish. delegation and therefore 
were easily evaded, Without excessive apprehension of being reprimanded by 
the Soviets . · As late as July, 1947, Lange, who. had been admonished both 
from Moscow and Warsaw for his lack of coordination with the Soviet 
delegation, still managed to. maintain a degr�e of independence. Lange 
was president of the Security Council, which was discussing the Greek 
problem at this time . Lange still showed his independent nature in 
several rulings on procedural matters. 121 
Rudzinski headed the Legal Department of the Pol�sh Consulate ·General 
in New York . During 1946 and 1947 the P�l�sh consulate was not dominated 
by the Soviet Consulate. A large margin· of independence was permitted for 
the operation of the Polish Consulate. There was no official contact 
l'26rbid. ,  PP• 129-130. 
l:2-'7. . . �·· pp. 116-122. 
between the Soviet and Polish Consulates on legal procedures. Legal 
problems concerning former Polish territories in the East which were 
now recognized as Sovie� provinces were routinely r�ferred to the 
Soviet Consulate. The Polish Consulate refused to become involved in 
these issues to any degree. 128 
During 1946 and 1947 there existed a certain degree of free 
exchange of conversation concerning international political affairs 
within the Polish delegation. In early postwar Polish diplomatic . 
quarters it was even possible to openly discuss controversial policies 
with the Soviet diplomats. 129 
Rudzinski emphasized throughout his work the significance of 
Oscar Lange ' s  participation in the initial acts of Polish independence 
in foreign relations. According to R�dzinski Lange was never trusted · 
completely by the Soviets because of his background of Western living. 
Lange was used only to advance the Soviet scheme for complete Polish 
domination, as long as his abilitiei;i were useful . When Lange ' s  use-
fulness came to an end in late 194 7., he was retired from the government 
service. In sununary Rudzinski defines Lange's and therefore Poland ' s  
position in the United Nations during 1946 and 1947: "His conception 
was that Poland accepted in the pos�ar world the protection of the 
Soviet military might against defeated Germany and a Soviet guarantee 
of her new Western frontiers. That situation resulted according to 
. Lange ' s  views in the impossibility for Polish diplomats to take a 
standpoint opposed to the Sovi�t Union in matters of vital (military 
lZ8 -�. ,  p. 188. 
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or other primary) importance to her. But this area did not cover by 
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any means (at •least so Lange thought) the whole 'field of political 
ques t-.ions. Outsi<:lc the core of problems so' vital to Russia, a Polish 
diplomat could and should , according to Lanqe ' s  conception, move with 
reasonable freedom of action always naturally preserving the obligatory 
friendly but not subservient attitude towards Poland ' s  mighty neighbor .11 130 
130I bid. , pp. 164-165; nlso see Annex I I ,  Document No. 1 0 ,  pp. 158-162 .. 
CHAPTER III 
POLISH DIPLOMACY IN DECLINE, 1948-1956 
As domestic conditions become more Communist-dominated after 1948, 
Polish foreign policy became more Soviet-oriented . Poland stepped into 
line on all succeeding votes in the United Nations after Oscar Lange ' s  
removal in 1948, and Poland ' s  entire foreign policy became almost identical 
with that of the U .  S .  s. R. This period , known as the St;,linist er.Cl, was 
e.x.ll."emely significant in the development of Poland as a Communist stote 
subservient to the Soviet Union . Relations between the u. s .  s .  R. and 
the Western allies became tense as the Cold War burs t upon the international 
scene and the insuing development of the American policy of containment. 
The Soviet Union, plagued by uneasy postwar relations with the Western world·, 
intensified her efforts to tighten control over all facets of Polish 
interna l and external affairs. The formation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO} in 1949 by the West, further antagonized 
East-Westrelations. China and Korea were also major issues during 
this period, both ending with Communist victories to a great extent. 
The Soviet Union refused to allow Poland and the rest of Eastern _ 
Europe to participate in the Marshal l  Plan, but did form the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance {COMECON ) in January , 1949 as a sub-
stitute for the Marshal l  Pl.an in the Communist world. The two German 
states presented a unique problem for Poland. West Germany made con­
siderable economic and political recovery and along with the Westei;:n 
Powers refused to recognize Poland' s Oder-Nei�se boundary as permanent. 
Also during this period the Soviet Union developed her military strength 
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to immense capacities with nuclear weapons. All these factors forced 
Poland l•er Communist leaders to become increasingly dependent upon 
the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviets gained an extremely high 
degree of control over Polish foreign relations . 
Poland ' s  attitude toward the u. s. s .  R .  and the other Communist 
nations has been one of "brotherly Communist friendship" since . 1948. 
Poland recognized the German Democratic Republic in 1949 and a border 
agreement was finalized in July, 1950. Poland has maintained economic 
•·p ''<'m"'11ls with lhe Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe , the mo!>t important 
ones with Romania ,  Bulgari a ,  and Hungary. Trade is also conducted on a 
large scale with Red China. Poland seems to serve as a carrier to Red 
China for some of the other satellite states.
1 
From 1948 to 1956 the 
Polish Communists did not adhere enthusiastically to the Soviet efforts 
to spread Communism throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world. 
The Polish Communists never really vigorously opposed such plans, but 
never whole-heartedly delegated many of their resources to these activities. 
During the past several years, a large trade increase has been noticeable 
between Poland and the so-called neutral states, such as the new nations 
of Africa and Latin America. A Brazi lian writer states that Polish and 
other Eastern European diplomats "enjoy privileged treatment compared 
2 
with their Soviet comrades." Such special treatment seems to be based 
1James F .  Morrison, The Polish Peoples• Republic (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1968-r;-p .  87. 
2
Jose Oswaldo De Meira Penna, "Brazilian Relations with Eastern 
Europe , "  Studies � � Soviet Union, VIII C l96B) , 82. 
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on the fact that these Eastern European nations had been allied with the 
West during the war but were later abandoned to the Communists. Rudzinski 
states that during 1946 and 1947 the chief Polish delegate in the United 
Nations , Oscar Lange, refused to allow the Polish United Nations delegation 
to display a hostile attitude toward the Latin American nations as the 
3 Soviet representatives did so vehemently. 
Shortly after World War II , Poland became a participant in a series 
of strategic agreements among Communist nations latter to be known cumulatively 
4 I I t'? W.-1n1.iw Ptlct. These agreements of friendship, collaboration and 
mutual assistance were made with the Soviet Union, April 21, 1945; with 
Yugoslavia, March 18, 1946, later denounced unilaterally by Poland o� 
September 29, 1949; with Czechoslovakia,  March 10, 1947; with Bulgaria, 
May 29, 1948; with Hungary, June 18, 1948; and with Romania, January 
26, 1949. These treaties call for "close co-operation, consultation on 
important questions and international relations, collaboration against German 
aggression, a ban on alliances or coalitions directed against a treaty 
partner , strengthening of political and economic as well as cultural ties , 
implementation of the treaty in the spirit of the United Nations and a 
5 duration of twenty years." The security system of the Communist world, 
which includes Poland, became multi-lateralized on May 14, 1955, with the 
signing in Warsaw of a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and 
3Alexander Rudzinski ,  Inside Polish Postwar Diplomacy (New York: 
Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe , 
1953 ) ,  P• 197. 
4For complete listings of Polish foreign treaties 1919 to 1960 see: 
Stephen Horak , Poland's  Internationul Affairs, .!2..!2,-1960: A Calendar 
(Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1964) . 
5
Richard 1taar, Polann _!lli-�: � Sovietization 5!f. .! Captive 
Peopl� (New Or1Pnnsi l .<>1d · 1 1 "n:\ State University Press, 1962) , p .  115. 
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Mutual Assistance to be known formally as the Warsaw Pact. Members were 
Albania, Romania ,  the U. s. s .  R. , Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany and 
6 Czechoslovakia. This agreement established a unified command of the 
armed forces of these eight countries to safeguard peace and security in 
7 · the world. 
Polish attitudes toward the United States and the West have changed 
tremendously since the July, 1944, declaration by the Polish Committee of 
National Liberation proclaiming permanent friendship and alliance with 
Gr��t. Rrlt�in and the United States. The Polish Communists point to 
several factors that have 
'caused their anti-American policies since 1948. 
The United States had strongly objected to the 1947 Polish elections, de-
claring that they were not free and unfettered as the Yalta agreements had 
provided. · The United States also persistently stated that border demarcations 
should await a permanent peace settlement with unified Germany as the Big 
Three had decided at Potsdam. After 1948 the United States also placed a 
blockade on all exports to Poland that might contribute to Soviet military 
8 power. Polish relations with the United States and the West gradually 
became almost non-existent by 1956. Poland looked only to the East for 
economic, military, and cultural assistance.9 Polish diplomats supported 
6 For a complete discussion of the legality of Poland ' s  postwar 
alliances under the United Nations Charter see: Krzysztof Skubiszewski , 
"The Postwar Alliances of Poland and the United Nations Charter" , Journal 
-2! International �' LIII (July, 1959) , 613-634. 
7 Staar, .£E• �. , p. 115. 
8 !!z!.9.• , P• 116. 
9 For complete documentation of Polish foreign treaties during t·his 
pt?d.od see: lloralc, .££• ill• ,  pp. 179-�07. 
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the Soviet policy by producing violent attacks upon any efforts to improve 
international relations by the Western Powers . 
The major world crises of the years after 1948 found Poland enthusiastically 
supporting every Soviet policy. Perhaps the most noteworthy eruption on the 
international scene during this period was in Korea. "The deterioration in 
relations between the Western and Communist groups of states culminated in 
10 the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950." The u. s .  s. R. demanded 
greater military expenditures from Poland. This hastened the adoption of a 
!:i Y.-Y"ilr plan by thP. Cf!ntral Committee of the PZPR on July 15-16, 1950. The new 
plan was supposed to transform the Polish economy completely into a socialist 
one. Consumer goods were to be ignored and industrialization was to be de-
veloped with emphasis on armaments. "That Bierut and Minc--probably on 
Soviet instructions--sought to ensure by every means in their power the 
early fulfilment of this very far-reaching plan was certainly connected with 
11 the tension between East and West caused by the Korean War." From 1951 to 
1955 eleven per cent of the total industrial investments were for defense 
production. This was more than the complete investments for light industries. 
The Polish army was built-up at the demand of the Soviets. By 1953 the 
Polish army had reached 300,000 to 4009000 men under arms, not including the 
security corps . Even though many polish officers held high posts, Soviet 
dfficers actually held the key positions.12 During the Korean War the Soviet 
10 Richard Hiscocks, Poland Bridge for � Abyss? An Interpretation .2£. 
Developments .!,!! �-� Poland (London: Oxford University Press ,  1963 ) ,  
P• 151. 
11Hans Roos, � llistorx � Modern Poland--� the Foundation of � 
_?Jate Jn th� _£_1.rr:!:_ World � � ,!£ .!:.!:!.£ Pc<>:;,:,.�!lt !:�'X• tnm�. J .  R. Foster 
(New '{01:k.: AH t�d A. Knopf , 196(;) , P• 23&. 
12 Morrison, .22• �. , P• 73. 
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Union took full advantage of Poland's  vast coal deposits. Prior to the out-
break of the Korean War coal had brought in 250 million dollars a year for 
Poland. However, because of Soviet insistence that Polish coal be exported 
only to the U. s .  s. R. and be used at home for armament production "it 
13 probably earned a third of that amount." In 1951 Poland was "under ot>.-
ligation to deliver to her neighbors 7,000,000 tons yearly at a price of 
Sl.S per ton. If sold to the West at world parity prices, a ton would 
bring $10 to $15.!•14 
Tn the Uni ted Nations Poland supported the Soviet Union in her state-
mcnts concerning Korea. As early as 1948 the Soviet bloc nations, which 
included Poland, maintained that the General Assembly did not have the right 
to take any action with regard to Korea as that matter had been covered by 
the Moscow Agreements and should be dealt with by the Allied governments 
concerned. The Soviet bloc held that a unified Korea should be established 
by the Korean people themselves. Poland refused to participate in a 
temporary conunittee to study the Korean problem. The Soviet bloc nations 
jointly declared that "the Assembly ' s  refusal at that session to permit 
Korean representatives to take part in the discussions of the question at 
a time when questions affecting the independence of their country were 
being discussed contravened the provisions of the Charter and the right of 
15 self-determination of peoples ." 
13 Clifford R. Barnett, Poland-� People, ,ill Society, ,ill Culture 
(New Haven: H�F Press, 1958) , p. 301. 
14 "Cracks in the Soviet Bloc," United Nationc. World, V (April ,  1951) ,  6. 
15Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950 ( New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1951) ,  pp:-22():221 . 
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On June 25-�7, 1951, the United Nations Security Council voted to 
send medical units, economic assistance, and military forces to South 
Korea. Poland stated that these resolutions were 0illegal since they had 
been adopted without the vote of the u. s. s. R. and with the vote of the 
16 Republic of China." The Soviet delegate, along with the Polish delegate 
had walked out of the United Nations in April, 1950,in protest of the 
majority' s refusal to immediately expel the Nationalis� Chinese delegates 
from the United Nations Security Council. The Soviet bloc nations con-
!.:1:;l:cnt.ly declared that the Republic of China had no right to represent 
the Chinese people in the United Nations. The Soviet bloc "took the 
position that the events in Korea were the result of a planned and un-
provoked attack by the South Korean forces on the frontier areas of 
North Korea, and that the United States had resorted to open, armed 
17 
intervention in Korea, before the convening of the Security Council." 
However, in the final armistice negotiations to settle the Korean 9on-
flict, Poland participated as a neutral party. Halecki calls this "just 
another painful fiction.018 
The same pattern for Polish diplomacy has been followed concerning 
all major issues -since 1948 . Poland has supported the u .  s .  s .  R. un-
faill°ngly in questions concerning the Near East. In 1948 in the General 
Assembly , the Polish representative express�d this view toward efforts 
16Yearbook � � United . Nations, 1952 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1953 ) ,  P• 4. 
18 Oscar Halecki , � History � Poland (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 
1966 ) ,  P• 343. 
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to end hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis: "The majority 
n' the General Assembly, at a special session, had yielded to pressure 
19 from the United States and the United Kingdom." The Polish delegation 
voted consistently with the u. s .  s .  R. �elegation against efforts of the 
West to solve the problems in the Near East. The Polish delegate claimed 
that Israel was really just being turned over to Great Britain. The Polish 
representative declared that "the war and misery in Palestine were due to 
the attitude of the United Kingdom and the United States • • •  the Arab 
ppnpl �s •. m<l the State of Israel should learn that they could not gain 
real independence by reliance on certain Great Powers."
20 
Polish reliance on Soviet foreign policy patterns of behavior was 
also exercised during the problems in Indo-China. Polish diplomats, like 
those of the u. s. s. R.,  responded to any efforts of the West to solve 
the difficulties in Indo-China as imperialistic attempts to dominate the 
area. Within the United Nations General Assembly debates and votes the 
Polish delegation simply mimicked the Soviet viewpoint.
21 
Again Halecki calls Poland ' s  participation in attempts to settle 
22 
the problems of Indo-China a mere joke. Condemnation and unfounded 
allegations against the West were the main features of Polish diplomacy 
concerning Indo-China. 
19 . Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-49 (New York: Columbia 
University Press:-1950) , P • 170. · ----- � 
20ibid . ,  P• 173. 
21Ibid . ,  P• 59-60. 
22 
Halecki , 2£• .£!!· t P• 343. 
On June 20 ,  1956, a general strike in Poznan by the industrial 
workers and climactic riot the following day spurred hopes in the West 
that Poland might be able to change her international position. The 
Central Committee of the Polish Conununist Party was called into session 
in July , 1956. A three-headed struggle for power developed within the 
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committee. The Stalinist group sought complete censorship and the termination 
of any liberalization movement. Another group of younger, more nationalistic 
Polish Communists wanted liberalization to be continued. The third group led 
tir I· "'·"•H"d Ochab and Josef Cyrankiewicz supported change, but at a much 
slower pace. The only man who all three groups felt could restore party 
unity and authority was Wladyslaw .Gomulka. Even though the old-line 
Stalinists agreed to support Gomulka only because of his widespread 
public support, all three factions voted to return Gomulka to the political 
bureau. Oh ;  August 4, 1956, he was reinstated in the Polish Conununist 
23 Party. 
Having sgreed on the composition of the new political bureau, Ochab, 
Gomulka, and Cyrankiewicz summoned a meeting of the Party' s  Central Com-
mittee on October 19, 1956. Unanticipated visitors arrived at the meeting 
from the Soviet Union, N. s. Khrushchev, v .  M. Molotov, L. M. Kagonovich, 
and A. I .  Mikoyan. Upon the arrival of Marshal I. s .  Konev , Conunander-
in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, it was reported that Soviet 
23see: Frank Gibney , � Frozen Revolution: Poland-� Study in 
Communist Decay (New York: Farrar, Strnus, and Cudahy, 1959 ) ;  K. s .  
Karol, Visa !.££ Poland, trans. Marvyn Savill ( London: Macgibbon and 
Kee, 1959 ) ;  Flora Lewis, The Polish Volcano: � � History of Hope 
(London: Secker and Warburg , 1959 ) ;  s .  L. Schneiderman, The Warsaw 
Heresy (New York : Horizon Press, 1959) ; Konrad Syrop, Sp�g .!!! Octob<?r: 
� Polish Revolution � �  ( London: Weidenfeld and Nicolsen, 1957) . 
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troops were moving toward Warsaw. Belweder Palace in Warsaw was the 
scene of the meetings of the Polish Communist Party ' s  Central Committee 
and their Soviet guests on the night of October 19-20, 1956. Evidently 
the Polish Communists convinced the Soviet representatives that Gomulka ' s  
reinstatement would not damage Polish-Soviet relations. The Soviets re­
turned to Moscow on October 20, 1956. Perhaps the Soviets were aided in 
making their decision to return by forecasts of further .demonstrations by 
the Polish workers and students. The next day the Central Com ittee 
c J ecled a new nine-member political bureau with Gomulka as its chairman. 
The new political bureau had no representative of the former Stalinist 
group in its membership. 
An era of reform seemed evident for Poland. Oscar Lange was brought 
back into the government and some domestic reforms were undertaken. There 
were hopes in the West that the 1956 change of power in Poland might also 
bring some changes in Polish foreign affairs. Observers felt that the 
implications of Titoism might spread to Poland because of Gomulka ' s  early 
attachment to Tito' s cause but of course , were to be gravely disappointed 
· in this respect. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCUJSION 
The modification of the p0litical power structure in 1956 in Poland 
brought about many basic changes in internal Polish affairs but no real 
changes in foreign policy. Khrushchev made certain that Polish foreign 
relations would not be altered before he returned to Moscow on October 
20, 1956. Gomulka pledged that Poland would remain in the Warsaw Pact 
and accepted arrangements for Soviet troops to remain in Poland indefinitely. 
Thus Gomulka had sacrificed any influence Poland might acquire on the 
international scene in order to gain control of the Polish Communist Party. 
Even though Poland forfeited any power she might assume in world 
affairs for a greater degree of independence domestically, the very 
assertion of any independence from the Soviet Union was an expression of 
a shift in Polish foreign relations. Naturally, questions were asked 
throughout the world as to Poland ' s  real position. Since many clearly 
remembered that Gomulka had been ousted from the Central Committee of the 
· polish Camnunist Party for nationalistic tendencies, there was hope that 
he might follow the 1948 path of Tito in Yugoslavia or that at least a . 
kind of Titoism within the Soviet security system might possibly develop. 1 
Poland ' s  course after 1956, however, did not prove to be worthy of 
such optimistic expectations. Gomulka proved to be a unique partner for 
the Soviets; he was initially reluctant to accept Soviet direction without 
some reservation. Many times the Sovi�t regime had to accept delays and 
1John Campbell , "Poland ' s  International Position Since 1956, "  � 
Polish R�view, IV (Summer, 1959) , 47. 
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deletions of the usual pr�ises of the Soviet Union as the great Communist 
leader. During the Hungarian revolt Gomulka never expressed any justification 
for the Soviet intervention in Hungary. A Polish newspaper stated that the 
source of the Hungarian rebellion "should not be sought in the simplified 
version about alien agencies nor looking for counter-revolution at each 
step • • •  It must be sought, first of all, in the errors ,  distortions, and 
2 even crimes of the past Stalinist period." This definitely was an unpre-
cedented occurence in postwar Poland. For a time i t  even seemed that 
Gomulka's regime might try to formulate its O'ft'n foreign policy. Poland 
took a position closer to that of Yugoslavia by condemning the first 
3 Soviet intervention in Hungary. In the United Nations General Assembly 
the Polish delegation abstained in a vote to send observers to Hungary, 
obviously a switch from the old pattern of following unquestionably every 
4 step of the u. s .  s .  R .  On November 9 ,  1956, the Polish delegate also 
voted in favor of an Austrian resolution to send relief to Hungary . The 
Soviet delegation opposed the resolution . 5  Gomulka was quite indifferent toward 
the Soviet intervention. He claimed that the whole problem was a Hungarian 
internal issue. Even though he never showed outright support of the Soviet 
2Adam Bromk�, Poland'_s_ EAl.itics: Idealism :!:!.• Realism (Cambridge, 
Mass . :  Harvard University Press, 1967) ,  P• 127. 
3 Clifford R. Barnett, Poland�Its People, � Society, Its CUlture 
(New Haven: HRAF Press, 1958) , p. 171. 
4 Joseph W. Z·urawski , Poland-� Captive Satellite-A Study ,!!2 National 
Psychology (Detroit: Endurance Press,. 1962 ) 9 p. 109. 
5 
Barnett, .21?.• .£.!!• •  p. 171. 
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actions, Gomulka' s  speeches were always filled with condemnations of the 
West for even considering intervention. Such statements evidently succeeded 
in convincing the Soviets that there was no chance of a Polish attempt for 
greater independence in foreign affairs. By May, 1957, Gomulka "found it 
necessary to term the Soviet help in suppressing the counter-revolution a 
regrettable but inevitable necessity, although we may differ from other 
6 parties in our assessment of events in Hungary." 
Gomulka remained throughout the years friendly toward Tito. In 
September, 1957, Gomulka and Tito made a joint declaration concerning their 
divergent, kxlt compatible roads to socialism. Poland has refused to join 
in the violent denunciations of the Yugoslav regime as the Soviets have 
done continuously since 1948. 
At a November, 1957, meeting of Conununist Party chiefs in Moscow, 
Gornulka was said to strongly oppose a declaration issued by the party 
leaders . Polish sources claimed that the final draft of the declaration 
was considerably altered because of Gomulka' s  resistance to proposals 
stressing the leadership of the Soviet party in world Communism. Through 
the years, however, Gomulka seemed gradually to accept the fact that there 
was really cause for opposing Soviet policies. After the Soviets put down 
the Hungarian Revolt, it was obviously unrealistic for Gomulka to believe 
7 he could ever attain the independence Tito had achieved. in Yugoslavia. 
If Gomulka ever had any aspirations for Polish independence, and there 
6 Campbell� .2£• cit . ,  48. 
7Ibid. ; ' 48-49. 
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are viable questions about that point, by 1958 they were completely abandoned. 
By this time Gomulka was blaming inexplicably the Yugoslavs and Hungarians 
for their own problems. Gomulka was a devout Communist and therefore his 
view of nationalism for Poland was a str�ng Communistic Poland and because 
of her immediate neighbors this also meant strong Soviet influence in 
Polish international relations. As Bromke says , "in foreign policy, . the 
Gomulka government did not exploit the opportunities to win more leeway 
for Poland from the Soviet Union. Both in East-West relations and in the 
disputes among the Communist countries-including participation in the 
suppression of Czechoslovakia--Warsaw trailed along after Moscow at every 
tu .. 0 rn. During Khrushchev' s  second de-Stalinization campaign in 1961, 
Gomulka could have perhaps forced the Soviets to allow his government. more 
autonomy because of the tension between Red China and the Soviet Union. 
However, Gomulka did not push for any change. 
9 The l960 ' s  were marked by serious challenges to Gomulka' s  power. 
In 1964 and 1968 complications arose between the Catholic Church and the 
government. Through the mid-sixties the intellectuals defied the govern-
ment•s restrictions on free expression. As a result of the government's 
banning of a play by Adam Mickiewicz, because of its anti-Russian character 
10 there were three weeks of sit-ins and rioting in February, 1968. 
Gomulka suppressed the protesters and managed to be re-elected First 
Secretary at the Fifth Party Congress in November, 1968, "but his political 
8 Adam Bromke, "Beyond the Gomulka Era" , Foreign Affairs, XLIX 
(April,  1970) , 485. 
9For activities within Poland during the sixties see: 
Galati, Eastern Europe in � Sixties (New York: Praeger, 
Kuron, Revolutionary Mandtit Students Spenk �' 1964-12§.§. 
Publishers , 1968. 
10 Bromke, "Beyond the Gocnulka Era", .2£• ill• •  481-482. 
s .  A.  Fischer-
1963) ;  and Jack 
(New York: Merit 
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influence was waning. He was discredited among the people; dissatisfaction 
11 with the deteriorating economic conditions was mounting among the workers." · 
Poland' s  economic situation became intolerable to the workers in late 
December, 1970. A goverrunent announcement of a food price increase resulted 
in rioting in several Polish coastal cities. In typical Conununist fashion, 
a reshuffling of party leadership was the answer. Wladyslaw Gomulka was 
replaced as Polish Communist Party First Secretary on Decei:ru>er 20, 1970, 
12 by Edward Gierek. The success of Gierek in settling the problems in Poland 
will be the key to future Polish foreign relations. The economic situation 
with which Gierek must contend is extremely difficult. 
Regardless of leadership, Polish diplom�cy probably can never be anti-
soviet, even th_cugh •he may continue to attempt to become more independent. 
Poland' s  position between Germa.'ly and the Soviet Union makes it impossible 
for the Polish leaders to ignore the superior Soviet strength in Eastern 
Europe. Simply by noting the Soviet-occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 
and being aware of the large postwar Soviet militacy complex in East 
Germany, Poland must accept the fact that she is surrounded by Soviet 
forces. Even before the Poles and the West Germans �oncluded a treaty 
recognizing Poland' s  western boundary , the U. S. S. R. and West Germany 
had formally sanctioned the border in a Soviet-West German pact in August, 
1970. Thus Polish leaders cannot dismiss the immense importance of Soviet 
13 influence in any respect. 
11Ibid. ,  482. 
12Ibid. ,  483. 
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Poland, however, occupies a unique position in the family of Soviet 
satellites. The Soviet Union must control Poland to sustain Soviet access 
to East Germany and Czechoslovakia. If Poland becomes uncontrollable the 
Soviet Union would surely find it impossible to control other areas of 
Eastern Europe. Poland ' s  geographical position, therefore, not only 
limits her activities in foreign affairs , but also provides Poland with a 
certain amount of influence that none of the other Eastern European nations 
possess. Evidence of Poland' s  special position within the Soviet security 
nystem was noted in the 1950' s  when Polish leaders were allowed to de­
collectivize agriculture and throughout the postwar era the Catholic 
Church has been permitted to continue functioning; such policies have 
been prohibited in the other Eastern European nations which the Soviets 
control. If the Poles do not push too hard or too fast, they can possibly 
continue �o hold this privileged position. 
Since March, 1969, when at a meeting in Budapest the Communist leaders 
began calling a broader political framework in Europe, Polish diplomats 
have been energetically trying to create an atmosphere in Europe that 
might lead to multi-lateral agreements among all the nations of Europe, 
instead of the customary bilateral Soviet treaty system. Evidence of this 
can be seen in the improvement of relations between. Poland and France., and 
Poland and West Germany . Polish diplomats have become major proponents 
of an all-European conference seeking the support of all the Western 
nations , including the United States. 
Even though the Soviet Union now actively supports the reduction of 
East-West tensions , Polish diplomats also must realize the advantages that 
this policy offers her own nation. By relieving the tensions between the 
East and West, Poland will gain new markets and technology which will 
boost her stagnant economy. Also lll.llti-lateral cooperation would lead 
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to troop reductions and a de-emphasis of formal bilateral treaties. Such 
a situation should help to solve some of Poland' s  political and diplomatic 
difficulties and allow her to play a more significant role in international 
affairs. "Poland' s  return to Europe would also be of great importance in 
resolving East-West conflicts in that part of the world. Precisely because 
she is a lynchpin of the present system in East-Central Europe, such a 
development would have far-reaching repercussions throughout the entire 
continent. Conversely, a major explosion in Poland could be extremely 
damaging to the prospects for an East-West detente . For there can be no 
stable European system without Poland' s  active participation. Whatever 
the final outcome of the present political crisis in Poland , for better 
or for worse, one thing seems to be certain--with the · end of the Gomulka 
era, Poland will play an increasingly significant role in the international 
14 sphere, as befits this dynamic and proud nation." 
After Gomulka's rise to power the limits to Poland ' s  freedom of action 
in international affairs remained only too obvious. Even if Gomulka had 
wished to befriend the West his chances were slight. Soviet troops re-
mained stationed in large numbers on both sides of Polan�, in East Germany 
and in the ·Soviet Union, as well as some Soviet troops remaining on Polish 
soi l .  The West would not help Poland in 1939, what chance was there that, 
even if Poland could challenge the Soviet military strength , the West 
would support her efforts this time . 
Poland has remained to a high degree dependent on the Soviet Union 
economically. The Soviet Union completely dominated the Polish economy 
during the Stalinst period , 1948· to 1956. Even though the Poles have 
tried hard to break 0ut of economic isolation, especially since 1956, 
western markets did not develop to a satisfactory level. The only 
alternative for Polish leaders was to remain economically bound to the 
Soviet Union. 
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Even though Poland's own fate depends on the handling of the great 
issues involved in the East-West confrontation; she can take only limited 
part in these affairs. An example of Poland ' s  lack of influence in world 
affairs came in the late 1950's and the early 1960 ' s  with the introduction 
of a plan for the curtailment of atomic weapons. The plan was first 
presented to the United Nations on February 14, 1958, by Adam Rapacki, 
the Polish Foreign Minister who proposed that no atomic weapons be 
manufactured or stockpiled in Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany , or 
West Germany. The proposal also suggested that a ban be placed on all 
equipment and 1nstallations in these countries designed to service atomic 
weapons. The use of atomic weapons against these four nations would 
also be prohibited. Rapacki presented a revised version of his plan 
in two parts on November 4 ,  1958. The first part · called for a general 
agreement among the world powers that no nuclear weapons would be manu­
factured or introduced in areas not already possessing nuclear capabilities. 
The second part of the revised plan proposed that a ban on atomic weapons 
would be linked with a reduction of conventional weapons in the four 
country area. Finally on March 28, 1962, Rapacki introduced a third 
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version of his proposals to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. This 
new version included a section concerning international control and in-
spect.ion within the four countries. However, the plan remained unaccept-
able to the West. EVen though the Rapacki Plan might have led to wider 
disarmament negotiations and the general reduction of �he dangers of 
war, the Western Powers feared the strategic and political complications 
of the plan. The acceptance of the Rapacki Plan mighf have given Poland 
• 
a chance to maneuver on the international scene and perhaps have led to 
Soviet troop withdrawals from Poland. A Polish official summed up Poland' s 
international position in this way: "Poland cannot throw her weight around 
in international affairs , but did try to wriggle her toes a little bit. 
Now the fate of the Rapacki Plan shows the cannot do even that."
15 
Little was accomplished in relations with the United States because 
of Gomulka' s  denunciations of the United States as an aggressor in the 
Arab world, violator of international agreements in Germany, meddler in 
Chinese internal affairs, and promoter of imperialism throughout the 
world. If any advances are to ever be made in Polish-Western relations 
the West must accept the fact that there is no chance that they will 
ever replace the Soviet Union in Polish foreign affairs. The Polish 
leaders ID.1st work within the limitations placed on Poland by the Soviet 
Union. Polish leaders must continue to act as the Soviets cOIM\and be-
cause of Poland ' s  econonlic, political, and military dependence upon 
15 Campbell, �· ill• t  53. 
Moscow. The Western Powers must realize that only gradual change is 
possible in Poiand, as well as the rest of Eastern Europe. If 
aid is offered to these nations it will probably be accepted , but 
perhaps taunted at the same time. "Without losing site of the dread 
possibility of war, the Western governme�ts must develop policies 
geared to gradual change. Change is going to take place anyway. The 
situation on both sides of the Iron Curtain is dynamic , not static. 
What American policy should seek in the long run--through diplomacy, 
trade, and cultural ·relations are ways and means of influencing those 
forces of change in directions which serve the needs and desires of 
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the people of Poland and of the rest of Eastern Europe, while at the same 
Ume serving the fundamental interests of the United States and the 
W t .. 16 es • 
The present situation in Poland is quite susceptible to change. 
The workers succeeded in changing the political leadership of Poland 
in December, 1970. They will not likely forget this limited success. 
If the situation becomes completely unbearable again, perhaps more 
distinct change might result. These assertions of nationalistic 
feelings on the domestic political scene may also result in a more 
independent Polish position in foreign affairs. Such developments 
will surely lead to conflict between the u. s. s.  R. and Poland. The 
Western nations must be alert at all times to fully capitalize on any 
nationalistic developments within Poland. 
16Ibid. ,  SS. 
-
As this paper suggests , it  is extremely difficult, to explain 
Polish foreign policy since 1945. In fact Poland has seldom been 
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allowed to conduct her own foreign relations. Surely as John c .  Campbell 
suggests "it is wiser to speak of the international position of Poland 
than of Polish foreign affairs. History shows the grave limitations 
of the scope of any foreign policy Poland can have. From the time 
of the partitions until the end of the first World War, Polish foreign 
policy consisted of the silent will of the nation and the activities 
of emigres trying to influence the chancelleries of the world in the 
direction of restoration of a free Poland. The period of independence 
between and wars witnessed and illusory attempt to play a role beyond 
Poland' s  capacities and the realities of its situation. The hollow-
ness of the attempt to achieve status as a great, or just less than 
great, power was exposed once Poland no longer enjoyed the situation 
of security resulting from German and Russian weakness. Colonel 
Beck' s  attempt at • realism• led only to the fourth partition. Whether 
a different policy would have avoided that result, is another question. 
The fact remains that Poland ' s  fate was not in Polish hands . .. 17 
At the termination of World War II Poland's activities in international 
affairs were obviously a matter of paramount importance to the Soviet Union. 
17 Campbell, �· ill• •  45-46. 
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Territorial gains in the West only helped to strengthen pro-Soviet Polish 
government ' s  determined endeavor to provide the Soviet Union with a completely 
subservient Polish foreign policy. · The new Polish Provisional Government of 
National Unity, even though it quite clearly exhibit�d its exclusively in­
timate relationship with the u. s .  s .  R. ,  did experience a period when limited 
insubordination was shown toward the Soviets. After closely scrutinizing 
the official United Nations records, and especially after studying the 
Security Council debate s ,  i t  is quite obvious, even though unusual, that 
the Polish delegation to the United Nations proved that its actions were 
not merely echoes of Soviet opinions on. international affairs. Within the 
Security Council Oscar Lange was continuously confronted by explosive. crises 
in international relations. Even though Lange emerged as the only supporter 
of Soviet actions in many instances, such as the numerous proposals concerning 
the Corfu Channel incidents, the Greek problems , and the indictments of 
Franco ' s  Spain, it is relatively easy to locate several occasions when Lange 
bitterly disagreed with the Soviet position, such as the deliberations con­
cerning Ireland ' s  application for admission and numerous procedural issues. 
Within the Security Council Lange cast seven votes completely opposite those 
of the Soviet delegate between March , 1946, and July, 1947. Four of these 
six votes were votes concerning procedural matters; one was concerning 
Irish admission to the United Nations; one concerned general disarmzment 
and weapon reduction; and one established guidelines for the postwar 
supervision of the former Japanese;-mandate islands in the Pacific . From 
March, 1946, to August, 1947, however , there were twenty more occasions 
in which the Polish and Soviet delegations did not vote identically; these 
involved . abstentions on the part of one of the nations. Of these incidents 
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only three were disagreements concerning procedural matters; eight concerned 
the problems in Greece; two involved disagreements over the Soviet attitude 
toward the Corfu Channel incidents; two concerned the general regulation 
and reduction of armaments; two were disagreements over the future of the 
Japanese mandate islands; and one vote each concerned the settlement of 
the control of Trieste , the British and Dutch involvement in Indonesia, 
and the application for admission to the United Nations by Ireland. 
Besides these undeniable votes in the Security Council there were also 
fervent debates regarding other major issues which never came to conclusive 
votes in the Council such as: the discussions regarding the Iranian com­
plaints that Soviet troops still remained in their country in March and 
April,  1946 , in which Lange consistently held that the issue was simply 
a procedural matter and could be rejected or accepted by the Security 
Council, therefore refuting the Soviet attempts to postpone consideration 
of the Iranian issue indefinitely through clever Soviet legal manuevering; 
the deliberations concerning free passage into the nations involved in 
the Greek controversy in December , 1946, in which Lange, speaking for 
Poland refused to support the u .  S. s .  R . ' s  attempts to limit international 
passage of the investigative commission in Yugoslavia and Albania; the dis­
cussions in connection wit� general disarmament and weapon reduction in 
January, 1947 , in which Lange chose to support a French proposal as opposed 
to one presented by the Soviet delegation; and finally debates with relation 
to the planned investigation of the Corfu Channel incidents, in which Lange 
refused to support the Soviet demands that no action be taken until the 
Albanian government had had an opportunity to reply to the British allegations. 
Some suggest that these early gestures of Polish independence in foreign policy 
110 
were meaningless, and that they were even implemented by the Polish officials 
with Soviet approval, considering it to her own interest to project the 
appearance of a free Poland conducting an independent foreign policy. 
However ,  these suppositions ITllSt be disregarded after carefully studying 
the verbatim accounts of the activities of the United Nations. 
Oscar Lange, as chief Polish representative on the United Nations 
Security Council proved to be the source of most of the assertions of 
Polish independence. Lange frequently took positions in the Security 
Council which conflicted with Soviet aspirations, and many times he even 
rejected those patterns already established by Zygmunt Modzelewski, his 
predecessor in the Security Council. In discussions over the postwar 
Iranian problems concerning the slow. Soviet troop withdrawal program from 
Iran Modzelewski was always a staunch Soviet supporter; Lange accepted no 
such position. Similiar incidents occurred in discussions concerning the 
Indonesian issue and the Greek issue, both of which had found Modzelewski 
only repeating Soviet statements . Lange, though by no means establishing a 
complete break from Soviet dictates, clearly exhibited his independent nature 
in votes and debates concerning many issues. It was Lange who often rebuked 
what Gromyko stated; it was Lange who made numerous attempts at East-West 
reconciliation, and it was Lange who quite graciously expressed to the 
newspapers his initial interest in the American Marshall Plan. With 
Lange' s  condemnation in late 1947, and his complete removal from the Polish 
United Nations delegation in 1948, Polish insubordination toward the Soviets, 
in terms of foreign affairs , was largely terminated, even though domestically . 
Poland managed to attain more independence. While initiative from the lower ech­
elons in political matters was a welcome virtue and almost always approved during 
the first period ( 1946-1947) , it became a vice and very serious hazard after 1948. 
What a Polish delegate was doing became dependent upon prior approval by 
his Soviet opposite number .  A passive role of seconding Soviet motions 
became a duty and a better part of wisdom • • •  it became obvious to every 
member of the Polish delegation that the advocating of a political view-
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point opposed or conflicting with the current Soviet line is out of question ." 18 
Because of the new Polish government ' s  lack of experienced diplomats, 
• 
the postwar Polish foreign policy was generally compo�ed of amateurs at all 
I 
levels. This situation added to Oscar Lange' s  importarce in the early 
United Nations deliberations , as a result he. was allowed a great amount of 
personal decision-making responsibility for the Polish delegation. Lange 
was an international personage , as a result ?f his notorious rejection of 
his newly-acquired American citizenship to become a public servant of his 
formerly deserted homeland, and not su.rprisingly the non-professionals in 
the Polish foreign office seemed to be quite anixous to capitalize on the 
added prestige that such a development accorded tne new pro-Soviet regime. 
Surely no one really believed that postwar Poland, regardless of the 
\ 
attractiveness of the idea, could ever again adopt any foreign policy 
attitudes which were diametrically opposed to those of the Soviet Union, 
especially after the acceptance by the Western Powers of the distinctively 
Communist-oriented Provisional Goverrunent of . National Unity, least of all 
a man of the intelligence and experience of Oscar Lange. Undoubtedly 
Lange sympathized, and even planned, to closely cooperate at all levels 
of policy-making with the Soviet Communists, but his actions within the 
18 
Alexander Rudzinski ,  Polish Postwar Diplomacy (New York; Mid-European · 
Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe, 1953) , p. 200. 
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Security Council quickly proved that he did not intend to become a Soviet-
puppet, catering to every whim of the Soviet delegation. 
The accounts cited in this paper clearly indicate that Gromyko and 
Lange quite obviously got more than Party signals confused occasionally. 
Their conversations and voting records only too clea�ly reveal that Lange 
longed to establish Poland ' s  own independent path in international affairs. 
However ,  Lange' s  rem6val in 1948 demonstrated more absolutely than ever 
that the Soviet Union was clearly determined to . realize complete dominance 
in Poland, not just internally, but also externally. The appointment of 
Juliusz Katz-Suchy as Lange ' s  successor only further supports the fact 
that Lange was the key to Polish independence. As Rudzinski states: "The 
Soviet Union became so afraid of any semblance of independent or quasi-
independent moves by her satellites that the role of satellite foreign 
policy was reduced to obedient svpport given to Soviet proposals. They 
had to perform exactly the same task the Ukrainian and Byelorussian delegates 
were performing from the beginning of the functioning of the United Nations. 
Any kind of initative was suppressed by Soviet delegates • • •  Soviet policy 
insisted furthermore that Polish delegates take the floor only after a 
Soviet delegate had already spoken. Polish representatives were required 
to clear their draft proposals with their Soviet colleagues before such 
proposals were officially submitted to the committees. That held good 
irrespective of the fact whether the contents of the proposal. were in 
line with Soviet policy or not and in spite of how much they might be 
t h i 1 . . ,1
9 
ec n ca or innocuous .• · Being a devout Communist Katz-Suchy proved 
19 
.. •Rudzinski, 22• ill· ,  PP• 136-137. 
to be just what the pro-Soviet Polish politicians were seeking, a mere 
puppet ready to echo the objectives of Soviet foreign policy aims and 
to contribute only ancillary remarks in the United Nations in relation 
to the Soviet attempts at intimidation of the West. 
A definite date can probably never be established for the actual 
beginning of the Cold War. However, Poland surely must be involved in 
i 
any discussion of postwar international developments which led to the 
Cold War. As World War II started in Poland, the first major East-West 
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confrontation in postwar world affairs resulted from disagreement between 
the Soviet Union and the Western Powers over Poland' s  future position in 
world politics. Since few wartime coalitions survive any war and with 
the added friction between two distinctly opposing political structures, a 
rupture between the West and the Soviet Union was unavoidable. Nevertheless, 
. had the West not so completely and irrevocably abandoned Poland immediately 
after World War II, the Western Powers might have been in a more advantageous 
position in the Cold War. Surely Polish history would have· been different 
had the West exhibited greater determination in postwar negotiations. It 
must be anoteq. however, that the West's  only other alternative was a certain 
clash with the Soviet Union and probably another :catastrophic war. "The 
lessons of Poland were not quickly or universally absorbed; they are still 
relevant today� It was the first defeat for the West in the Cold War, but 
it was not presented as such. Ever since, whether during the Berlin air-
lift, Korea, CUba, or Vietnam, the same kind of voices first heard on the 
Polish issue, castigating the victim or .. minimising the importance of. the · 
prospective loss, and advocating appeasement, have invariably been raised 
20 in the West, using on each occasion the familiar sentiments of fear." 
20 Alexander Bregman, "The Polish Question," Survey, No. 58 (January, 
1966) t 167. 
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In 1960 William E .  Griffith reported from Warsaw, "the situation here 
is getting normal .  You know, it's not bad, it 's  even quite good�but it's 
21 totally without hope."· Perhaps the Polish situation has not been significantly 
altered during the last decade, but due to recent developments in Poland, 
there seems to be a hopeful revival of political aspirations of some of the 
more nationalistic segments within the Polish political stn.tcture . Many 
observers believe that the new Polish Communist Party chief , Edward Gierek 
has been given freer hand in domestic affairs only in exchange for the 
perennt�l Sovietdemand of complete subservience to the u .  s .  s .  R . ,  in 
foreign affairs. As Edward Rohrback reported from Warsaw in July, 1971; 
"Gierek ' s  problem will be to break trru the choking centralization and 
crusted-over bureaucracy in Poland that in the past has stifled almost all 
reforms instituted . This was what happened in 1956 to Gomulka when the 
' bread and freedom' riots in Poznan brought him into power on a similar 
wave of public optimism." 
"That is how the sad cycle has gone in Poland. When the reforms 
failed to meterialize or were taken back, the people become disenchanted 
with the new leadership. Then, in order to bridle their discontent, re-
pression returns, often worse than before. History had been cruel enough 
22 for the Poles .11· Although Poles could certainly not publicly agree with 
writer, Stefan Kisielewski 1968 statement that "the country was run by 
23 
ignoramuses ," · doubtlessly many would agree privately, as the recent outbursts 
21 
William E. Griffith, "Warsaw Notebook ," Survey, No. 35 (January-March , 
1960) ' 26. 
22 
Chicago Tribunet 25 July 1971, A-3. 
23 Adam Bromlce, "Beyond the Gomullca Era," Foreign Affairs , XLIX (April, 
1971) t 484. 
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of workers in the Polish coastal cities readily substantiate. The 1960 ' s  
brought several encouraging developments i n  international relations for 
Poland: a renewed Soviet de-Stalinization campaign in 1961; the Chinese­
Soviet disagreements; improved East-West relations; greater Rumanian 
independence in foreign affairs; the 1968 Czechoslovakian eruption; 
the new favorable West German overtures which resulted in a Polish-
West German treaty in late 1970 sanctioning Poland ' s  western border; and 
finally, the recent change in the political leadership in Poland. These 
phenomena, if link�d with cautious and realistic foreign policies by the 
Western Powers toward East-Central .Europe, provide a measure of hope that 
Poland may eventually emerge with increasing authority in international 
affairs. 
ANNEX I 
BIOORAPHICAL SKETCHES 
It would be a nearby impossible task to give biographical information 
on all of the Polish delegates assigned to the various agencies of the 
United Na�ions. It is in the interest of understanding more thoroughly 
I 
the Polish delegation' s  actions within the United Nat�ons that the 
following information is presented concerning some of the most active 
and influential personalities. Therefore , the following delegates will 
be considered: Wincenty Rzymowski ,  Zygmunt Modzelewski ,  Jerzy Michalowski, 
Josef Winiewicz, Hilary Mine, Josef Olszewski, Ignacy �oltowski, Juliusz 
Katz-Suchy, and Oscar Lange. 
SECTION l�Wincenty Rzymowski 
Wincenty RZymowski was born in Warsaw in 1883. · After studying at 
the universities of Geneva, Lausanne, and Odessa, he received his law 
degree. In the early 1920 ' s  he began a publication in Warsaw called 
The Horizon in which he editorialized for a democratic ,  independent 
Poland and against a popular concept of Polish independence within 
the structure of the Soviet Union. From 1923 to 1941 he was a corres-
pendent in Italy, but was forced to leave Italy because of his anti-
Fascist articles. Upon his return to Poland, Rzymowski continued to 
write critically about Fascism and was also a member of "various . , 
radical groups dependent upon Communist favor , although non-Communist, 
q.6 
who were fol lowing the line of the PPR .11 1 These activities resulted in 
an eight month sentence to a German prison in the early 1940 ' s .  Upon 
his release from prison in 1944 by the Soviets, he seemed to align 
himself more with the Leftists. 2 At the age of sixty-one, Rzymowski 
volunteered for duty in the Polish army and became an original member 
1 17 
of the pro-Soviet Committee of National Liberation. He was later appointed 
Minister of Arts and Culture in the pro-Soviet Lublin Committee. Rzymowski 
became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Polish Provisional Government 
of National Unity in June , 1945, and was selected as Chief Polish Delegate 
to the Paris Peace Conference in 1946. He was also chief Polish represent-
ative to the United Nations Genera l Assembly in 1946 and continued as 
Polish Foreign Minister until February 7 ,  1947, when, foll0wing the 1947 
elections he became Minister without Portfolio, an insignificant and 
uninfluential position. Nevertheless, he remained as nominal pre sident 
of the remnants of the dying Democratic Party, which was composed largely 
of the submissive members of the intellectual class. 3 Never an absolute 
Soviet .puppet Ryzmowski died in Warsaw , May 2, 1950, at sixty-seven , 
having lost all political influence. 
lM .  K. D ziewanowski ,  The Communist Party in Poland: fill Outline 2f. 
History (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959 ) , p.176. 
bradeusz Rakowski ,  Foreign Policy of the Communist Regime in. Poland-­
Techniques and Functions, 1945-1949 (New York: Mid-European Studies Center 
of the National Committee for a Free Europe , 1953) pp. 104-105. 
3Personalities in the GPneral Assembly--Wincenty Rzymowski , "  United 
Nations Weekly Bulletin, I ( December 3 ,  1946 ) , p. 22. 
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SECTION 2�Zygnrunt Modzelewski 
Born to a family of Jewish origin in Czestochowa, Poland in 1900, 
Zygnrunt Modzelewski joined the Polish Communist Party in 1920. In 1925 
he moved to Fra�ce, where he remained active in the Communist Party 
trying his hand at jounalism and working for the Soviet Trade Commission. 
Upon the outbreak of World War II Modzelewski entered the Soviet Union 
were he became a captain in the Soviet-organized Poli�h Army based in 
Moscow. At this time he also became an editor for the Polish Press 
Agency in Moscow. In 1944 he was named Ambassador from the Polish 
Committee of National Liberation to Moscow and later served in this 
same capacity for the Polish Committee in Lublin. In July, 1945 , the 
position of Polish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs became available, 
upon the appointment of former Vice-Minister Jacub Berman to the Presidium 
as Under-Secretary of State. Modzelewski was selected as the new Vice-
Minister of Foreign Affairs to serve as a top aide to Foreign Minister 
Wincenty Rzymowski .  Modzelewski proved to be extremely effective in his 
new position and grew very influential within the Foreign Ministry. He 
was appointed the first chief Polish delegate to the United Nations 
Security Council in 1946. After the 1947 elections he became Rzymowski ' s  
replacement as Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs . However, by early 
1948 he too had fallen into ill-favor with the Communists and was re-
placed by Stefan. Wieblowski . 4  
4Norld Biography (New York: Institute for Research in Biography, Inc . ,  
1948) , p .  3288. 
Rakowski presents this description of Modzelewski: "Modzelewski is 
an able man, clever, smooth and liable. He is a fanatical Communist, 
though he knows, when need be ,  how to mask himself to win over people of 
different opinion. As president of the Preparatory Commission for the 
United Nations Security Council in London in 1945, Modz�lewski became 
very popular amon� his fellow diplomats due to his dea�ings. Despite 
appearances, Modze"iewski is a Communist trained in Russia; he thoroughly 
understands the Soviet Union ' s  policy toward conquered nations, and he 
feels no scruples in carrying it out. 115 
SECTION 3--Jerzy Michalowski 
Jerzy Michalowski came from a family of the Polish small gentry . 
He was a graduate of the Warsaw Law School and became an active, but 
not prominent, member of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) before World 
War II. He had served on the editorial staff of the Institute for 
Social Research in Warsaw and had participated in the prewar Socialist 
cooperative movements. I)Jring the war he served as an officer of the 
Polish Army in a German prison camp. As the Preparatory Commission of 
the United Nations Security Council convened in London in November, 
1945, Michalowski served as a counsellor to Modzelewski and the Polish 
embassy.6 
5Rakowski, ££• cit., p .  112. 
6Alexander w. Rudzinski ,  Inside Polish Postwar Diplomacy (New York: 
Mid-European Studies Center of_ the National Committee for a Free Europe, 
1953) , P• 49. 
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SECTION- 4--Josef Winiewicz 
Josef Winiewicz was born in the western provinces of Poland and 
like much of the populace of this area, held strong anti-German prejudices. 
These convictions brought him .. into close contact with the Soviet-organized 
Polish Committee in Lublin. Winiewicz was a Rightist journalist prior 
to World War II , who supported the Polish regime of Marshall Rydz-Smigly 
and the Ozon Government Party. During the war Winiewicz acted as Director · 
of the Bureau of Preparatory Studies for the Peace Conference , an agency 
of the Polish government-in-exile in London . He was a strong advocate 
of the Oder-Neisse boundary and published several articles concerning 
this subject and other matters relating to Polish-German affairs. His 
anti-German feelings made Winiewicz very popular with the Soviets, who 
also sought to establish the Oder-Neisse line as the Polish border. 
General Wladyslaw Sikorsk i .  who was head of the Polish government-in-
exile at this time , did not agree with Winiewicz's statements concerning 
the Polish-German frontier issue. Sikorski felt that Polish territory 
should not be so greatly extended to the west, still hoping that the 
Soviet Union would not continue to maintain her own boundaries in the 
eastern Polish provinces .  The recurring dispute finally forced a 
complete split between Winiewicz and the Polish government-in-exile.? 
Like Michalowski, Winiewicz accompanied the Polish delegation to 
London as a counsellor to Modzelewski during the first meetings of the 
United Nations Security Counci l  in London . He later came to New York 
7 Ibid . ,  PP• 23-24. 
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as a counsellor to the Polish delegation to the United Nations.a In 
1947 Winiewicz was named Polish Ambassador to the United States, replacing 
Oscar Lange who had been appointed permanent Polish representative to the 
United Nations. 
Rudzinski describes Winiewicz in this not so complimentary manner: 
Winiewicz as Ambassador of a Communist Poland is a fantastic joke to 
everyone who knowa his background. Of an intelligence not much surpassing 
the average level ,  very self-controlled and rather phl@�matic, of easy 
manners, he is the kind of man trying very hard and with some . success 
to persuade himself that what is going on in Poland is +ight after a l l  
and consistent with basic Polish interests. The German danger i s  the 
main psychological motive enabling Winiewicz to try to justify before 
his own conscience the necessity of supporting the present Warsaw govern-
ment."9 
SECTION S�Hilary Mine 
Hilary Mine, a professional economist, came from a Polish family of 
Jewish origin. 'Refore World War II he was an insignificant employee of 
the Central Statistical Office in Warsaw. He joined the Polish Communist 
Party before the war and rec�tved special Party training in Moscow as the 
war ravaged. Mine participated in the Lublin Committee during the war 
. as; Minister of° Industry and in the postwar Polish Provisional Government 
Stearbook 2£. the United Nations, �-47 ,  (Lake Success: Department 
of Public Information , 1947) , p. 952. 
9. Rudzinski ,  .21? •  .£!!. ,  PP• 24-25. 
of National Unity.10 During the Second Part of the First Session of the 
United Nations he was a Polish delegate to the United Nations General 
A5sembly, while continuing as the Polish Minister of Industry. 
In 1947, Mine returned to Poland to become Prime Minister and 
virtual r economic dictator. Rakowski says of Mine: "He merely carries 
out obediently the Soviet directives i� regard to economic life. 
Extremely proud arid conceited, Mine is difficult to get along with, and 
is generally disliked even in Communist circles .1111 
SECTION 6--Jozef Olszewski 
Jozef Olszewski was a Communist Party member before World War II.  
He had served several terms in Polish prisons prior to the war as a 
political criminal .  As the hostilities erupted in Poland, Olsz.ewski 
122 
escaped to the Soviet Union. In 1944, he was appointed secretary of the 
Polish embassy in Moscow, during Modzelewski ' s  ambassadorship. In 1946 
Olszewski was selected to become the head of the Political Department 
of the Polish Ministry of Fo.reign Affairs.12 While serving in this capacity 
he was chosen to be one of the Polish delegates to the United Nations 
General Assembly during the Second Part of the First Session. In February, 
1948, Olszewski, having become unacceptable to the Communist leadership, 
was removed from the Polish Foreign Ministry and was sent to Poznan as 
10 . " Rakowski , 
llRakowski, 
.22• cit. , 
ll?• ci..t. '  
12xbid. ' pp. 115-116. 
p • 99. 
p. 100. 
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Communist Party district secretary, a position of little real significance. 13 
SECTION 7� Igpacy Zlotowski 
Little is known of Ignacy Zlotowski's  activities prior to the estal>-
lishment of the Polish Provisional Government of Nation&l Unity in 1945 . 
His first offici�l position was in 1945 in New York Ci�y as a member of 
of a relief and rehabilitation committee conducting research for some 
Polish universities and scientific institutions. In 1946 he became a 
counsellor to the Polish embassy in Washington; this �ppointment occurred 
shortly after Oscfir Lange had been reassigned from hi� post as Polish 
.. 
Ambassador to the United States to permanent Polish d�legate to the United 
Nations. Zlotows�i was soon transferred to the Uniteq Nations as Lange' s  
deputy in the At�ic Energy Commission. However, Zlotowski was returned 
to Poland in 1948 after critical newspaper reports were released implicating 
him in espionage activities concerning American scientists' advances and 
experimentation with atomic energy. 14 
SECTION 8--Juliusz Katz-Suchy 
Another important figure in the Polish delegation to the United Nations 
during the first few years was Juliusz Katz-Suchy. Even though Katz�Suchy' s  
appointment to replace Oscar Lange as Permanent Polish Delegate to the 
United Nations on January 1, 1948, had a definite influence on subsequent 
Polish voting in the United Nations, Katz-Suchy was not completely unknown 
14Rudzinski,  .21!• cit. ,  pp. 86-87. 
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in international politics. He had been a member of the Polish delegation 
to the General Assembly during every session since 1946, as adviser, 
alternate delegate, and temporary Security Council delegate. 
Katz-Suchy was born to a family of small merchants in Sanok, Poland, 
in the Carpathian Mountains of Galacia, on January 28, 1912. He joined 
the Communist Party at about fifteen years of age while still a student 
in the Gymnasium. He was later removed from the University of Lwow Law 
School for organizing strikes and circulating Communist propaganda, 15 nit· 
finally attended the University of Cracow and the University of Warsaw, 
earning his Ph. D .  in 1932. In 1933 he began a career in journalism by 
contributing to several reviews on economics, foreign affairs, and social 
problems. By 1938 Katz-Suchy' s writings had become unforgivably hostile 
to the prewar Polish regime, resulting in his imprisonment as a political 
criminal. After nine months in prison, hqwever, he was released and 
forced into exile in Prague, Czechoslovakia.16 When Hitler invaded 
C!.Zechoslovakia in 1939, Katz-Suchy managed to escape to England with 
the aid of the British consulate. During the early part of World War 
II he worked as a laborer in a British textile factory, later becoming 
foreman in a tool factory. During these years he published a left wing 
magazine meant for Polish refugees in England, outlining his plans to 
15 Ruth Karpf, "The Big Brain From Poland ," United Nations World, III 
(May, 1949) , P• 60-62. 
16 current Biography, �' Anna Rothe, ed. (New York: H. w. Wilson 
Company, 1951),  P• 322. 
organize forces to instigate a Communist take-over of several English 
factories. 17 
In July, 1944, when the Soviet-organized Polish Committee of National 
Liberation moved from Moscow to Lublin, Katz-Suchy was named dupty chief 
of the London bureau of Polpress, the official news agency of the Lublin 
Committee. In July, 1945, after the Big Three had withdrawn diplomatic 
recognition from the Polish government-in-exile in London and recognized 
the newly-organized Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in 
Warsaw, Katz-Suchy was appointed press attache of the Polish embassy in 
London. 18 In 1946 Katz-Suchy became counsellor of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and adviser to the Polish delegation to the United Nations. From 
this time his life was so thoroughly interwined in Polish foreign relations 
in the United Nations that the story has been incorporated into the body 
of the preceding paper. 
SECTION 9�0scar Lange 
Oscar Lange , being the key personality within the United Nations 
delegation during 1946 and 1947, has been discussed recurrently in this 
paper; the following information concerns Lange' s  life before World War 
II and after his service in the United Nations. Lange was born on July 
27, 1904 , in Tomaszow, Poland, the only son of a textile manufacturer. 
He attended the University of Posen in 1922-1923, then spent the next 
ten years working and studying at the University of Cracow , where he 
17Rudzinski , 22• £.it. ,  pp. 10-11. 
18 Current Biography, �' 22• .£!!. ,  p. 323. 
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earned an LL.M. in 1926, an LL.D. in 1928 and in 1931 became an instructor 
of economics and statistics. As a student he had joined the Socialist 
Students Organization and later became an active member of the educational 
committee of the Polish Socialist Party. Always active in the labor move-
ment, Lange had been a member of the Ministry of Labor .in the prewar Polish 
government. 19 
In 1932 Lange came to the United States on a Rockefeller Fellowship 
and studied at Hqrvard , the University of Minnesota, and in 1936, lectured 
on economics at the University of Michigan. In 1937 he returned to Poland, 
only to come back to the United States the fall of that same year, with 
intentions of becoming an American citizen. The University of California 
and Stanford University were his first lecturing assignments upon his 
return to the Un�ted States. In 1938 Lange received a permanent appoint-
ment as assistan� professor at the University of Chicago where he became 
a full professor· in 1943. In the same yeur he became a naturalized 
American citizen. Lange' s  activities from 1943 to 1948 are well known 
and quite controversial, and need not be discussed here. Frank Gibney says 
that "by 1948 he (Lange) had discovered that it was far easier to be a 
sophisticated Marxist' at the University of Chicago than it was in Warsaw.020 
19 
Current Biograp�, �' Anna Rothe , ed. (New York: H .  w. Wilson 
Company, 1947) , P• 322. 
20 
Frank Gibney , The Frozen Revolution--Poland: � Study in Communist 
Decay (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy , 1959) , p. 237. 
In January , 1948, upon his replacement in the United Nations by 
Juliusz Katz-Suchy , Lange returned to Warsaw. Rudzinski says that Katz-
Suchy had misled Lange by suggesting that he might become· Prime Minister 
' 
of Poland upon nis return. Lange also had plans to org�ize the Socialist 
Parties of Europ� into an international force to fight �ne Soviets for 
Polish independe�ce� However, Lange was not allowed to leave Poland after 
!-
his attendance at the General Assembly in Paris in ea�lY 1948, until he 
was readmitted info the Polish government by Wladyslaw Gomulka in 1956. 21 
Lange incredibly .managed to survive the 1948 to 1956 strict Stalinist 
period in Poland, and in 1956 "when the winds had noticeably shifted he 
'again revealed h�mself as an active libera1 .1122 
When Gomul�a came to power . in Poland in 1956, Lange who had not 
been active in Polish politics since 1948, was called back into the 
government service. Lange later became Gomulka' s Deputy Premier and 
chief econ�mic planner, as chairman of the economic council of the · 
Polish cabinet.23 Lange was again allowed to suggest some degree of 
Polish autonomy in such statements as this: "Although the Soviet Union 
used central planning as its basic method of economic coordination, other 
socialist countries might differ from one another as to the character of 
the produc �n� units, the degree of their centralization, and the relative 
2 1  
Rudzinski, £1?.• cit . ,  pp. 40-41. 
22 
Gibney, £1?.• �., p. 238. 
23 
The New � Times, 4 October 1965 , p. 4 .  
importanc� of planning and of the market.1124 Lange, "a 1930 vintage 
parlor pink who dislikes Communist excesses (especially when he had to 
participate) �t who managed to survive , "25 died on October 4 ,  1965, in 
London still a powerful and respected leader of Communist Poland. 
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Having a special interest in socialist economic theory and economic 
fluctuation , Lange published numerous works in this academic field: On 
the Economic Theory � Socialism, 1938; The Rate of Interest and � 
Optimum Propensity to Consume, 1938; Economic Mobilization, 1940; The 
Foundations .2f Welfare Economics ,  1942; � Theory .2f the Multiplier, 
1944; The Working Principles of the Soviet Economy, 1944; and Price 
Flexibility � Employment, 1944. 26 
24Richard Hiscocks ,  Poland Bridqe for � Abyss7 � Interpretation 
of Developments in �-War Poland (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) , 
PP• 123-124. 
25 
Gibney, .2E• cit . ,  p. 77. 
26 
Current Biography, 1946, 2E· cit . ,  p. 323. 
ANNEX II 
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
DOCUMENT NO. 1 ,  �GREEMENT BETWEEN THE U. S .  S .  R .  AND TH� POLISH 
GOVERNMENT, JULY 30, 1941• 
1. The Goverrunenf of the u. s .  s. R. recognizes the Soviet-German 
, ,  
treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes i n  Poland as having lost their 
validity. The Polish Goverrunent declares Poland is not �nd by any 
agreement with any third power which is directed against tne u. s .  s .  R .  
2 . Diplomatic relations will be restored between the t�o goverrunents ·� 
upon the signing of this agreement, and an immediate exch�ge of Ambassadors 
will be arranged. 
3 .  & 4 .  The Govepllt\ent of the u .  s .  s .  R. expresses its consent to 
: 
the formation on ter�itory of the u. s .  s .  R .  of a Polish Army under a 
commander appointed py the Polish Goverrunent in agreement with the Soviet 
Government. 
s • • • •  
• • • 
The Soviet Government grants amnesty to all Polish citizens 
now detained on Soviet territory either as prisoners of war or on other 
sufficient ground s ,  as from the resumption of diplomatic relations. 
•International Conciliation, Document No. 39, No. 386 ( January, 1943 ) , 
77-78. 
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DOCUMENT NO. 2 ,  POLISH-RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL 
• 
AID, DECEMBER S ,  1941 . 
1. German Hitlerite imperialism is the worst enemy of mankind and 
no compromise is possible with it. Both governments, together with 
Great Britain and other States and with the support of the United States, 
will conduct the war until complete victory and the final defeat of the 
German bandits. 
' 
2. In accordance with the agreement signed on July 309 1941, both 
governments, as long as the war lasts, will give each other full military 
assistance. Also the forces of the Polish Republic statiqned in territory 
of the Soviet Union will conduct war against the German robbers hand-in-
hand with the Soviet forces. In peace-time their mutual relations will 
be based on friendship, cooperation and the carrying out of obligations 
undertaken. 
3. Once the war has been brought to a victorious conclusion and the 
Hitler criminals duly punished, the task of the Allied Governments will 
be to establish a just peace. This can only be achieved by new organiza­
tion of international relations based on the association of democratic 
States in union. Such an organization to be a decisive factor must have 
• 
78. 
International Cocciliation, Document No. 40, No. 386 (January, 1943) ,  
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respect for international law and be supported by the armed forces of all 
the Allied Governments . Only under such conditions can Europe be re­
established and the defeat of the German barbarians achieved ; only thus 
can it be guaranteed that the catastrophe caused by Hitlerites shall never 
repeat itself. 
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OOCUMENT NO. 3 ,  N<Jl'E HANDED TO EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, SEcRETARY OP' 
STATE, BY THE POLISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STA'J;ES, JAN 
CIECHANOWSKI, ON BEHALF OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENt IN LONDON, 
ON THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, MARCH 12, 1945 
The Honorable 
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. 
Secretary of State. 
Acting on instructions of my Government, I have the honor to bring 
the following to your attention: 
l. The Polish Government learned through the press and radio on 
March 5th, 1945, that the United States Govenunent, acting on its own 
behalf and on behalf of Great Britain, China and the u. s. s. R . ,  
sent ou t  invitations to thirty-nine States to take part i n  a Conference 
of the United Nations , convened on April 25th, 1945 , at San Francisco, 
for the purpose of preparing a general international organization for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. 
The Polish Government notes that i t  has not received an invitation 
to take part in this Conference, despite the fact that i t  is one of 
the original signatories of the United Nations Declaration of January 
1st, 1942. 
2 .  Considering that the Polish nation was first to take u p  arms 
against Gennan aggression on September 1st, 1939, and that from that 
• 
United Nations Review, V (March 15, 1945) , 99-100. 
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day up to the present moment it incessantly continues to fight in Poland 
and abroad on lan d ,  on sea and in the air; considering also that, in 
thus carrying on the fight in defense of ideals, the Polish nation 
having fought longest has sustained in proportion to its possibilities 
greater sacrifices in human lives and property than any other nation; 
considering further that the war which started for Poland has created 
among the free nations of the world that feeling of solidarity which 
gradually led to the concept and the creation of the United Nations; 
and, finally, considering that at San Francisco the United Nations are 
13� 
to work out a permanent world organization of peace for the purpose of 
making aggression impossible in the future, and , that such an organiza­
tion should be based on the respect of laws and of the sovereign equality 
of peace-loving nations--the Polish Government, as the only legal and 
independent representative of the Polish state, most emphatically and 
insistently asserts its inalienable right to take part in the world 
conference on security and most categorically protests against being 
omitted in the invitations to the said conference. 
3. The Polish Government begs t o  state that the fact that Poland ,  
whose constitutional President and Government are recognized by all 
United Nations as well as by all neutral nations with the exception 
of one power only, is not invited to the Conference at San Francisco-­
is the first disturbing example of the application of the right of 
veto on the part of the Big Powers exercised by them even before the 
United Nations have agreed .t o and carried out the suggestions to be 
submitted to them relating to the future establishment of a world 
security organization. 
4. The Polish Government has already presented some preliminary 
amendments to the proposals prepared at Dumbarton Oaks and intends fully 
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to participate in the working out of an international security organization. 
Under the circumstance , the Polish Government is deprived of the possibility 
of presenting at the Confernece its final views both in relation to the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals and to the proposal respecting the voting procedure 
in the Security Council formulated at the Crimea Conference. 
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. 
�. Ciechanowski 
DOCUMENT NO. 4 ,  APPEAL OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL UNITY TO THE SAN 
FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, JUNE 7,  1945• 
At present it can be revealed that on April 25, 1945, the Council 
of National Unity (Poland ' s  Underground Parliament) sent to the members 
of the San Francisco Conference a note, addressed to Secretary of 
State Edward R. Stettinius J r . ,  in which it represented concisely the 
wishes and desires of the Polish nation. 
Assuming that its blood shed in this war and its steadfast loyalty 
to the noblest ideals of humanity established Poland' s rights to indepen-
dence and sovereignty, the Council of National Unity expressed the 
belief that the United Nations , negotiating in San Francisco would not 
pass over in silence the tragedy of Poland , which for six long years 
has been fighting for the ideals of humanity, of freedom and of real 
democracy . 
The Council of National Unity stressed that being in the Polish 
Underground Parliament, consisting of repres .ntatives of exclusively 
democratic parties, speaks on behalf of the whole Polish nation united 
in its general attitude. A t  this occasion, it is necessary to remind 
history of the creation and the �evelopment of democratic political 
representation of Poland, during the six years of criminal occupation • 
• 
� Poli·sh Review (PIA) , V (June, 21, 1945 ) ,  2. 
13.5 
At the beginning of the German occupation three great Polish 
political parties: the Polish Socialist Party, the Peasant Party and 
the National Party created , together with the Labor Party, a political 
intermediary committee which later called itself the Home Country 
Political Representation of the Polish Nation. The above-mentioned 
four parties committed themselves to close collaborati9n, and resolved 
I 
upon a common program in the basic structural and social problems, 
an expression which was given in the declaration of A�gust 15, 1943. 
In January, 1944, in the place of the political representation 
of the home country, the Council of National Unity was appointed; 
three other democratic groups, headed by the Democratic Party, joined 
this recently created Council of National Unity. 
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The Council of National Unity was the genuine und�rground parliament 
of Poland, fighting against the Germans. 
After the expulsion of the Germans, conditions which existed in 
the home country did not permit the parties of the Council of National 
Unity to reveal their activities. Among the fifteen Polish democratic 
leaders arrested March 28th are many members of the Council of National 
Unity, together with its Socialist leader Kazimierz Puzak . In the place 
of the arrested, the parties have delegated new representatives .  The 
Council of National Unity still exists. 
�ziennik Polski, official organ of Polish Government, London. 
' ' DOCUMENT NO. 5 ,  AMERICAN CHARGt D AFFAIRES, GERALD KEITH' S,  NOTE 
TO THE POLISH FOREIGN OFFICE, NOVEMBER 22, 1946 , - CONCERNING 
AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE COMING POLISH ELECTIONS• 
Excellency: 
I have been instructed to inform you that my Government has taken 
note of the announcement that the Polish Government of National Unity 
has fixed January 19, 1947, as the date on which genera� elections will 
be held in Poland. In this connection, my Government recalls that 
Ambassador Lane' s note of April 24, 1946, stated that in accordance 
with the Potsdam Agreement of August 2 ,  1945, which provided that elections 
would be held as soon as possible, elections would take place this year. 
Although my Government is surprised that the Polish Government would 
fail ,  without explanation, to fulfill this formal assurartce, its chief 
concern is not with any particular date but with the discharge of its 
responsibility under the decisions taken at the Crimea and Potsdam 
conferences with respect to the holding of free elections in Poland. 
The importance which the United States Government attaches to the 
carrying out of these decisions has repeatedly been brought to the 
attention of the Polish Government. In his note of August 19, 1946, 
to which no reply has been received, Ambassador Lane outlined certain 
•Journal .2!. Central European Affairs, VI (January , 1971) , 404. 
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f>:Oints w11lch the United States Government considers essential for the 
carrying out of free elections. In view of the disturbing reports 
which it has received concerning the preparations for the elections, 
my Government has instructed me again to inform Your Excellency that 
the Government of the United States expects that equal rights and 
facilities in the forthcoming election campaigns and in the elections 
themselves will be accorded to all democratic and anti-Nazi parties 
in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. My Government could not 
<,lherwlse regard the terms of the Yalta and Potsdam decisions as 
having been fulfilled. 
Gerald Keith, American Charg'e d' Affaires 
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DOCUMENT NO. 6 ,  UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT APPEAL TO THE ijRITISH 
AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON AND TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN QFFICE 
IN MOSCOW, JANUARY S ,  1947• 
. . 
Excellency: 
The Government of the United States as a signatory of the Yalta 
and Potsdam agreements, with particular regard to those sections of 
the two agreements which deal with the establishment of a representative 
Goverrunent in Poland through the instrumentality o� free and unfettered 
elections, wishes me to inform you of the concern with which it views 
the pre-election activities of the Polish Provisional Government of 
National Unity. My Government is especially perturbed by the increasingly 
frequent reports of repressive measures which the Polish Provisional 
Government has seen fit to employ against those democratic elements in 
Poland which have not aligned themselves with the "bloc" parties. 
According to information reaching my Government from various 
authoritative sources ,  these repressive activities on the part of the 
Provisional Government have now increased in intensity to the point 
where, if they do not cease immediately, there is little likelihood 
that elections can be held in accordance with the terms of the· 
• Journal £f Central European Affairs, VI (January 1947) , 405. 
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Potsdam agreement which call for free and unfettered elections 
"on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all 
democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part 
and put forward candidates ." 
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DOCUMENT NO. 7 ,  NarE TO THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTRY FROM UNITED 
STATES AMBASSADOR ARTHUR BLISS LANE• 
Excellency: 
I have the honor to refer to the Embassy ' s  notes of August 19 
and November 22, 1946, regarding the .Polish national elections, to 
which no reply has yet been received, and pursuant to instructions 
from my Goverrunent to inform Your Excellency, as a signatory of the 
Yalta and Potsdam agreements, with particular regard to those sections · 
of the two agreements which deal with the establishment of a govern-
ment in Poland, through the instrumentality of free and unfettered 
elections, of my Governmen t ' s  continued concern over the pre-election 
activities of the Polish Government of National Unity. 
My Government is especially perturbed by the increasingly 
frequent reports of repressive measures which the Polish Provisional 
Goverrunent has seen fit to employ against those democratic elements 
in Poland which have not aligned themselves with the "bloc" parties. 
It is a source of regret to my Government that its previous efforts 
to call the attention of the Polish Provisional Government to its 
failure to perform its obligations under the agreements cited have 
not resulted in any change in the course which that Government has 
•Journal of Central European Affairs, VI (January, 1947) , 407-408. 
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pursued in connection with pre-election political activities . 
According to information reaching my Government from various 
authoritative sources ,  these repressive activities on the part of the 
Provisional Government have now increased in intensity to the point 
where , if they do not cease immediately, there is little likelihood 
that elections can be held in accordance with the terms of the 
Potsdam Agreement which call for free and unfettered elections "on 
the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all 
democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part 
. 
and put forward candidates." 
It is the view of my Government that this matter involves the 
sanctity of international agreements, a principle upon which depends 
the establishment and maintenance of peace and the reign of justice 
under law. 
The obligations with respect to the Polish elections which my 
Government assumed at Yalta and reiterated at Potsdam, together with 
the Soviet and British Governments, and the obligations subsequently 
assumed by the Polish Government and frequently reiterated, provide 
for the cond�ct of free and unfettered elections of the type and in 
the manner described above. 
The fact that the subject matter of these agreements related to 
elections in Poland i s  incidental. The essential fact is that they 
constitute an international agreement under which all four nations 
concerned have assumed obligations. 
I need hardly say that my Government is interested only in seeing 
that the Polish people have the opportunity to participate in a free 
and unfettered election and that my Government does not regard the 
results of such an election as being a proper concern of anyone other 
than the Polish people themselves. 
My Government would be failing in its duty if it did not again 
point out that the continuation of the present policy of suppression, 
coercion and intimidation as applied to political opposition in 
. ' 
Poland constitutes a violation of the letter as well as the spirit of 
the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. 
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IXX:UMENT NO. 8 ,  STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONCERNING 
THE POLISH ELECTIONS, JANUARY 28 ,  1947• 
On January 19 a general election was held in Poland, the results of 
which are to be announced shortly. 
The United States Government has followed the developments leading 
up to this event in accordance with the commitments it accepted at 
the Yalta and Potsdam conferences .  O n  numerous occasions it has expressed 
its concern over the course of events in Poland which increasingly 
indicated that the election would not be conducted in such manner as 
to allow a free expression of the will of the Polish people. 
On August 19 and November 22, 1946, formal notes were addressed 
to the Polish Government on this subject. 
On January 5 this Government brought the situation in Poland to 
the attention of the British and Soviet Governments and expressed the 
hope that those Governments would associate themselves with the Govern-
ment of the United States in an approach to the Polish Provisional 
Government of National Unity. This proposal was rejected by the 
Soviet Government. 
On January 9 this Goverrunent delivered a further note to the 
Polish Provisional Government which stated among other things that 
if the repressive activities on the part of the Provisional Government 
•Journal of Central European Affairs, VI (Januray 1947) , 409-410. 
did not cease invnediately, there was little likelihood that elections 
could be held in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam agreement. 
The British Government has also protested to the Polish Provisional 
Government the violation of its election pledges. 
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The reports received from the United States Embassy in Poland in 
the period immediately prior to the elections as well as its subsequent 
reports based upon the observations of Ame�ican officials who visited 
a number of Polish voting centers confirmed the fears which this 
Government had expressed that the election would not be free. 
These reports were corroborated by the general tenor of the dis­
patches from foreign correspondents in Poland. 
It is clear that the Provisional Government did not confine itself 
to the suppression of the so-called "underground" but employed wide­
spread measures of coercion and intimidation against democratic elements 
which were loyal to Poland although not partisans of the Government 
"bloc ." 
In these circumstances the United States Government cannot consider 
that the provisions of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements have been 
fulfilled. 
The United States Government has made it clear that it has no 
desire to intervene in the internal affairs of Poland. By virture 
of the responsibility which devolved upon it as one of the principal 
powers engaged in liberating the countries of Europe from Nazi occupation, 
it undertook, together with the British and Soviet Governments, to 
secure for the long-suffering Polish people the opportunity to select 
a Government of their own choosing. It was in connection with this 
undertaking that this Government agreed to the decisions respecting 
Poland that were taken at the Yalta conference, including the decision 
to recognize the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. 
These decisions with respect to Poland, which were accepted by 
the Polish Provisional Government in their entirety, formed part of a 
series of agreements between the United States, British and Soviet 
Governments. The United States Government considers that the Polish 
Provisional Government has failed to carry out its solemn pledges. 
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The United States Government firmly intends to maintain its 
interest in the welfare of the Polish people. While retaining full 
liberty of action to determine its future attitude toward the Government 
of Poland, this Government will continue to keep itself informed of 
developments in Poland through its diplomatic mission in Warsaw. 
DOCUMENT NO. 9 ,  SPEECH BY WINCENTY RZ'lMOWSKI IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 
JANUARY 16, 1946• 
Before defining Poland ' s  attitude towards the historic tasks of 
the United Nations. I would like to ask permission to perform the 
duty entrusted to me by our provisional Parliament at its last 
meeting in Warsaw. 
"The Polish nation, represented by its National Council ,  greets 
the delegates of all the peace-loving nations. 
"At this crucial .moment in the history of mankind, we greet you,. 
Gentlemen, as brothers, on behalf of twenty-three million living Poles 
and also on behalf of six million Polish citizens murdered or slain 
in battle. 
"We who were the first to stand against the Hitlerite invasion, 
who made countless sacrifices, who know the essence of Fascism thcoug� 
and through, we have paid dearly for this knowledge , but thereby we 
have earned the right �o speak with authority on the problems of war 
and Facism and on the danger these problems represent for the whole 
world. 
•official Records .2f. �First � of the First Session of General 
Assembly, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly-Verbatim Record­
Januray 10, February 14, 1946, Tenth Plenary Meeting, January 16, 1946, 
(Central Hall, Westminster, London: United Nations Publications , 1946) , 
152-158. 
"To you, the representatives of the United Nations, we address 
this appeal: 
''Henceforward, let there be no more war, no more sufferance for 
the seeds of Fascism, no more irresponsible playing with the ·fire 
which, but for the joint victory of the Allies, would have destroyed 
human civilization. Never again must we repeat the mistakes of the 
past. 
"The Polish nation firmly believes that the United Nations can and 
will become the factor which will guarantee the peaceful progress and 
prosperity of mankind. It will do so on condition that all peace­
loving nations remain united in their action and base themselves on 
the harmonious collaboration of the three great Powers, and provided 
they concentrate their efforts on the prevention of aggression and on 
securing the prompt reconstruction of the war-ravaged countries. 
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"The Polish p.ation assures the representatives of the United 
Nations that Poland will take her place in the forefront of the builders 
of peace and prosperity. 
"Within her new frontiers, Poland, independent and democratic, 
is an indispensable factor of European and world peace. Harmonious 
international collaboration and understanding are necessary conditions 
for the security and well-being of our martyred country. 
"In addressing to-day its best wishes to this great Assembly which 
has become the world ' s  focal point, the Polish nation believes that, 
by our combined efforts, we shall banish the terror of war and Fascism, 
and that friendship and brotherly collaboration among the nations will 
become a lasting reality." 
That is how our provisional Parliament concludes its appeal to 
the United Nations. 
I should now like to state the Polish delegations position with 
regard to the problems of an enduring peace. 
Never before have the intentions and decisions of Governments 
been of such importance; never have the nations bound up their destinies 
to such an extent �ith that of a single institution. 
We are faced with this alternative: either to destroy the plans for 
a better world and allow the forces of destruction to be unleashe� , ; ·thus 
hurling mankind into chaos ; or else, notwithstanding the difficulties, 
to prepare in common for a better future. 
Already the nations have spontaneously found a way out of this 
dilemma: they wish to live in peace , to work , to recover. Entrusted 
with a great mission�to give effect to the goodwil l  of the nations--we 
are advancing along the difficult path that leads to its achievement. 
We shall accomplish our task�we who voice the sentiments of the peoples, 
who think as they do, who speak their language . 
Many questions divide us, but others, still more numerous, unite 
us. What are racial or national differences, contrasting levels of 
civilization or culture , different ways of life, cqntrary interests, 
past ills, lack of confidence , or even dissimilar systems of govern-
ment, compared with the community of man and the unity of effort to 
attain our distant goals, with ever increasing international co-
operation and interdependence? 
i 
How trivial are these differences compared with all that would 
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await us in the event of another wart How unimportant these divergencies 
and difficulties at a period when man is becoming the dominant factor 
in shaping history, when social, economic and international relations are 
more and more the product of the constant will of the masses and of their 
leadersl 
We are passing from the age of chaotic events in history to that 
of its conscious moulding. The essential bases and conditions of this 
new era already exist; they have been created by economic and social 
progress. To-day we are capable of rationalizing the life of man and 
even the turning-points of history, just as we rationalize economic 
processes. We have the power to lower the cost price of progress in 
the history of future times , just as we are already lowering the cost 
of production of material goods . 
We are able to form a picture of the future we want, and provided 
it is based on the laws of progress, we can make it a reality. We can 
achieve this, as experience has shown, by building up a social and 
economic system on a planned basis, and by organizing international 
relations--the purpose for which the United Nations exists. It must 
be said that, at the present stage of historical development, systems 
of government tend more and more to become a means of attaining a 
definite aim: the welfare of the community. We can try to achieve 
this,  not through revolution and bloodshed, but through deliberate 
and planned reconstruction; not by force of arms , but by ideological 
and political efforts. Are not the latest transformations of the 
European countries sufficient proof of this1 
Social conditions have undergone fundamental changes in many 
parts of the world. The sources of imperialistic wars, I venture to 
say it openly, have gone. War is no longer a necessity; it is no 
longer a manifestation of life; on the contrary, it now spells 
destruction. What is more, international collaboration, the building 
of the worlds future by joint and consclous effort, has become a 
vital necessity. 
This is the result of historical advancement ,  as well as the 
raison d ' �tre of our Organization and the real basis of its future 
success. That is why it seems to us that the call of our nations is 
not a voice crying in the wilderness. We must answer this call. It 
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would be a crime against humanity to allow the nations to endanger their 
own existence �ither through lack of understanding or through the fault 
of their leaders . 
We maintain that peace--lasting peace�is possible in the world 
of to-day. Will this possibility materialize? We are convinced it 
will, provided certain conditions are fulfilled. 
Here are a few of the main stipulations: 
1 .  The complete extermination of Fascism and the triumph of 
true democracy. 
2. Intensified collaboration between the great Powers, the 
democratization of international relations and the indivisibility 
of peace. 
3 .  Prompt international action to adjust cultural levels in 
all countries and speed up the rate of social, economic, and intel• ". 
lectual advancement throughout the world. 
What Fascism · is , would be superfluous to say here. We wish to 
stress just one of its characteristics which must awaken a deep . ' 
loathing in every human being. The essence of Fascism is its; ibestialt�y 
in the relationship between man and man: out-and-out barbarism. You 
have been made familiar with the manifestations of Fascism by news­
paper stories, films, photographs of Oswiecim, Belsen and Majdanek , 
the Nuremberg trials, and Dachau. But, fortunately, the majority 
of you the United Nations, have escaped direct contact with Hitlerism. 
We the peoples of continental Europe, know what it is from personal 
experience, from the ordeal of five years of occupation. You have 
heard about the gas chambers and the crematorium ovens; our kith and 
kin were burnt in them. As we walk through the ruins of Warsaw, we 
trample the sacred remains of our brothers and si�ters, whereas your 
dead have found decent burial in places of . public worship. Your sons 
perished as soldiers in glorious battle. Many of ours perished under 
torture, stripped of that which is most sublime in man: human dignity. 
Believe me, it is not death that is horrible, but the torture 
that goes before , inflicted by Nazi butchers; the fact that man is 
stripped of his humanity, that he must die like a brute beast simply 
because he lived and fought like a hero. 
The great Allied leader, General Eisenhower, said, when he visited 
the ruins of Warsaw, that he would like to show this monument of German 
barbarity to every American soldier, because then they would realize 
the purpose of their efforts, the purpose of the sacrifices made by 
the American people. 
How we wish that each member of this great Assembly could visit 
our martyred landl Then they would witness the degree of suffering 
and misfortune wrought by Fascism, and would understand our attitude 
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towards it. They would support our demands that the work of justice 
be completed, the seeds of Fascism destroyed. 
Although its military might has been smashed , Fascism is not 
extinct. It st!ll lives. It lives on in the form of latent seeds 
among a reaction�ry minority; in social classes opposed to progress. 
It lives on in conceptions of racial ascendancy fosterep by Hitlerism; 
in post-war demoralization and decadence; in the machinations of great 
trusts and cartels, It has spread throughout the world, lurking in 
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nooks and crannies, lying in ambush and biding its time; waiting for the 
war to be forgotten; waiting for increased antagonism and a revival of 
the influence of private interests and group egoism over the policy of . 
the various Governments. 
�· 
We experienced a similar state of affairs after the first world 
war. It led to the . industrial rebuilding of Germany, rashly financed 
by foreign capital, because Hitlerism was backed by the moneyed German 
capitalist classes, and because other countries tolerated Germany' s  
aggressive policy and allowed her to re-arm. And so we had a second 
world war. 
That is why we voice our determination never again to fall into 
the errors of the past. Let us put forth our best efforts to destroy 
the conscious and unconscious seeds of Fascism, even if they be well 
disguised. Let us deprive them of the right of santuary in certain 
countries; let us control the activities of the German trusts and 
cartels. Let us do all in our power to instill,in our peoples faith 
in a better future towards which, with their help, the world will 
go forward along a smoother path. 
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This path is that of true democracy of a political, social, 
economic and intellectual democracy. The idea of such a democracy 
has just been born. Its essence is beginning to take shape. It is 
not surprising that there should be so many differences ,  and even · 
discrepancies, between our conceptions in this respect, but this will 
not be allowed to hamper our common efforts. We all have some far-
' 
off vision of universal happiness towards which we are striving. . .· 
Such happi�ess lies not in material prosperity alone. Freedom 
for the nation and for the individual, an untrammelled spiritual life, 
opportunities for the development of creative powers, respect for human 
dignity of peoples in international relations, the impregnation of 
daily life with great and high ideals all these are almost as important 
as the material factors. 
Some of us go boldly forward towards this future , with definite 
aims in mind, realizing the path we must follow and the methods by 
which these aims can be achieved, mobilizing all our strength, making 
an almost superhuman effort. Others allow themselves to be carried 
forward by technical, economic and scientific progress, by the spon-
taneous evolution of history, husbanding their muscles and nerves, 
sacrificing less generously the effort of this present generation for 
the happiness .of generations to come • . 
Through these two channels, controlled by the great nations, 
modern life flows on. To-day, the two currents are strange to one 
another, aloof and sometimes hostile. Let us not be discouraged 
or dismayed . Life obliges us to harness and control the blind forces, 
to keep them in check . The activities of the United Nations will 
hasten this process. The goodwill of the great nations and their 
leaders will place it on a sound and lasting basis. 
That is whf we remain convinced that collaboration between the 
great powers--no�withstanding certain appearances--will be intensi-
fied and that its blessings will spread to every sphere of life 
throughout the globe. We realize the importance of such collaboration. 
To it the nation of Europe owe their liberation from the yoke of 
Hitlerism. Thanks to it, the peoples will be delivered from the 
...... 
dread of war and, it may well be from fear of want. Even to-day-
notwithstanding great and understandable difficulties the fruits of 
this life-giving collaboration are already manifest. 
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The threat of civil war in Euro� has been eliminated. National 
coalition governments are being formed practically all over the continent; 
our countries are beginning to raise themselves from their ruins; an 
atmosphere of peaceful toil and confidence prevails. These are the 
first-fruits of your collaboration, great nations of the worldl You 
have won the war, and you will win the peace. 
Ravaged and decimated as we are, we shall help you with all the 
strength of our hands, hearts and brains, just as we helped you by 
our sacrifices in the war against Hitler. The greater our responsi-
bility, the more we shall help you. 
This depends primarily on our own creative powers, but it also 
depends on your attitude towards us. It would not be to our benefit 
or yours nor would it help world progress, if your strength were to 
diminish our responsibility. To achieve its destiny, the human race 
must mobilize all its forces and reject all impediments. 
We must concentrate on one thing only: to create a collective 
psychology, so that we may look to a conunon future and not brood over 
the differences�sometimes even the hostility�of the past, so that 
we may follow our guiding star. 
To-day�as has been stressed by the British Prime Minister, Hr. 
Attlee�each nation ' s  destiny is bound up with the destiny of the family 
of nations, just as the destiny of each individual is bound up with 
that of the community. 
It will be the task of the coming era to bridge the gap between 
the individual and the community to form a synthesis and ensure that 
the highest values for the individual are social values. Just as the 
principle of indivisible peace has already taken root in our minds, 
so the principle of indivisible world happiness is establishing it­
self in the consciousness of the nations and their leaders. 
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To-day these are no longer mere ethical maxims. They are realities. 
If we desire consciously to shape the course of history, we must know 
the laws by which it is governed and help to fulfil them by our joint 
efforts. 
Such, in our view, are the guiding principles which must preside 
over the work of the Economic and Social Council. Its task is to 
establish the most suitable concrete forms of international collaboration 
with a view to economic, social and intellectual reconstruction and progress 
in the devastated countries. 
Collaboration, we maintain, is not charity. Considered thus, the 
tremendous sacrifices which the great nations are making to help the 
impoverished and ravaged countries are not only a noble demonstration 
of human solidarity, but a w�se and far-sighted contribution to future 
world peace and prosperity . We welcome these sacrifices not only with 
our hearts but with our minds. 
In making this statement on behalf of martyred Poland, now risen 
again, we would stress that the United Nations, in its �ork for the 
stabi lization of peace and international collaboration, will have the 
lasting and energetic support of the Polish people. 
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DOCUMENT NO. 10, POLAND' S  FOREIGN POLICY, OR. OSCAR LANGE, POLISH 
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES• 
The foreign policy of the Republic of Poland is inspired by two 
objectives. One is the preservation of peace, the other is the 
preservation of Poland ' s  national independence. Both objectives are 
closely interrelated. A people in Poland ' s  geographical position can 
survive as a free and truly independent nation only in a world at 
peace. On the other hand, the peace of the world cannot be maintained 
without a free and independent Poland. Under no circumstances will 
the Polish people give up their national independence, a fact amply 
demonstrated by the whole course of Polish history. Whoever has seen 
the ruins of Warsaw, whoever visualizes the fact that six million 
people in Poland have given their lives during this war must know 
about the Polish people ' s· readiness and ability to resist, 1"t he will 
also understand why the preservation of peace is the cornerstone of 
Poland' s  foreign policy. 
The Polish Provisional Government of National Unity believes 
that the preservation of peace depends upon good and friendly cooperation 
between the great powers, between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, as - well as between each of these and Great Britain and France. 
•Poland .2f Today, I (March, 1946) , 4-5. 
It desires, therefore , to f�ci litate such cooperation by removing 
Poland from any situation which may make her a center of international 
trouble. This policy is the exact opposite of the policy pursued by 
the former government-in-exile. The government-in-exile sought to · 
create conflict between the Western powers and the Soviet Union and 
speculated upon a new world war. The present Polish Government 
' 
believes that any major international conflict can only be harmful to 
the Polish people and may endanger the very existence of the Polish 
nation. 
In order to promote the cause of international peace and coopera-
tion Poland allies herself with the democratic and progressive forces 
throughout the world. She demands the isolation and removal of all 
Fascist centers which have survived the military defeat of the Axis 
and she participates and plays an active role in the international 
bodies which have been created by the United Nations. Poland has 
signed the Bretton Woods agreements and will participate in the 
International Morletary. Fund and in ·the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development. Poland has joined the United Nations 
Organization and has been elected to serve for two years in the 
Security Council .  This election constitutes international 
recognition of the important place , both economic and political, which 
Poland occupies in Europe. At the meetings of the Security Council, 
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the Polish delegate pursued a consistent policy of promoting understanding 
and adjustment between conflicting interests. 
The preservation of Poland ' s  national independence requires a 
prevention 'of any possible resurgence of German imperialism. 
The problem of Germany must be solved in such a way that Germany can 
never become a menace to her neighbors , whatever the relation between 
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the great powers. This necessitates complete destruction of Germany' s 
war making capacity and eradication of the social roots of German 
imperialism. In both directions Poland has made a notable contribution. 
The acquisition by Poland of the whole of Silesia deprives Germany of a 
major part of her war potential. The expropriation by the Polish Govern­
ment of the German industrial barons of Silesia strikes at one of the 
foundations of German inperialism. The acquisition by Poland of East 
Prussia and of Pomerania, the expropriation of the Junker estates and the 
division of these estates among Polish peasants, destroys the social 
breeding-ground of Prussian militarism. This effect is reinforced by 
the agrarian reforms carried out by the Soviet authorities in the part 
of Germany occupied by the Red Army . German feudal barons will no 
longer be able to subjugate Slav peasants and to turn them into serfs. 
In order to prevent a new resurgence of German imperialism Poland 
has also entered into a military alliance with the Soviet Union. Further­
more , she pursues a policy of friendly cooperation with
.
Czechoslovakia 
and with other Slav nations . The alliance with the Soviet Union is a 
direct consequence of the fact that the absence of such an alliance in 
1939 made impossible any effective defense of Poland by her Western 
Allies and that Poland owes her liberation in 1945 to the Red Army. 
Poland and the Soviet Union both distinguish clearly between the role 
of an ally and that of a satellite. Poland is not, and will never 
consent to be, a satellite of any power, near or distant. The Polish­
Soviet alliance is based on cooperation between free and equal partners. 
The policy of preventing a new resurgence of German imperialism does 
not rely upon alliance with the Soviet Union alone. Poland wants to 
maintain her alliance with Great Britain and desires to enter into an 
alliance with France . The necessity of supplementing the Polish-Soviet 
alliance with the Polish-British and a Polish-French alliance is clearly 
recognized by the government of the Soviet Union. Views to that effect 
have been expressed on several occasions by Generalissimo Stalin. 
In order to play her role of a truly independent nation, an ally 
of her neighbors and of more distant countries, Poland needs a proper 
geographical and economic . basis. Such a basis is provided by the land 
transferred to the Polish administration under the Potsdam agreement. 
The final international recognition of this territory as an integral 
part of the Polish Republic is regarded by the Polish people as a 
vital neces�ity for their national independence. On this question all 
Poles are perfectly unanimous, whatever other differences there may be 
among them on questions of internal or foreign policy. 
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The policy of a network of alliances between Poland and the Soviet 
Union and between Poland and the countries of Western Europe makes the 
Polish Government and people strongly opposed to any idea of a Western 
Block in Europe. Such a Western Block as preached by some people in 
France and in Great Britain ,  is but another form of a cordon sanitaire 
directed against the Soviet Union. Furthermore , in order to be effective, 
such a block must result in re-establishing Germany as a political and 
military power to serve as the outpost of anti-Soviet policy. Thus it 
endangers the peace of Europe. Another consequence would be the emergence 
of an Eastern Block under the guidance of the Societ Union. Frequent 
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misunderstandings to the contrary, such an Eastern Block does not exist. 
Neither Poland, nor Czecholsovakia, nor the Soviet Union desire it. Polish 
policy stands for economic and political cooperation of all European 
countries. It rejects, however, all plans of unification of Europe in 
which the Soviet Union does not participate. Such plans imply the 
restoration of German hegemony over Europe. The only sound unification 
of Europe is one in close cooperation with the Soviet Union as well as 
with Great Britain and the United States. 
Relations between Poland and the United States are based on a 
conunon interest in peace and " in · economic .and social, progress. 'The Polish 
people are fully aware of the great role the American armed forces have 
played in the defeat of the Axis and they are desirous to maintain the 
most freindly relations with the United States. In addition to being 
based on a community of democratic ideals, these relations should be 
cemented by close economic relations. The acquisition by Poland of . 
new industrial regions as well as of a large Baltic coast, will make 
her a major maritime nation. This opens new possibilities for Polish­
American trade . Poland realizes that American participation in interna­
tional security is essential for the effective preservation of peace. 
Poland , therefore , greets with great satisfaction the participation of 
the United States in the United Nations Organization. In expression of 
the great importance it attaches to this participation, the Polish 
delegation at the UNO Preparatory Conference has voted that the United 
Nations Organization have its seat in the United States of America. 
(Signed) Oscar Lange 
DOCUMENT NO • . 11,  LETTER DATED APRIL 8 ,  1946, FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE 
OF POLAND ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GEN�RAL• 
( 
I should like to inform you that I have received �q�tructions 
from my Government to draw the attention of the Securit¥ Council to a 
·.-
situation of the nature referred to in Article 34 of the Charter. 
This situation is due to international frictions resulting �rorn the 
existence and activities of the Franco regime in Spain . 
In view of .the fact that information about it has already appeared 
in press dispatches from Warsaw, I want to inform you that in the 
very next day I shall present you with a request to put this matter 
on the agenda of the Security Council .  
(Signed) Oscar �ange 
Ambassador of Ptjland 
•security Council-Official Records, First 1ear: First Series, 1946, 
Supplements, No. 2 ,  Annex Ja, (Church House, Westm.inster, London : United 
Nations Publications , 1946) 1 54. 
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DCX:UMENT NO. 12, LETTER DATED APRIL 9, 1946, FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE 
OF POLAND ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL• 
On February 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations without 
a dissenting vote condemned the fascist regime in Spain as having been 
founded "with the support of the Axis Powers" and banned it from member-
ship in the United Nations · on the grounds that "it does not possess by 
reason of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association 
with aggressor States the qualifications necessary to justify admission." 
The Assembly also recommended that the United Nations take this resolution 
into account "in conducting their future relations with Spain."' 
Since then a series of developments has made it clear that the 
activities of the Franco Government have already caused international 
friction and endangered international peace and security. As a consequence 
the French Government was compelled on February 2691946, to close the 
frontiers between France and Spain. These frontiers continue to be closed. ·· 
One day later the Franco Government ordered the concentration of troops 
at the border of France. 
Moreover, the Franco regime has given haven to the largest aggregation 
of Nazi assets and personnel, it has given refuge to a large number of war 
• 
Security Council-Official Records, First Year: First Series, 1946, 
Supplements, No. 2 ,  Annex 3b, (ahurch House, Westminster, London: United 
Nations Publications, 1946) , s. 
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criminals and Nazi leaders who continue their activities from Spanish 
territory , it allows and promotes scientific research by German scientist 
engaged in devising new means of warfare. 
In view of the foregoing, the situation in Spain must be considered 
not as an internal affair of that country but as a concern of all the 
United Nations. Article 2 of the Charter in paragraph' 6 provides that 
the United Nations Organization shall ensure that States not Members 
of the United Nations act in accordance with · principles of the Organiza-
tion so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. The situation in Spain makes the application of 
this provision imperative . 
The Polish delegation, therefore , under Articles 34 and 35 of the 
Charter, requests the Security Council to place on its agenda the 
situation arising from the existence and activities of the Franco 
regime in Spain for consideration and for adoption of such measures as 
are provided for in the Cl)arter. 
(Signed) Oscar Lange 
Representative of Poland 
DOCUMENT NO. 13, ADDITIONAL REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF 
POLAND TO THE REPORT OF THE SU&"COMMITTEE ON INCIDENTS IN THE 
CORFU CHANNEL• 
I .  Considering that the main aim of the Sub-Committee of the 
Security Council on the Incidents in the Corfu Channel was to "examine 
all the available evidence concerning the above mentioned incidents, 
and to make a report to the Security Council • • •  on the facts of the 
case as disclosed by such evidence", the Polish representative asked 
at various meetings of the Sub-Committee that certain facts established 
during the proceedings of the Sub-Committee which are relevant to the 
question under consideration should form the main part of the report, 
and thus enable all the members of the Security Council to draw certain 
conclusions and to form an opinion on the basic questions. 
II. It was agreed by the Sub-Committee that the problem under 
consideration could not be solved before the three following questions 
were answered: 
Ca) Whether explosions on October 22, 1946, caused lose of life 
and damage to ships of the Royal Navy when sailing in the Corfu Channel ;  
(b) Whethe� a minefield existed i n  the Channel on October 2 2 ,  1946, 
and whether this minefield was unnotified; and 
•security Council-Official Records, Second Year, Supplement No. 10, 
Appendix I ,  ( Lake Success, New York: United Nations Publications, 1947) , 
83-87. 
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(c) Whether this minefield was laid by Albania or with the 
connivance of the Albanian Government. 
In the opinion of the Polish representative, the proceedings before 
the Security Council and the Sub-Committee confirmed only the first 
question, while no evidence exists on the remaining two questions. 
III. During the proceedings of the Sub-Corrunittee .a certain 
number of �acts directly relating to the problem have been established. 
I 
Both in the draft report prepared by 
; 
the Secretariat and in that prepared 
by the chairman of the Sub-Committee, a list of the above-mentioned facts 
has been included. In both cases, the Polish representative was prepared 
to accept the reports as a basis for the report of the Sub-Conunittee, 
subject to certain minor changes he would propose. The Polish representative 
was prepar:ed to dispense with any conclusions ·if such were imp.lied in the 
proposed list of facts, and agreed to include in the report any facts any 
other representative might ·consider relevant to the basic problem. 
IV. In the opinion of the Polish representative, the report as 
accepted at the meeting of the Sub-Committee on March 12,  1947t · .does· ·not 
represent a report "on the facts of the case" , and therefore does not 
fulfil the task set forth by the Security ·Councif for the Sub-Committee. 
The Polish representative had no objections to the main parts of the 
report; however, he could not accept it as such and reserved for himself 
the right to submit an additional report on the facts established during 
the proceedings of the Sub-Committee. 
V. In the opinion of the Polish representative , the following 
facts · established on the basis of evidence should be taken into con-
sideration by the Security Council ,  when pronouncing itself on the two 
qUestions: 
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(a) Whether a minefield existed in the Corfu Channel on October 2 2 ,  
1946, and 
(b) Whether this minefield was laid by Albania or with the connivance 
of the Albanian Government. · 
A .  Facts relating to the situation prior t o  the explosion 
1 .  The existence of a German minefield CPS directly in the vicinity 
of the explosion and the question whether the incident could have been 
caused by floating mined or mines remaining from a previously swept field. 
2. General Hodgson , chief of the British Military Mission in Albania, 
in a note addressed to the General Staff of the Albanian National Army 
on January 2 5 ,  1945, said that even the channels of navigation declared 
open were not safe and ships navigating in them did so at their own risk. 
3 .  On May 29, 1946, the Government of the United Kingdom received the 
text of a note which . the United States representative had received from 
the Albanian Chief of Staff warning the authorities concerned that vessels 
must not sail in Albanian territorial waters without notification. 
B. Facts relating to the situation in the channe l during explosions 
4 .  The heavy Bri tish cruisers passed through the alleged rather dense 
minefield without being damaged, whi le lighter ships struck the mines. 
5 .  A west wind of 15 to 20 miles per hour was blowing the ships 
toward the Albanian shore .-
6 .  The first explosion occurred at 14.53, while the second explosion 
occurred at 16.16. The difference is nearly one hour and a quarter , 
during which time the vessels had been maneuvering in the alleged mine­
field without being struck by mines. 
c. Facts relating to the situation i n  the channel after the explosion 
7. On October 2 9 ,  1946, three UNRRA barges passed through the alleged 
minefield undamaged. 
8 .  No explosion occurred during the operations of the British Navy 
in the Channel on November 1 2 ,  prior to the minesweeping . 
o .  Facts relating to the minesweeping on November 13 
9 .  The Mediterranean Zone Board agreed to ask the Central Board to 
request the concurrence of the Albanian Government for a check sweep of 
those parts of the Medri routes which passed- through Albanian territorial 
waters . 
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10. The Central Mine Clearance Board had decided that the clearance 
of mines from the Corfu Channel should be carried out only after the 
approval of the Albanian Government had been obtained. 
1 1 .  The British and Greek representatives rejected the Yugoslav and 
Soviet proposal that Albania should be invited to participate in mine 
clearance of her coastal waters. 
12. The responsibility for the minesweeping of the Corfu Channel was 
laid by the Mediterranean Zone Board upon Greece but the Commander of the 
British Naval Forces unilaterally ordered Greek forces to undertake other 
tasks than those assigned by the Board. 
13. The French naval officer, Commander Mestre, who was present as an 
observer during the minesweeping on November 14, was invited by the British 
Command without the knowledge of the Mediterranean Mine Clearance Board, 
and without its authorization. 
14. The statement of the Albanian representative allowed a possibility 
that mines could have been laid under cover of darkness without the know­
ledge of the Albanian coastal authorities. 
15.  No evidence exists that the fragments of the mines which caused 
the explosions on October 2 2 ,  1946, are identical with the mines found 
during operations of November 13, 1946. 
16. All the mines found on November 13, .were brand-new and could have 
been in the water less than two months . 
17. Exhibit VIII presented by the representative of the United 
Kingdom shows that the mine' nearest to the Albanian shore, allegedly 
found on November 13, was 525 yards from the shore, while the British 
statement places the mine only 300 yeards from the shore. 
18. Actual laying of mines requires about fifteen minutes for eight 
mines from one mine-laying vessel. 
19. On February 20, 1947, Lloyd' s  listed that forty-five ships were 
sunk by mines and sixty-four had been damaged since the end of hostilities. 
In addition, eight-six small vessels under 500 gross tons were sunk and 
thirty-one were damaged. 
VI. The Polish representative stated at various meetings of the 
Sub-Committee that no evidence is available as to the existence of the 
minefield on November 13 , 1946. There is only a British statement in 
this respect, and as the United Kingdom is a party to the dispute this 
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statement cannot be accepted as evidence. 
VII. The Polish representative held the opinion that the statement 
of Convnander Mestre cannot be taken into consideration as evidence as 
it contains several contradictions. Commander Mestre states that the 
result of the sweeping on November 13, 1946, was twenty-two mines, but 
he indicates that he only saw eight mines during the first and second 
lap. In his statement of November 16, he says �hat two mines were 
brought ashore , one of which he examined, while the other could not 
be examined because of the darkness. On November 23, he states that 
"owing to the difficulty of getting ashore before nightfall I was not 
able to examine them personally on shore ." On November 16, Commander 
Mestre described the mines as German mines of the type GR, while on 
November 23, the mine shown to him in Malta he described as a German 
mine type GY which is much larger in diameter and differs so much in 
shape from the GR type that the fact that the mines were submerged in 
water does no� justify the error, especially as on November 16, Commander 
Mestre stated that he examined one mine on the shores of Corfu . Commander 
Mestre' s  report does not give any location of the mines or of the mine­
sweeping operation except for the description of a general character 
that the operation took place in the Corfu Channe l .  
VIII. At various meetings of the Sub-Committee the Polish 
representative pointed out that, although many of the British allegations 
and Albanian counter-allegations have no direct bearing on the answer to 
the basic questions, they should be taken into consideration for the 
purpose of understanding the whole atmosphere of the mutual relations · 
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between the United Kingdom and Albania, which in his opinion was responsible 
for allowing this question to develop into a dispu�e before the Security 
Council. 
DOCUMENT NO. 14, JULIUSZ KATZ-SUCHY ' S  LAST SPEECH IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL, DECEMBER 30, 1947• 
The end of the year is the traditional time for looking back over 
the record of accomplished work . For the Polish delegation, this date 
also marks the end of its term as a non-permanent member of the Security 
Council and I should therefore like to review briefly its position during 
the two years of its membership in this principal o�gan of the United 
Nations. 
It was a great privilege indeed, and at the same time a great 
responsibility, to be elected by the United Nations during its first 
General Assembly as a member of the Security Council. No doubt those 
who wanted to see Poland represented on the Security Council took into 
consideration the role Poland played during the war, its sufferings 
during the period of German occupation and the great contribution of the 
Polish nation which fought in accordance with our best historic tradi-
tions on all the fronts�in the air, on the seas, on land and in the 
underground. 
The Polish delegation has always considered that it represented on 
the Security Council not only itself, or even the regional group from 
•security Council-Official Records, Second Year, No. 108, 225th 
Meeting , December 30, 1947, (Lake Success, New York: United Nations 
Publications, 1947) , 5-11. 
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which i t  has been chosen , but all the United Nations. 
Its attitude in all problems which were brought before the Council 
was dictated, therefore , not only by its own national interests. Its 
primary consideration was given to the interests of peace and security. 
It has always acted in accordance with the letter and spirit of the 
Charter . It has always considered as its paramount duty to serve the 
fundamental interests of the United Nations . and not the interests of 
one country or of a group of countries. This principle has guided it 
during its two years of work in the Security Council, as well as in 
every other organ of the United Nations on which it was represented . 
The war against fascism has taught us that peace is indivisible 
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and collective; and that wherever it is threatened, the security, the 
peace and the freedom of our people are equally endangered . To every 
Pole, therefore , the United Nations, representing the universal interest 
in the maintenance of peace and security, represents at the same time 
the primary and principal interest of the Polish nation. The war has 
taught us that only by a common effort of all nations, small and large, 
can we maintain and guarantee the peace. 
At the same time, we have learned that the role in maintaining 
the peace varies, and that much more responsibility in this matter is 
to be assumed by the big Powers . This is a lesson of life which we 
learned at the gravest hour of our nation, much stronger than any theory 
invented in a school or in a laboratory . It was our desire, therefore , 
to continue this new form of international collaboration, born in our 
conunom fight against the enemy of humanity and embodied in the structure 
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of the United Nations, in the special position of the Security Council 
and of the permanent members of the Council. 
We accepted the fact that at the very basis of the Organization of 
the United Nations lies the principle of understanding and compromise. 
This is the only way the United Nations can work and achieve its purposes. 
Whenever possible, therefore, my delegation has attempted to bring about 
such compromise and understanding and it was one of those which always� 
although often in vain�called for understanding . 
I must confess that the realization of the existing disagreements 
is by no means gratifying . We understand , however, that this cannot 
be ascribed to the special position the five permanent members enjoy. 
We have opposed the clamour and propaganda of those who th�ght that 
by abolishing these special rights they can improve the entire Organization. 
We fully understand that we are living in a transitional period when the 
effects of the war are still in process of liquidation and when the 
differences and disputes between the major Allies are much greater than 
at the time when we were faced with one great problem--victory over the 
I 
enemy. / 
My Government believes, however, that agreement on all the controversial 
issues is not only possible but most essential. The preliminary require-
ment for such an agreement, which might become the foundation of harmonious 
co-operation, is -a proper understanding of the differences in approach to 
various international problems . Every effort must be made to lessen these 
differences in the approach to various problems by having mutual respect 
and by constantly bearing in mind the final goal of all of us�peace. 
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Only by working together can we win the peace as we have won the war. 
The Polish delegation spoRe in the Security Council for those 
countries which wished to see this collaboration maintained , strengthened 
and extended. We based our conception of international collaboration 
on the principles of law, justice and national sovereigrty, rejecting 
violence, force <Pld any form of pressure. We rejected: also the alleged 
solidarity which resembles the solidarity between the :porse and the rider. 
Our will for peac� is dictated not by weakness, but by pur moral strength. 
We wanted the united Nations., and the Security Council in particular, to 
be organs of harmonious co-operation for the maintenance of peace and 
general prosperity. It is not the fault of the Polish delegation that 
many of these ai�s have not been achieved and many a problem has remained 
unsettled. 
Considering that fascist centres, if allowed to continue, may become 
a source of political complications and endanger the peace, the Polish dele­
gation submitted to the Security Council and later to the General Assembly 
a proposal to extinguish the centres of fascist unrest and aggression in 
Spain and thus to bring to an end the regime brought about by the war 
which Germany and Italy waged against the Spanish people. We found, 
however, with regret, that a bloc of nations, contrary to their own 
interests and acting against the will of the majority, has made im-
possible even the simple re-affirmation of the resolution of the General 
Assembly of December 12, 1946. 
It was not Poland which supported the monarcho-f ascist regime of 
terror and civil war in Greece. We have consistently tried, along with 
all the nations which defend the cause of peace and security, to 
liquidate that centre of civil war which constitutes a great danger 
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to south-eastern Europe . We opposed those who, in spite of the unanimous 
resolution that no foreign aid should be used for political purposes ,  
went on pouring cµins, ammunition and money to keep the fires of civil 
war burning, notwithstanding the fact that at the same time most war­
stricken nations of Europe were being refused economic aid for re­
construction, aid which is due to them, and that the refusal was 
motivated by purely political reasons. 
We strongly advocated the withdrawal of foreign troops from the 
territory of war-torn Greece and demanded that the Greek nation, which 
has a glorious tradition of fighting for freedom, should be allowed 
the right of self-government according to its own will, without foreign 
intervention. 
Bearing in mind the General Assembly' s  resolution of December 14t 
1946, we demanded , in conformity with the principles of sovereign 
equality of nations, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Greece, 
from Indonesia, from Egypt and from Palestine. 
Poland demanded an effective disarmament and an effective control 
of weapons of mass destruction. Having started disarmament in our own 
country, we submitted plans both for disarmament of conventional 
weapons and for control of atomic energy. Instead, we find that no 
progress has been made, that atomic bombs are being manufactured and 
stockpiled, that experiments with new weapons are being continued and 
that a threat of bacteriological war is becoming real. We wanted to 
end the war of nerves which was started on August s ,  1945, by the blast 
in Hiroshima and which since has been fought in the hearts and minds 
of the conunon people of the world. We wanted to see the warmongers 
branded and outlawed and mutual confidence installed in their place, 
because what is lacking most in our work is mutual confidence. 
All these set-backs, however, have not undermined the confidence 
of our people in the United Nations. We continue to stand firmly on 
the principles of the Charter which we have signed and we fight for 
the sanctity of all treaties and agreements which have been concluded •. 
In the framework of our foreign policy we shall continue to 
participate actively in the solution of all international problems 
and shall not confine ourselves to the role of spectators. We shall 
vigorously attempt to influence the course of events and, acting in 
conformity with our right to national existe�ce, we shall fight to re­
strain aggression and to bring about a consolidation of all constructive 
forces for peace. We shall try to steer the course of national feelings 
and world economy on the road to peace and to strengthen the dearly 
bought independence and sovereignty of the nations of &urope. We shall 
try to consolidate the efforts of all Member States in order to assure 
the economic reconstruction of the world and to bring a.bout a gene�al 
prosperity based on new economic foundations. It is another lesson of 
this past war that not only peace and war are indivisible--prosperity 
is indivisible as well. 
There is no return to a Europe of the past. The economic and 
political structure of that Europe was the cause of the war. We note 
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with regret the attempt to eliminate dictinctions between aggressors 
and victims, between those who supported the aggressor under the cover 
of neutrality and those who carried the heavy burden of the war to the 
very end. 
New criteria are being put forward and from them derive the claims 
for help and reconstruction of Germany at a time when her victims are 
being barred from most needed commodities. History teaches that the 
economic hegemony of Germany has always resulted in political hegemony 
and that both have then created the war machinery which in time was 
let loose. 
If it is possible today, on this side of the A tlanti.ci:·,. � to· Jthinlc': 
of war, I say that to my people, who twice in one generation have seen 
world war and occ:Upation, 1 to the men and women · of Warsaw who are being 
denied mechanical tools and with their bare hands are removing the 
rubble from the streets of Warsaw, the very thought of war is beyond 
the realm of possiblity. That is why we say that there is no return 
to a Germany which may become a centre for future aggression. 
In the coming year the Security Council will be faced with many 
difficult problems which will require speedy solution. The war in 
Indonesia is still being fought, Franco is still oppressing the people 
of Spain, foreign troops are maintained in many countries and the 
majority of the people of Greece are still forced to tolerate a Govern­
ment imposed upon them. 
The peoples of the world ex{>ect from the Security Council that 
in the next year it should bring about real disarmanent and solve all 
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the problems of int�rnational collaboration and the problem of placing . 
an international police force at the disposal of the Security Council. 
My Government is watching with great anxiety the developments in 
Palestine which may require the intervention of the Security Counci l .  
I may assure members that even from outside the Security Council 
we shall continue to watch their efforts with the greatest of interest, 
and we pledge here again our full support of all new decisions which 
may lead to the realization of the aims of the Charter, because peace 
in our time and for future generations depends upon it. 
On his way to the Congress of the Socialist Party, the chief 
repre ·sentative of Poland, Mr. Oscar Lange, whose name will always be 
associated with Poland ' s  work in the United Nations during its first 
two years of existence , sent to us the following letter addressed to 
the members of the Security Council, which , with the permission of 
the President, I shall now read: 
'Ir regret very much that urgent political business at home 
prevents me from participating personally in this meeting of the 
Security Counci l ,  which is the last attended by the representative of 
Poland. I should like, however, to take this occasion to express my 
words of appreciation for the freindly co-operation shown to me by 
all my colleagues · and by those with whom I have been associated during 
the two years of Poland ' s  term - in the Security Council. It was a great 
honour for my country to have been entrusted with the high office of 
membership in the Security Council. To me, personally, it has been a 
great privilege to be associated with and to be a colleague of all of you. 
ttAs the representative of a non-permanent member of the ·security 
Council, elected by the General Assembly , the representative of Poland 
has always considered himself as a mandatary of all the United Nations, 
a mandatary entrusted with the responsibility for international peace 
and security. It is this responsibility which shou ld take precedence 
over any narrow nationalist or special interest. I have tried to live 
up ot it according to the best of my conscience and wisdom. It is not 
for me to judge to what extent I have been successfu l .  
"As the representative of a non-permanent member of the Security 
Council, the representative of Poland has always been conscious of the 
special role entrusted by the Charter to the permanent members. This 
role, which resu lts from fundamental facts of history which none of us 
can change , imposes on the permanent members a special duty , the duty 
of seeking agreement and conciliation, the duty of refraining from 
using this Council or any other organ of the United Nations as a means 
for organizing groups of countries or world opinion against any of the 
Powers. 
ttThe representative of Poland has made every effort to promote 
agreement among the members of the Security Council, particularly ·· 
among the permanent members. Such efforts were made by Mr. Modzelewski 
in connexion with the Greek question during the sessions in London . 
Such efforts were made by myself, or by my colleague , Mr. Katz-Suchy , 
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in connexion with the questions of Iran, Spain and Greece , in connexion 
With the problems of admissions to membership of disarmament and atomic 
energy , of the armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security 
Council and many others. Some of the efforts were successful, others 
were not, but we are not discouraged because we firmly believe in the 
future of the United Nations and in the special role entrusted to the 
Security Council within the framework of our Organization. As firm 
supporters of the United Nations, we have done everything in our power 
to maintain the authority of the Security Council, for example, in the 
cases of Indonesia and Egypt. For the same reason we advocated rapid 
and radical disarmament, a position which my Government continues to 
uphold. 
. "I should like to convey my greetings· to the new members of the 
Security Council. I wish thE?¥ will stay in my memory. The personal 
assibilities which, by the wish of the General Assembly, have been 
assigned to them. 
"For me personally, the time spent as a member of the Security 
Council will always remain one of the most valuable periods of my 
life. The debates we have had and all those who participated in them 
will stay in my memory. The personal associations formed will, I hope, 
continue. For this reason I refrain from taking leave of my friends 
assembled at this table. Instead, I wish them all a happy New Year; 
a year of successful work for the benefit of the United Nations." 
(Signed) Oscar Lange 
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I have been acting with the Polish delegation in various capacities 
during the past year and a half. The time I have been associated with 
the Security Council I shall always consider as the most important 
period of my . life. It was a great honour and privilege to be allowed 
to be associated with its members, to learn statesmanship from all of 
them and to represent Poland in the Security Council. 
With the end of the year, let me wish all the members of the 
Security Council personally, to their Governments and to the people 
they represent, every happiness and success in their work . 
I should like to convey my greetings to the new members of the 
Security Council. My special greetings go to the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic which , in accordance with the principle of equitable 
geographical distribution , and in spite of the ill effects of those 
who wanted to see it barred, is taking Poland' s  place on the Security 
Counci l .  
Le t  me once more express my thanks for the help I have been given 
here by all the members of the Secutity Council and their delegations, 
by the Secretary-General, Mr. Trygve Lie, by the Assistant Secretary­
General, Mr. Sobolev, and by all the members of the Secretariat and 
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the Press who, in their various capacities, have made our work possible. 
To all of you then go rrry best wishes at this solemn moment. 
(Signed) Juliusz Katz-Suchy 
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